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Statement of Problem. Art currently maintains a 
~recarious status within Western society. This can be 
attributed to the fact that the lay-public, in general, 
does not understand what is precisely meant by the term 
"art," nor do they possess the cognitive and perceptual 
abilities necessary to under£tand the art of today. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study, was an attempt 
at establishing a justification for including art criticism 
as instructional course content in institutions of higher 
education in the United States. 
Sources of Data. Data from aesthetic theory, art 
education, ancl anthropological investigation were utilized. 
The major contributors in aesthetics included Ducasse, Saw, 
Smith, and TeJera. Those from art education were Kaufman, 
Knobler, McFee, Munro, and Pappas. Those from anthropology 
were Mead and lloebel. 
Methods and Procedures: The study was conducted 
utilizing three 111ajor premises; (1) that there is a lack 
of understanding and acceptance of the visual arts by the 
greater mass of Western society; (2) it is thoroughly impos-
sible to involve students in individual works of art before-
there is a preliminary, thorough resolution of their doubts 
regarding the nature and validity of art in general; and (3) 
that there is meaning to be found in forms of art, which are 
at present, beyond the understanding of the merely interested 
individual. 
In an attempt to verify these premises, art was con-
ceived as having cognitive subject matter. This necessitated 
a precise and operable definition of art; its scope and func-
tion, as in the initial three chapters. This, in turn, 
resulted in research regarding this subject matter, and those 
elements in Western society which directly influence its 
being understood and comprehended. 
Major Findings. It was discovered that (1) a lack of 
continuity exists between art and technology, art and one's 
environment, and the art of the ~ast in relation to that of 
present day; (2) the average layman does not have the 
ability to "deal" with the works of art without the assis-
tance of an informed, third party; (3) the art curriculum 
of institutions of higher education contribute to this 
social milieu, by its continuance as a polarized curriculum. 
Conclusions. Four major conclusions were resultant 
from this study; (1) the term "visual art" should be used , 
instead of "art " alone, when r eferring to the disciplines 
of painting , drawing , sculpture , and architecture; (2) the 
art curriculum of colleges and universities should be 
restructured , and integrate courses that wou ld describe 
the ramifications of the visual arts in today's world, as 
proposed by Silverman and Lanier; (3) the general education 
curriculum should be replaced with a new "core curriculum;" 
and (4) college and university art departments should seek 
a structural relationship between the components of produc-
tion and history by including aesthetic criticism into the 
curriculum content. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis project, as it was conceived in a 
discussion between Dr. Bill Booth, Dr. Roger Jones, and 
myself, was for the purpose of establishing a justifica-
tion for including art criticism/as instructional course 
content in institutions of higher education in the United 
States. This directive was kept in mind, albeit in some 
loosely constructed fashion, as the research proceeded. 
However, as so often happens in an activity as stimulating 
as research, there was, to an extent, a departure from 
the original plan; some ideas were altered, unexpected 
research was undertaken and new ideas were generated. 
The resultant product may differ slightly from what was 
intended, but it does abide by the "spirit" of the original 
concept. 
The primary sources of data were single-volume 
works collected from the Johnson-Camden Library, Morehead 
State University; and the Library of Congress, Washington, 
D. C. Many delimitations were encountered during the 
processes of research and investigation. The initial 
delimiting factor was that of time. The relatively short 
period of one school year, (two semesters), was allowed 
for the research, organization, and completion of this 
particular thesis. In lieu of this, there are probably 
many sources of data that would have contributed to both 
ii 
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the content and structure of this work that have been 
overlooked. Also, there was extreme difficulty in locating 
single-volume works at the University library that pertained 
to art criticism and aesthetics per se. Many works were 
listed in the card catalog, but upon extensive search, 
it was learned that numerous works had been "misplaced." 
The major delimitation, however, was the lack of contem-
porary research conducted in the area of art education. 
As an example, the last Art Education Yearbook was pub-
lished in 1965. The theoretical framework of the thesis 
was conducted utilizing three major premises; (1) there 
is a lack of understanding and acceptance of the visual 
arts by the greater mass of western society; (2) it is 
impossible to thoroughly involve students in individual 
works of art before there is a preliminary, thorough 
resolution of their doubts about the nature and validity 
of art in general; and (3) there is meaning to be found 
in forms of art which, are at present, beyond the under-
standing of the merely interested individual. These 
premises constitute the underlying hypothesis that works 
of art require an informed, perceptive, and responsive 
observer if the work itself is to be understood and 
appreciated. 
In an attempt to verify these premises, art was 
conceived as an entity, therefore containing specific 
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subject matter. Ascertaining the nature of this subject 
matter necessitated a premise and operable definition of 
art, its scope and function, as in the initial three 
chapters. Thi.s, in turn, led to research in regard to 
the understanding of the subject matter of art, and those 
elements within Western society which directly influence 
such understanding. This area of research was most pro-
fibable. It was discovered that those elements which 
influence the understanding of art, in turn affect the 
status of art within our society. 
From this research sequence, it was discovered 
that art holds a precarious status within Western society; 
that a lack of continuity exists between art and technology, 
art and one's environment, and the art of the past in rela-
tion to that of present day. Also, it was discovered 
that the average layman does not have the ability to 
"deal" with works of art without the assistance of a 
third party, who will tell him what to look at, why he 
should look at it, and what it should mean. Finally, it 
was found that the art curriculum of institutions of 
higher education has contributed to this social milieu. 
It continues to be a polarized curriculum, with studio 
art courses at one end of the pole and art history at the 
other end. 
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Chapter 1 
WHAT IS "ART?" 
Origin of Terms "Fine Arts" and "Beaux Arts" 
The English term "fine art" is a product of the 
eighteenth century. The Oxford Dictionary states that it was 
originally used in the plural as a translation of the French 
"beaux-arts," and that "fine" as an adjective meaning "beauti-
ful" is often used as equivalent to "beau." "Fine art," then, 
means in plural, the arts which are concerned with "the beau-
tiful," or which appeal to the faculty of taste; in the widest 
use including poetry, eloquence, music, etc., but often applied 
in a more restricted sense to the arts of design, as painting, 
sculpture, and architecture. The English concept of "fine 
arts" can be traced back a considerable distance, to somewhat 
similar meanings under different English names, such as, 
"polite," "elegant," and "voluptuary" arts. Under any name, 
however, this idea was rare in England until the late eight-
eenth century. The main stem of its ancestry goes back rather 
to France and Italy. 
The term "beaux arts" was current in the seventeenth 
century and in 1690, it was used by Charles Perrault in the 
title of a book. 1 In French literature, it occurs as early 
as La Fontaine's "Songe de Vaux," (1657-61). 
1A. P. McMahon, Le Cabinet des beaux-arts, Preface to 
an American Philosophy of Art, (Chicago, 1945), pp. 24, 181. 
1 
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Ancestoral Background of "Fine Arts" and "Beaux Arts" 
The British Royal Academy was patterned after the 
Acad~mie royale des beaux arts, to which one must turn for 
the French ancestry of the concept of fine arts. It was 
founded by Louis XIV in 1648. At first limited to painting 
and sculpture, it was later unified with the Acad~mie 
d'architecture, founded in 1671. It was composed not only 
of painters and sculptures, but also architects and engravers. 
This partition of culture among the various academies, 
including the realm assigned to the "Acadfunie des beaux-
arts," did much to determine what arts should be considered 
"beaux-arts" or "fine arts." The emphasis on visual arts 
in both French and British Academies is partly responsible 
for the conception of the fine arts as visual, and as dis-
tinct from music and literature. 
The modern history of the concept of fine art leads 
one back from Baroque France to Renaissance Italy, and to 
earlier academies. There were academies in Italy, including 
one for architecture in Milan in 1830; but they were smaller 
and more specific. The countless literary and scientific 
academies in Renaissance Italy were remarkable for their 
whimsical names and their lack of interrelation. There 
was no systematic apportionment of the arts among super-
visory bodies; there was no national government to have 
undertaken it. 
3 
The Italian academies were successors to the 
medieval guilds as institutions for the training of young 
artists. The latter had become repressive by the fifteenth 
century, while the academies were allowing individual compe-
tition. T~e earliest academy to be concerned with painting 
is said to have been the "Academia del Disengo," founded 
by Vasari in Florence in 1562. Vasari used the expression 
"most beautiful arts," as applied to the arts of design. 2 
The essential difference between the guilds and the acade-
mies, according to Anthony Blunt, was that "the latter 
treated the arts as scientific subjects to be taught 
theoretically as well as practically, whereas the guilds 
had mainly aimed at fixing a technical tradition."3 
France: 
Venturi describes the transition from Italy to 
"Even the terms which comprehend painting 
are changed. Vasari had called them arts of 
design, attributing to design their unity. 
Likewise 1 he had spoken of 'the finest arts,' 
and Baldinucci of 'fine arts in which design 
is adopted,' and Scamozzi of 'fine arts.' 
It is only in the milieu of the Academy of 
France that the term 'beaux-arts' is in gen-
eral use, and the term when remained. For 
unity of design is substituted that of the 
ideal of beauty."4 
2McMahon, op. cit., p. 26. 
3A. Blunt, Artistic Theory in Italy, 1450-1600, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 57. 
4L. Venturi, The History of Art Criticism, (New York: 
E. P. Dutton, 1936), p. 126. 
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Emphasis on the scientific, theoretical approach 
to painting was an important phase in the struggle of 
painting, sculpture, and architecture to raise their status. 
This struggle, whose crucial phase was enacted in Renais-
sance Italy, is summarized by Blunt as follows: 
The upshot of all these disputes was that 
the painter, sculptor, and architect obtained 
recognition as educated men, as members of 
Humanist society. Painting, sculpture, and 
architecture were accepted as liberal arts, and 
are now grouped together as activities closely 
allied to each other and all differing, funda-
mentally from the manual crafts. The idea of 
the "Fine Arts" comes into existance this way, 
though a single phase is not attached to them 
until the middle of the sixteenth century, when 5 
they came to be known as the "Arti di disengo." 
At the same time critics began to have the idea 
of a "work of art" as something distinct from 
an object justified simply by its beauty and 
which is a luxury product.6 
Early discussions of the arts were largely evalu-
ative, often from an educational standpoint. They dealt 
with the question of what skills are worthy of a freeman 
or a gentleman, and hence with what should be taught to 
the well-born youth. Also, more searching moral and 
religious questions were asked, in regard to the values 
and dangers of practicing various arts. These were answered 
SF. P. Chambers treats "disengo" as equivalent to 
"drawing." During the Renaissance, the common denominator 
of all arts was drawing, 'il ban disengo,' "As late as the 
eighteenth century, the Italians were describing the fine 
arts as 'le belle arti del disengo.'" F. P. Chambers, 
The History of Taste, (New York, 1932), p. 41. 
6Blunt, op. cit., p. 55, all of Ch. IV. 
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differenLly, according to the religious and moral princi-
ples asswned, and 1,.-i th different verdicts about which arts 
were wort~y to be taught the superior man. 
From the standpoint of aristocratic, secular edu-
cation, the important criterion for classing an art as 
"liberal," polite," or "elegant" was that it be recognized 
as genteel and .t1onorable. 7 For this recognition, the 
approval of ancient aristocrats was of greater weight 
than the beauty or intellectuality of the product. Many 
beautiful and pleasant things, such as chairs and garments, 
were made humble artisians, and hence were not 11 fine 11 
in the sense of elegant, noble, or superior. 
Ancest:,ral Background of "Liberal Arts" 
'.!.'he idea of liberal as distinguished from servile 
or mechanical arts has been traced back as far as Solon 
(6bh C.. B.C.). As to the "arts of design" and other vis-
ual arts, they were arts in the broad technical sense of 
skill in 1:,aking and doing. Their first purpose was useful-
ness: tha.t of the building arts, says Chambers, was 
"str.:n•,1th a!1d shelter; the usefulness of the figurative 
art was th<; illustration of a moral doctrine and sacred 
history. ~rchitecture was ~dmired for being well and 
ski!lfully bui:t; paintin~ and sculpture were admired 
7"Liueral:" Befit.t.,,·,g, or worthy of, a man of 
free birth: free, no'.: se1.·v: le, (Webster). 
6 
because they bore some semblance of reality. Ornament for 
its own sake was the conception of a later time.•• 8 
The Greek word "techne" and the Latin word "ars" 
implied useful skill in general. Under the general concept 
of "techne," a certain type of art was recognized in'Greece: 
" ' 
namely, "mousike techne," or art of the Muses. This is 
sometimes translated as "fine art,'' and the particular 
arts included are sometimes call "fine arts." The word 
"techne" was often omitted in greek, and "mouiske" alone 
meant "art of the Muses." "Mouiske" included all three 
branches of Athenian education, namely, music, grammar, 
and gymnastics. 
There appears to be no clear conception in Greek 
or Roman thought of a group of "fine arts," distinguished 
from other arts by their devotion to beauty and aesthetic 
pleasure, rather than to practical use. Certainly, no 
group of visual arts, such as painting, sculpture, and 
architecture, is so set apart. The "arts of the Muses" 
were "fine" in being distinguished from the humbly untili-
tarian, manual skills, but were also regarded as useful 
from a moral and educational standpoint. They were not 
regarded as devoted mainly to pleasure and sensuous beauty. 
The "arts of the Muses" were mainly literary and 
musical, with a dash of early science. They gave no place 
8chambers, op. cit., p. 10. 
to the visual arts of painting and sculpture, which are 
today regarded as fine arts "par excellence." 
It is true that no clear conception of fine art 
existed in Greece, which is identical with any of those 
7 
in modern definitions. However, many of the ideas included 
in those definitions did exist in Greece, under various 
names and in various associations. So it is not correct 
to suppose that the concept of fine art is entirely 
modern. There was a disagreement in Greece as to which 
arts were "fine." Moreover, Greek thinkers developed the 
notion of liberal arts as those befitting an educated, 
free citizen. This deeply influenced medieval and modern 
theories of the arts. 
In summary, the term "liberal arts" covered a 
group of skills or subjects, variously conceived in the 
Greek and medieval periods, but always distinguished as 
(a) genteel, noble, aristocratic, befitting a freeman or 
member of the upper class, and thus opposed to the "ser-
vile" arts; (b) involving mental rather than crude manual 
or mechanical work and ability, hence manifesting a higher 
type of mental development; (c) tending to elevate the 
mind of the artist and those whom he serves rather than 
merely providing physical necessities and comforts. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the 
conception of art became more hedonistic in tone, less 
intellectual and moralistic. It marked off a certain 
group of arts as aiming to provide aesthetic pleasure, 
by producing beautiful forms for sensuous perception. 
This type of art came to be called "beaux'arts" or "fine 
arts." However, it had inuch in common with the older 
conception of liberal arts. 
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The term "fine arts" came to be associated mainly 
with certain visual arts. These were separately grouped 
for practice and instruction. In Italy, they were called 
"the beautiful arts of design," arid had their own academy, 
which bore the title "Acadfunie des beaux-arts." 
To the extent that the modern "fine arts" are 
successors to the Greek "liberal arts," exists the strange 
spectacle of the visual arts being, first, excluded from 
the select list as too manual; second, admitted to the list 
through a rise in social and intellectual status; third, 
so dominating the list that music and poetry, though 
original members, are often omitted from it. 
Chapter 2 
WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF "ART?" 
Semantic Classification 
Confusion over both the scope and the context 
of art begins with the basic terms "art" and "arts." 
The full extent of their ambiguity is not commonly 
realized. First, the work "art" is applied to certain 
skills and techniques, and also to the products of 
these skills, that is to works of art. It is sometimes 
applied broadly to all kinds of useful skill, including 
medicine and agriculture; sometimes restricted to skill 
in certain media such as painting, or to the skills aimed 
at producing "aesthetic pleasure." The work "art" is 
sometimes used in a laudatory way, to imply high aesthetic 
quality in the product; sometim~s in an indiscriminate 
way, as applied to all production and performance in 
certain fields. 
Another source of confusion over the meaning of 
art arises from the old problem of the relation between 
"fine" and "useful or servile" art. When art is thought 
of in the broad technical sense, it includes both "fine" 
and "useful or servile" arts; all branches of applied 
science and technology. However, when art is thought of 
in the broad aesthetic sense, the question still remains: 
9 
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does it include the "useful arts," or only those supposedly 
devoted to aesthetic ends? How much of technology is 
covered by the word "art"? How much is left out? 
Many of the terms used to classify the arts into 
various groups, such as "fine and useful arts," "major 
and minor arts," "decorative arts," and "arts of design," 
are also very differently understood. Thus our present 
nomenclature of the arts is far from being precise or 
standardized for technical discussion. 
A partial classification of the arts is implied 
whenever such terms as "fine arts," "useful arts," 
"theatre arts," "graphic arts," or "handicrafts" are 
utilized. Several other terms, such as "space and time 
arts," "plastic arts," "imitative and non-imitative arts" 
are also used. Inclusive arts such as literature are 
divided into subclasses such as prose and poetry, drama 
and fiction. Some arts are closely connected, with much 
in common such as, painting, drawing, and etching. Others, 
such as music and sculpture, seem farther apart, and it 
is more difficult to discern what they have in common, 
or to group them under a single heading. 
Historically, there has been a sharp antithesis 
between fine and useful art; between beauty and utility; 
between the aesthetic and the practical. Plato made a 
fairly clear distinction in theory between the two sets 
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of arts: one which satisfied basic human needs, and the 
other, which provided sensuous pleasure. He was also 
interested in another distinction, between what were later 
called the liberal and the illiberal or servile arts. The 
useful arts put in the latter c:lass. 9 This separation were 
reached its zenith with the nineteenth century doctrine 
of "art for art's sake" and the "ivory tower" conception 
of art as something esoteric and aloof from everyday life. 
From the eighteenth century onward, the word "art" 
and its equivalents in other European languages came to 
be understood more and more with aesthetic and hedonistic 
associations. It became, therefore, less and less neces-
sary to utilize the prefix "fine" to distinguish the fine 
or aesthetic arts from other, more utilitarian skills. 
The latter came to be called, not ".arts," but applied 
sciences, industries, technics., technologies, or branches 
of engineering. Hence, the single word "art" or "arts" 
gradually replaced, to a large extent the term "fine arts." 
The latter term has persisted but with confusingly ambig-
uous meaning, since it was, and still is, understood as 
covering only certain visual arts (painting, sculpture, 
architecture, and perhaps the "minor" useful or decorative 
9Thomas Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelations, 
(Cleveland: western Reserve University Press, 1967), 
p. 42. 
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arts): at other times it has included also poetry, music, 
dancino, and drama.lo 
In attempting to avoid the contrast between the 
"useful" and "fine" arts, and also limit the scope of the 
term "a.rt," the term "visual art" came into vogue. This 
basis of classification shifted from the difficult and 
controversial or.e of "useful and not useful" to a more 
obJective and psychological one; that of, which one of 
the five senses is it primarily addressed. 
The term "visual arts" was, and is not quite speci-
fic enough when the term "arts" is used in its old, broad, 
technical sense; for visual arts would then include purely 
utili tar:,an bu_ildings, tools, and machines. If it is 
understood that art means "aesthetic art," then "visual 
art" is by definition restricted to products having some 
aesthetic function. Their visibility will not be merely .. ' 
incidental, but possess an essential characteristic; power 
to attract and interest through the eyes will be one of 
their principal aims. There is need for a term which 
definitely groups them together, as apart from music, 
theatre, drama, and literature. An explicit prefix is 
needed _i_n contrasting the aesthetic arts. 11 Fine arts 11 is 
not the Dest possible term because of its current meanings. 
lGMunro, 0p. cit., p. 512. 
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"Visual arts" is a term that is both limiting and simul-
taneously fairly objective. 
Far from being a merely theoretical problem the 
way in which the arts are defined and classified affects 
the practical organization and conduct of the arts them-
selves. It is a mistake to think of definition and 
classification as "mere preliminaries," coming at an 
early stage in investigation. They come also at the end 
and in the middle, in fact all along the line. Those 
made in the early stages of a subject always have to be 
revised later, in the light of increasing knowledge. The 
ones made now must be recognized as tenative hypotheses, 
sure to need further change in a few years' time. One 
can summarize in them, however, the results of the latest 
discoveries up to the present moment, and use them in 
turn as instruments in further inquiry. 
It is virtually impossible to have only one 
meaning for the word "art." ·Almost all other words have 
more than one meaning. The dictionaries may list ten or 
twenty definitions after a word, and yet it may be used 
without serious confusion, provided that each definition 
is used in a different field or realm of discourse. 
"Table" means one thing in discussing furniture; another 
in mathematics; another in parlimentary law. 
14 
Classification Using the Concept ''Skill" 
Every definition is in terms of other words, and 
therefore depends on how these other words are themselves 
defined. Agreement on a definition of "art" cannot be 
obtained until there is agreement on a satisfactory defi-
nition of some of these other words such as: "skill," 
"beauty," "pleasure," "expression," etc. Thus it is 
impossible to find a wholly satisfactory definition for 
a single, isolated term in a technical subject, where all 
are interrelated. The whole terminology must be gradually 
and constantly revised, with the hope of defining all 
important terms in a way which is mutually consistent, and 
consistent with current knowledge and expert opinion. As 
to any one term, one can only attempt to weight the rela-
tive advantages of alternative definitions, and decide 
which seems to be the most expedient at the time. Which 
has the least possibility of false or harmful interpre-
tations? Which will serve be'st as a tool for thought, 
research, and discussion within this particular field? 
It is virtually impossible to ascertain both the 
implied scope of the term "art," and what is precisely 
meant by "art," when studied from the vantage point of 
semantics and the "end-products" of "art." Therefore, a 
different basis for inquiry must be utilized. The basis 
will be that of skill. 
15 
The major current meanings of art, as recognized 
by leading dictionaries, differ from one another in degrees 
of breadth, and in this paper are arranged from the broad-
est to the narrowest. All are based on the concept of 
skill. 
Definition 1: Art is useful skill, or 
the product of such skill; especially, a 
skill which is developed and transmitted 
socially, as a tested set of methods for 
adapting means to purposeful ends. In this 
sense, art means "any kind of skill adapt-
ing nature for human uses."11 
This definition is broad enough to include, not 
only the "fine arts" of painting, sculpture, and music, 
but also all applied science, industry, and manufacturing. 
It includes as particular arts all building (whether 
beautiful or not) and the arts of agriculture, and navi-
gation. This sense of "art" is termed the "broad technical 
sense." 12 
The products of such skilled activity are also 
called "art." Art can mean a process of making or doing, 
11oxford Dictionary, Vol. I, 1888, "art," defini-
tions I, 1, 2, 3; II, 7, 8, 9, lla. S. Colvin, "Art," 
is "every regulated operation or· dexterity by which organ-
ized being pursue ends which they know beforehand, together 
with the rules and the result of every such operation or 
dexterity. I, 
12united States patents are granted to devices in 
the following classes: art, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, and new varieties of plants. "The 
term 'art' by interpretation has virtually the same meaning 
as the word 'method' or 'process.' (J. H. Byers, "Criteria 
of Patentability," Scientific Monthly, 1945, p. 435). 
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and also its products. To avoid confusion with works of 
"fine art," the products of art in this broad sense are 
often called "artifacts" or "manufactures." These terms 
covered all human products, whether intended to be beauti-
ful or not. 
"Art" in this broad sense is approximate to the 
Greek, "techne," which can be translated as skill, craft, 
cunning, or regular method of making a particular thing. 
It is from this Greek term that "technics," "technical," 
and "technique" are derived. "Technology" currently 
refers mainly to industry, engineering, and applied science, 
excluding the fine arts. The Greek conception of "techne" 
made no such distinction. It included skill in making 
either useful or beautiful things, or things combining the 
two qualities. This conception of art as useful skill is 
still taken to include both fine and useful arts, all, 
being considered useful in a broad sense. Important inno-
vation in technology is called "invention" or "discovery," 
whereas in fine art it is called "creation" or "original 
composition." 
Definition 2: Art is skill in intel-
lectual and cultural pursuits, or a branch 
or learning conducive to that skill.13 
"Arts in this sense means "liberal arts." Webster 
gives the following definition: "Liberal arts. (Trans. of 
13oxford Dictionary, op. cit., Vol, I, 1888. 
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'artes liberales,' the higher arts, which, among the 
Romans, only freemen (liberi) were permitted to pursue.) 
In the Middle Ages, the seven branches of learning were: 
grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music, 
and astronomy. In modern times the liberal arts include 
the languages, sciences, philosophy, history, etc., which 
compose the curriculum of academic or collegiate education, 
as distinguished from technical or professional education. 
The abbreviated term "arts" is ·also used, as in the desig-
nation of certain degrees granted by colleges and univer-
sities, as master and bachelor of "arts. 1114 
The history and appreciation of painting, sculpture, 
and architecture are sometimes included as part of a liberal 
arts curriculum, at least as elective subjects. They are 
seldom required, and are often omitted entirely. Only 
literature, among the fine or aesthetic arts, is always 
included. Today an "arts" curriculum usually involves 
some work in mathematics, and a basic acquaintance with 
several other sciences. This is not, then, a definitely 
aesthetic sense of the work "art," for it includes a 
considerable amount of science, and may include nothing 
in the "fii.ne arts" except literature.
15 
14webster's New World Dictionary, (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 814. 
15Munro, op. cit., p. 53. 
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The term "humanities" is sometimes used instead 
of "liberal arts," with similar meaning. Webster defines 
it as follows: "Humanities. The branches of polite 
learning regarded as primarily conducive to culture; esp., 
the ancient classics and belles-lettres; sometimes, secu-
lar, as distinguished from theological learning." 16 
Broadly interpreted, a curriculum in humanities is some-
times made to include social sciences, history, languages, 
and literature. More narrowly, it may indicate a range 
of choice within the general "liberal arts" curriculum, 
with emphasis on language and literature. It may include 
work in the visual arts and music; but that is not always 
implied. 17 
Definition 3. a. Art is skill in pro-
ducing beauty or that which arouses aesthetic 
pleasure, or the product of such skill. (In 
this sense, "art" is an evaluative, eulo-
gistic term, implying superior aesthetic 
worth.) 
b. Art is the practice of any of the 
fine or aesthetic arts (including music and 
literature as well as certain visual arts), 
or the product of such practice.18 
Both these definitions are intermediate in depth. 
Both define "art" primarily as "the application of skill to 
16webster's New World Dictionary, op. cit., p. 683. 
17L. Dudley and 
Aesthetics, (New York: 
A. Faricy, The Humanities: 
McGraw-Hill, 1940), p. 3. 
18oxford Dictionary, op. cit., Vol. I, 1888. 
Applied 
the production of what is beautiful, or of what arouses 
aesthetic pleasure.• 19 
Both definitions limit the scope of "art" by 
excluding not only the purely "useful arts" and applied 
sciences, but the intellectual skill in letters, philo-
sophy, and pure science which the "liberal arts" under-
took to give. "Art" in this sense is sometimes called 
19 
"fine art." With or without "fine," tha word "art" in 
this sense includes music and poetry. With or without 
"fine," it is also used in a narrow sense, restricted to 
the visual arts. 
Use of the work "art" alone in this sense is 
comparatively modern. The prefix "fine" or "beautiful" 
used to be thought necessary because of the very broad 
meaning of "art" in general. Now, the prefix is less 
necessary. Without it, "art" is presently understood in 
an aesthetic sense, while most of the old "useful arts" 
have been transformed into branches of engineering, tech-
nology, and applied science, and are so designated. 
A problem arises, however, with the utilization 
of definition three. According to this definition, to 
call a thing "art" is to praise it as beautiful, worthy, 
or pleasant. By these two definitions, then, there is no 
19webster's New World Dictionary, op. cit., p. 
78. 
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such thing as ugly, unskillful, or unpleasant art. The 
essential characteristic of the two definitions, is, that 
art or fine art is devoted to the production of beauty or 
aesthetic pleasure. Thus, the meaning of "art" relies 
upon evaluation, implying a high degree of ability in 
producing beauty or aesthetic value. 
Definition 4. a. Art is skill in pro-
ducing beauty in visible form, or the products 
of that skill. b. Art is the practice of one 
of the visual aesthetic arts, or the product 
of such practice.20 
Definition 5. a. Art is skill in pro-
ducing beauty in visible form in painting, 
or the product of that skill. b. Art is 
painting, or a product of it.21 
In the Oxford Dictionary, art is: 
"the application of skill to the arts of 
imitation and design, Painting, Engraving, 
Sculpture, Architecture; the skillful produc-
tion of the beautiful in visible forms. (This 
is the most usual and modern sense of art, when 
used without any qualifications. It does not 
occur in any English Dictionary before 1880, 
and seems to have been chiefly used by painters 
and writers on painting, until the present 
century.)" 22 
Definition five, is one of the narrowest defini-
tions of art, in which a concept that once covered tne 
20oxford Dictionary, op. cit., Vol., 1888. 
21Ibid., Vol. I, 1888. 
22Munro, op. cit., p. 61. 
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whole domain of human skill is limited to the single 
activity of painting pictures. It has not achieved much 
currency in technical aesthetics or art criticism. 
This definition presents several new problems. 
In general, what is "visible form" in art, and what arts 
produce such forms? What does it mean to call certain 
arts "the arts of imitation and design"? In particular, 
what arts are included? Painting is often mentioned; 
sculpture and architecture usually; drawing and engraving 
occasionally. Numerous other arts devoted to visual form 
are usually omitted, such as ceramics. 
In citing the aforementioned definitions, the 
premise is that there is no definition which is right or 
wrong by the eternal nature of things. There are various 
ideas and groups of phenomena, each important in its own 
way, to which the name "art" has become attached. When 
speaking of "art," one or more of these previous ideas 
are suggested, with some help from the context to indicate 
which is meant. If the word "art" is used in another, 
radically different sense, there is a risk of being misund-
erstood, and further aggravating an already confusing 
situation. 
Some writers on aesthetics accept one of the cur-
cent, dictionary definitions of "art," and then present 
their ideas about the nature and values of art as so 
22 
defined. Summari,~s of definitions by individual 
phers have been made by: Listowel, 23 Rader, 24 
philoso-
Heyl,25 
Parker, 26 and others. 
Not all these theories are explicitly offered as 
definitions of art. Some of them are, and others are 
more indefinitely worded as theories about art and its 
values, or about the processes of making and experiencing 
art. Some of the surveys and anthologies -of quotations 
call them, quite interchangeably, definitions, theories, 
doctrines, views, ideas, or conceptions of art. This 
vagueness in expression adds to the difficulty of surveying 
and listing the recent individual definitions of art, since 
it is often impossible to tell what is intended as a defini-
tion and what is not. However, since art is a complex and 
many sided entity, different theories can offer enlight-
ment as tc the different aspects of its nature. 
Ir. order to ascertain both the scope and context 
of "art," a middle-course of direction needs to be taken, 
23Earl of Listowel, A Critical History of Modern 
Aesthetics, (London, 1933). 
24M. M. Rader, A Modern Book of Esthetics, An 
Anthology, (New York, 1935). 
25B. C. Heyl, New Bearings in Esthetics and Art 
Criticism, (New Haven, 1943). 
26oewitt Parker, Encyclopedia of the Arts, 
"AeEthet.ics," (New York, 1946). 
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utilizing exclusively, nei~her definition nor theory, but 
a combination of bot-.h. Initially, a list of established 
dictionary definitions must be studied, to discern whether 
one of them is adequate enough to serve present needs. 
Secondly, definitions and theories need to be examined, 
in order to discern what important ideas they express. 
Finally, it should be decided, which of the definitions 
and ideas should be included as the established meaning 
of the term in question, and which should be termed 
otherwise. 
Following this procedure, and for the purpose of 
clarity ·::Jf 1.mderstanding, the scope and context of art 
will be defined as follows: 
ART: is skill in making or doing that 
which is used or intended as a stimulus to 
a satisfactory aesthetic experience, often 
along with other ends or functions; espec-
ially in such a way that the perceived 
stimulus, the meanings it suggests, or both, 
are fel~ as beautiful, pleasant, interesting, 
emotionally moving, o:i;- otherwise valuable 
as objects of direct experience, in addition 
to any instrumental values they may have.27 
The rational for the utilization of this, rather 
than another definition is three-fold. First, it avoids 
the antithesis between the "fine" and "useful" arts. The 
phrase, "making or doing," implies the manufacture of 
la.sting object.s, such al, statues and buildings. Secondly, 
27Munro, op. cit., p. 107. 
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it eliminates the relative concepts of "beauty," and 
"beautiful." Art may deal with the painful or the ugly, 
but the work of art which does this transmutes the ugli-
ness and is itself a thing of "beauty." Also, by ugly 
works, it is meant those works of art which themselves 
finally displease; i.e., works in the aesthetic contem-
plation of which, for whatever reason, not pleasure but 
displeasure is derived. Also, "used or intended as 
. ," puts the definition in behavioristic terms. To 
qualify as art, the product does not need to be aesthe~-
ically satisfying; only to be used or adapted for an 
aesthetic function by either the producer or consumer. 
Finally, the phrase, "along with other ends or functions 
. ," avoids the implication that the aesthetic 
function is the sole or most important function of art. 
Therefore, when referring to the scope of art, art shall 
include the disciplines of painting, drawing, sculpture, 
and architecture, and closely• related disciplines such 
as, etching, engraving, printmaking, etc. 
Chapter 3 
WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF "ART?" 
"Beauty" and "Pleasure" 
Discerning the scope of art, those disciplines 
that are to be included and those that are to be excluded, 
does not give forth any information as to the "meaning" 
of art; its purpose, function, and distinguishing charac-
teristics. Art nor the "visual arts," even though they 
exhibit, do not state what art is. 
If one wishes to understand both art and its 
meaning, one must ask, "what is its function?" Therefore, 
in an attempt to ascertain the "meaning" of art and its 
distinguishing characteristics, its precise, cognitive, 
and affective purpose must be established. In attempting 
to establish this, the concepts of: philosophers, aesthe-
ticians, critics, educators, sociologists, and psychologists 
must be carefully and objectively studied. 
Some theories concerning the function and distin-
guishing characteristics of art are irrelevant to this 
investigation because they commence with a different 
extension for the term "art." Hence, a different group 
of phenomena, other than that previously proposed, are 
described. Many purpose differentiae which are too broad, 
in that they occur in many other phenomena besides that 
of art. 
25 
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There are several related notions; art as expression, 
as symbolic, as communication, and as language. They are not 
identical notions. Saying merely that "art is expression" is 
an example of too broad a differentiae; it fails to distin-
guish art from science, conversation, and many other things. 
Some proposed differentiae are too narrow. Lange's definition 
is of this sort: Art, is the capacity of man to give himself 
and others a pleasure based upon illusion and free from any 
conscious aim except the immediate enjoyment.28 
According to Lange, art is to produce both pleasure 
and enjoyment. As there is no objective meaning of "beauty," 
there is also no objective definition of the term "pleasure." 
Different people .are "pleased" in different modes and by 
different things. Also, the term "enjoyment," carries 
with it the implication that art should be amusing, light, 
gay, novel, clever, and the like. Again, there is no 
objective criterion for deciding what is and is not art. 
t, 
St~ictly speaking, paintings, sculptures, drawings, 
and the like, are not "art," but instead, works of art. 
Art is not a quality discernable in them, but instead, an 
activity of man; the activity, of which, such things are 
29 
the products. Therefore, art is not an activity aimed 
28Rader, op. cit., p. 9. 
29curt John Ducasse, The Philosophy of Art, (New 
York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), p. 15. 
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at the creation of beauty, which as been the most common 
opinion concerning the nature of art. "Art," being an 
activity, rather than product, then implies, among other 
things, the critical control of a process of objectifica-
tion, and not the producing and creating of beauty. It 
then follows, that no matter how close in actual fact may 
be the relation between beauty and the activity called 
art, no essential connection exists between them. If being 
a product of art has any implications at all, the implica-
tions have to do with the skill presumed to be involved 
in the process of production, and not with the beauty of 
the product. 
Assuming that "art" is the activity and not the 
product of such activity, the terms "skill," and "process 
of production," contain important implications. The first 
implication is that of a product; which denotes the human 
activity of production. Secondly, "product" denotes a 
producer, who shall be referred to as the "artist," Third, 
"product," implies a "good," "service," or "commodity" to 
be utilized. Lastly, there must be those to utilize the 
"product" of this human activity. This group shall be 
referred to as the "consumer." 
Art as Language 
This leads then, to the aforementioned related 
notions of art as expression, communication, symbolism, 
28 
and language. While they are not identical notions, they 
do have something in common, and are quite related, in 
the sense that they are all human activities, making use 
of the means common to all as human beings. 30 In this 
sense, the artist produces a visual statement, which in 
turn becomes the "product," or the subject matter for 
a response or reaction from the observer or "consumer." 
In this regard, the visual arts may be considered a lan-
guage. As in other languages, there is a source for the 
communication, the artist; there is a medium that carries 
the information originating at the source, the work of 
art; and finally there is a receiver, the observer, the 
consumer. 31 
If language is expressive, and art is language, 
then art, like language, expresses either the meanings 
of things, or the intentions of human beings, or the 
ulterior consequences or contexts of things and acts. 32 
This concept of, art as language, is expressed 
by C. J. Ducasse, who declares that: 
30Ruth L. Saw, Aesthetics, (New York: Doubleday 
and Company, Inc., 1971), p. 143. 
31Nathan Knobler, The Visual Dialogue, (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), p. 3. 
32victorino Tejera, Art and Human Intelligence, 
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), p. 37. 
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"art is essentially a form of language; namely the 
language of feeling, mood, sentiment, and emotional attitude."3 3 
., . 
According to Veron, art is also essentially language; 
but different in the language that occurs through cries and 
gestures. Even though these expressions are natural to both 
man and animals, man has the capacity to vary, diversify, 
and elaborate on them as animals cannot. This further aids 
in discerning the nature of the term "language" as used in 
34 ~ 
this sense. Veron, even though he may be essentially cor-
rect in assuming language to consist essentially in expres-
sion, fails in this definition to adequately qualify the 
term "expression" in a manner which will exclude expression 
of feelings that are not art. This is the identical problem 
that exists with Ducasse's definition. 
Croce, attempts a definition of art, and states: 
"Art is essentially language, and a language is essentially 
'expression'."35 
What Croce calls "expression" is a very different 
thing from what is usually meant by the term. From the 
immediate context of the passage quoted, it appears that by 
"expression" Croce does not mean formulation in words, 
33curt John Ducasse, Art, The Critics, and You, 
(New York: Oskar Piest, 1944), p. 52. 
34oucasse, op. cit., p. 21. 
35 rbid., p. 42. 
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lines, colors, etc., but only formulation in terms of 
images, and that the physical work of art is nothing but 
a mechanical copy of what the artist has created and holds 
in his imagination. Rather than clarify, Croce has added 
to the confusion; namely the confusion of creation, origi-
nation, invention, and imagination. Although expression 
in images, to a limited extent, often precedes expression 
in physical 
necessarily 
terms, this 
36 
the case. 
is by no means universally or 
Croce's definition also implies 
that "expression" and "intuition" are synonymous, which 
in fact, they are not. Also incorrect, is Croce's view 
of the physical work of art. It is his contention that 
the physical work of art is essentially an aid to the 
reproduction of the act of expression, which seemingly 
rest on a very questionable psychological analysis. As 
an example, there is a vast and all important difference 
between the expressing of a feeling by actively drawing 
a line, and the obtaining of the same feeling by passively 
following a line. 
Tolstoy's definition of art is that: 
"Art is the expression and communication 
of remembered emotion, an emotion distinct 
from spontaneous expression such as laughing 
and weeping; to evoke in oneself a feeling 
one has experienced, and having evoked it in 
oneself, then by means of external signs, so 
36 Ibid., p. 47. 
transmit that feeling th~7 others may exper-ience the same feeling." 
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Unfortunately, Tolstoy's definition also encounters 
difficulties. A work which will succeed in communicating 
the artist's feelings to one individual will not succeed 
in doing so to another. Also, how can anyone discern, 
upon viewing a work'of art, whether it is the kind which 
will communicate the artist's feelings to the spectator? 
How can anyone discern whether the artist actually exper-
ienced, and now remembers, the emotion which the work of 
art arouses in others? However troublesome Tolstoy's 
definition; it is significant in that it defines the mode 
and method of communication, namely, through the use of 
external signs. 
Of the many definitions surveyed, Sydney Colvin's 
definition of art, even though it has a Victorian flavor, 
avoids many of the faults of others: 
"The fine arts are those among the 
arts of man which spring from his impulse 
to do or make certain things in certain ways 
for the sake, first, of a special kind of 
pleasure, independent of direct utility, 
which gives him so to do or make them and 
next for the sake of the kindred pleasure 
which he derives from witnessing or con-
templating them when they are done or made 
by others. Fine art is also, everything 
which. man does or makes in one way rather 
than another, freely and with premeditation 
37Munro, op. cit., p. 80. 
in order to express and arouse emotion, in 
obedience to laws of rythmic movement or 
regulated design, and with the results 
independent of direct utility and capable 
of affording to many, permanent and disin-
terested delight.•38 
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Calvin's wording in the definition, is both use-
ful and suggestive. First, Colvin does not say that, 
"fine art is the production of what is beautiful, or 
what gives pleasure," Had this been in his definition, 
it would have been impossible whether the resultant pro-
duct is or is not "fine art," without evaluating it, and 
thus part company with crrjective and scientific description. 
Colvin, instead, merely states that fine art is produced 
for the sake of a certain kind of pleasure. It is done 
or made to arouse and express emotion. Its results are 
capable of affording delight to "many," not necessarily 
to all, or to any particular kind of person. This is not 
a slight verbal distinction. It makes the whole statement 
much more cautious and objective. 
A more contemporary, abbreviated, and just as 
objective definition of art has been proposed by Nathan 
Knobler, in which he states: 
"Art is a product of man which has a 
defined form or order and communicates human 
experience, and is affected by the skilled 
control of the materials used in its 
38 I, 'd l.ul. • , p. 89. 
construction to project the formal and 
communicative concepts that the artist 
wishes to present."39 
Arts as Communication 
33 
Despite the diversity between the definitions 
cited, all share one common and very important premise. 
All, either state or imply, that art is a form of commun-
ication. If indeed, art is a form of communication, then 
communication, in itself, is a work of art; and if art 
is thought of as self-expression, then self-expression 
necessarily accompanies communication. Communication, 
then, can be referred to as a transfer of information or 
ideas from a source to a receiver. Some vehicle or medium 
is required for this exchange. The medium required is 
generally thought of as "language." That is, people 
observing the same object, and sharing the consciousness 
of that object. 40 
Assuming that art is a form of communication, 
gives rise to the following questions: "What does the 
artistJcommunicate?" and "Through what medium of 'language' 
is used in the artist's communication?" 
In answer to the first question, to judge by the 
evidence of the work of artists throughout history, the 
39Knobler, op. cit., p. 26. 
40ibid., p. 33. 
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subject matter of the arts may be broken down into three 
categories: "the world of perceptual reality," "personal 
response to experience, or conceptual reality"," and "the 
communication of order."41 These three areas are not 
mutually exclusive. Many works of art combine all of 
them, but there are art forms which appear to emphasize 
one to the exclusion of others, and it is important for 
the spectator to discern the initial intention of the 
artist when confronted with a work of art. 
A part of the traditional function of art has 
been the representation of perceptual reality. That is, 
the artist records what he "sees" in reality. Much visual 
art, however, falls into the category of conceptual reality. 
The artist represents what he knows about reality, rather 
than what he sees. Like a child, he records those aspects 
and segments of his world which are meaningful to him, 
putting together separate elements to form the entire 
representation of an experience. As an example, early 
Egyptian art is conceptual. In depicting a man, the Egyp-
tian artist selected parts of the body and then combined 
them to form the complete figure. The artist chose a 
profile view of the head and placed within it a front view 
of an eye. Also, the artist indicated the shoulders in 
41rbid., p. 50. 
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a frontal position, and the hips and legs from the side 
view. The resulting image may not satisfy the demands 
of other cultures for the representation of the human 
figure, but its conventions were accepted by the artists 
and their patrons in Egypt, so that variations from it 
became the exception rather than the rule. 
In contrast to the system of conceptual repres-
entation of physical reality is the system of perceptual 
representation of physical reality. This is intended to 
reproduce the l,lerceptual ex1,er ience derived from careful 
observation of the physical world. In this concept, a 
bird. is not always "the" bird. It may be a dot or a 
flash of light. The artist sees the world in flux, and 
nothing in it appears twice in exactly the same way. The 
key word is "reproduce," in that the artist attempts to 
reproauce actual physical entities and realities. An 
example of such would be Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres' 
painting of "Louis B1:rtin." 
Many works of art present no parallels with the 
experience of an observer because they were produced in 
a period, geographic location, or culture remote from 
his own. However, t.here are those works of art which make 
no r<:·hin,nce to the subject matter of physical realities 
of an:,• so.::-t, as surrealism, abstract expressionism, and non-
obje~~ivism. Often these art objects are characterized 
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by an extremely sensitive exploitation of the potentials 
of line, form, color, and texture. In the common use of 
the word "meaning," it may be argued that these works are 
meaningless, even though they may provide anesthetic 
response within the viewer, but it is possible to conceive 
of works of art in this group as their own subject matter. 
Their meaning lies in the complex relationships buil,t into 
them. To this, it can be said, that the artist's aim is 
that of the communication of order. 
The Sign and Symbol as Communication 
The second part of the original question must now 
attempted to be answered. In response to, "through what 
medium of 'language' is used in the artist's communication," 
Tolstoy's definition immediately comes to mind, when in 
the latter part of his definition, he states; "that feelings 
one has experienced, are transmitted to others by the means 
of external signs." 4·2 According to Tolstoy, then, the 
artist communicates through the medium of the utilization 
of signs. However, Veron states that symbols are the 
essential means of communication in the expression of 
emotion. 43 Tejera states that man is a creative animal 
who lives by art rather than instinct, and as such, by 
42M 't 80 unro, op. ci ., p. • 
43nucasse, op. cit., p. 21. 
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the symbolising of things, he copes and relates to his 
world. 44 The terms, "signs," and "symbols" are used in 
the vast majority of definitions and theories that attempt 
to describe the communicative qualities of art. The two 
terms are used, very often, in a very indiscriminate way, 
implying that both may be somewhat synonomous, which in 
fact they are not. 
A sign must have a physical or actual equivalent, 
while a symbol, though it may have particular denotations, 
is always a conceptual construction, that involves conno-
tations of words and objects, and metaphoria associations 
over and beyond their literal aspects.45 According to 
Langer: 
A sign indicates the existence, past, 
present, or future of a thing, event, or 
condition. Wet streets are a sign that it 
has rained. A patter on the roof, is a 
sign that it is raining, The relationship 
between a sign and its object is a simple 
one: they are associated somehow, to form 
a 'pair;' that is t2 say, there is a one-
to-one correlation. 6 
Symbols, on the contrary, 
are not proxy for their objects, but 
are "vehicles for the conception of objects." 
44Tejera, op. cit., p. 41. 
45 rrving Kaufman, Art and Education in Contempor-
ary Culture, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966) 
p. 302. 
46suzanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 57. 
To conceive a thing or situation is not the 
same thing as to "react toward it" overtly, 
or to be aware of its presence. Therefore, 
"it is the conceptions, not the things that 
-symbols directly 'mean.'" The fundamental 
difference between signs and symbols, is 
this difference of association, and conse-
quently 9f their use by another party to 
the meaning and function of the subject; 
signs "announce" their objects to the 
observer, whereas symbols "lead one to 
conceive" the objects."47 
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_The symbol, in contradistinction to the sign has 
many universal, variable and broadly conceptual character-
istics; while the sign is more specific, unique and basic-
ally involved with practical information. The essential 
difference that exists between the two and that divides 
them in kind is function. Symbols function as arbitrators 
of the mind, intrinsically. "Signs announce their objects," 
and all, animals and man, respond accordingly. "Symbols 
lead one to conceive of the object," and for this., man has 
the greater capacity. 
A Working Definition of Art 
In sumation, art as communication has much in 
common to all systems of communication; symbols and groups 
of symbols are combined in structured relationships to 
produce equivalents for human experience. The symbols 
that are developed are separate and distinct from the 
actual objects and experiences they represent. Often 
471bid., pp. 60-61. 
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these symbols and their organization are based upon pre-
vious experiences and traditions, but just as often they 
are the result of an individuals artist's attempt to find 
the means of communicating those aspects of his experience 
which he feel-s cannot be expressed with the visual language 
of his heritage. 
In lieu of this information, as to the function 
and distinguishing characteristics of art, the previously 
formulated definition of art must be altered, to include 
the phrase, "skill in expressing and communicating past 
emotional and other experience, individual and social, in 
a perceptivle medium." The definition of art should then 
read: 
ART: is skill in making or doing 
that which is used or intended as a stim-
ulus to a satisfactory aesthetic experi-
ence, often along with other ends or 
functions; especially in such a way that 
the perceived stimulus, the meanings is 
suggests, or both, are felt as beautiful, 
pleasant, interesting, emotionally moving, 
or other.wise valuable as objects of direct 
experience, in addition to any instrumen-
tal values they may have. It is also 
skill in expressing and communicating 
past emotional and other experience, 
individual and social, in a perceptible 
medium. 48 
48 Munro, op. cit., p. 518. 
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Chapter 4 
PROBLEMS IN UNDERSTANDING ART 
Perceptual and Intellectual Inadequacy 
For the observers, the consumer.s of the arts, the 
meaning of art begins with the work itself. The observer 
begins where the artist, producer, has stopped. The 
meaning that the layman finds in the art object is depend-
ent upon the work of art, but it is also dependent upon 
the viewer's own intellectual and emotional condition, as 
well as his ability to perceive the work before him. Like 
the reader of a written text, the observer must recognize 
and decipher the symbols and the pattern of symbols before 
understanding can occur.49 
The artist could express himself without his mean-
ing being comprehended by the observer; art could be 
symbolic without succeeding in being understood; the artist 
could do his half of the process of communication and yet 
not be received; but in speaking of art as language, then 
quite definitely, it could not be language unless it is 
shared by others, and unless it were hypothetically under-
standable, even if not understood by them. 50 
49Knobler, op. cit., p. 3. 
50saw, op. cit., p. 142. 
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There will always be art to be done because there 
will always be experiences that are fragmentary, un~atis-
factory, or in some way not unitary. Given the dynamics 
of human adaption and of social change, the moment alway.s 
comes when the art of the past no longer serves to inform us 
of current experience or the perceptions of the present. 
So it is with works of art presently being offered to the 
public. The artist often leaves the unitiated, and a 
vast majority of the public confused and sometimes anta-
gonistic. When faced with objects which at first glance 
may seem meaningless, the observer who seeks to understand 
art, and especially contemporary art, must ~ive the artist 
the benefit of a doubt, or at least take a second look. 
However, the observer must also grant the possibility that 
his inability to comprehend the work in question is due 
to an inadequacy in himself and not the artist. 
The perception of meaning in a work of art, is 
not automatic, even though it.appears to be for some works. 
The training and effort required of the artist for the 
production of his work often required a parallel prepara-
tion in the public which expects to respond to it. At 
this point the responsiblity shifts and it is the observer 
who bears the burden. If he is satisfied that his percep-
tual training is equal to the demands made by the artist, 
then he can question the content and the values implicit 
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in the objects before him. If not, the serious observer 
can react only to what he finds meaningful; many works of 
art will remain enigmatic to him until that time when he 
is prepared to respond to them. 
The present-day viewer of art can no longer assume 
that the photographic image is a standard by which other 
images are to be judged, a language acting as the measure 
of other communications systems, for the viewer finds him-
self in a multilingual visual world, a world in which all 
languages have a value measured by their ability to com-
municate a significant imag.e of some portion of human 
experience. Both the artist and the viewing public are 
today faced with the problems of communication which 
rarely affected their counterparts in the past. Because 
they are aware of so much of the world, because they per-
ceive it historically, scientifically, psychologically, 
and because the personal perception has been given a value 
which it did not have in the past, the representation of 
that perception and the comprehension of what has been 
represented becomes a complex process.51 
However, the public cannot place the total respon-
sibility for its response upon the artist. It is not 
enough to say that the artist must produce an object which 
makes the public respond, for the understanding and 
· 51 · Knobler, op. cit., p. 49. 
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appreciation of art results from an active participation 
on the part of the observer. The work of art exists as 
a completed physical entity when it is presented to 
the viewer, but it becomes an object of esthetic value 
only when it causes a response in that viewer, and the 
nature of that response is dependent upon the active 
participation of the viewer in the esthetic experience. 
The work of art has a statement to make, but it is the 
observer who shapes that statement into a personal commun-
ication. Art in this sense, then, is neither communication 
nor language unless there is a shared message between the 
precipitator of such and the recipient. When this pheno-
menon of a shared message occurs, then indeed, art is 
communication and language, for it then i.implies both 
communion and dialogue, rather than monologue. 
Art is communicative in the sense of dialogue 
' 
and communion, it is shared celebration or consecration 
of a value, perception, or experience. The development 
or achievement of this value requires intelligence, as 
does the process which is barely distinguishable from it 
of giving form to this value in some medium. Intelligence 
is communicative in the sense that it institutes cooper-
ation in activities which, however, are guided by mediate 
or remote ends in view. Intelligence attempts to be per-
ception of how things function, not just the experience 
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of others, but how they function in physical, or non-
human contexts. Intelligence and art are, both, creative 
and communicative processes. Intelligence is creative in 
the sense that it invents or is said to discover, an order 
in the world which allows the human being to intervene 
decisively in the course of affairs. Art is creative in 
the sense that it is expressive, and if it produces change, 
it is only indirectly and in moral matters. 52 
Although the arts are intended and adapted, on 
the whole, to stimulate satisfactory aesthetic experience, 
along with other functions, their success in do1ng so, is 
extremely variable. It depends to a great extent on the 
training and conditioning of the percipient. Except for 
the blind, perception of the visual arts would seem to 
pose no difficult problems, but few persons of normal 
vision realize how limited their perception and perceptual 
understanding really is. 
Perception, the awareness of the world around one, 
based on the information that comes through the sense, is 
too often considered as a natural, matter-of-fact attribute 
of the human being. The assumption is made that everyone 
sees the same thing, and this is not so. For some time 
psychologists and physiologists have known that there is 
52Tejera, op. cit., p. 214. 
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considerable difference between the raw information given 
to the brain by the senses and one's awareness of the world 
based on this information. Processor J. Z. Young states: 
"the once-blind man can learn to 'see' 
only by training his brain. By expending a 
considerable amount of effort, one can gradu-
ally understand the visual experiences of 
color, form, space, and textures."53 
Young's experiments suggest that the sensations 
one receives have no meaning until one knows how to order 
them into a coherent perception. Perceiving something 
requires that the observer make a selection of the numerous 
sensations transmitted to him at any one time. The obser-
ver must select those sensations which are significant for 
the construction of a particular experience and disregard 
those which are irrelevant. As Young points out, this 
requires training. The untrained observer cannot make 
sense of what he sees before him.54 
According to Kaufman, animals other than man have 
a highly developed receptor system that triggers an almost 
instantaneous effector system. Even when they do not as 
in laboratory experiments they evidence no more than the 
most rudimentary aspects of interpretive intelligence with 
no real qualities of imagination. There is a practical 
cast of mind in the animal that essentially responds to 
53Knobler, op. cit., p. 14. 
54rbid., p. 14. 
signs and signals but never really in a symbolic 
context. 
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The human mind on the other hand, has developed 
an inhibiting arrangement between the receiving of sense 
material and the reaction to it as well as an imaginative, 
projecting quality. There is a neuro-physiological base 
for this in the synaptic relay of messages to the brain. 
This is not of concern in this paper. What is important 
though, is the recognition of this innately human power 
that may be called the symbolic system. Man does not, 
in a biological and cognitive sense, react instinctively 
to his environment and stimuli found there. He stops, 
thinks, weighs, and counterbalances the choices that 
become consciously apparent or that he unconsciously 
devises. His way of knowing is dependent upon his intel-
lect and the symbol-making powers he possesses. Man's 
picture of the world, and his manner of reaction to it 
are determined by this inherent inhibition that activates 
the fluent symbolic screen in his mind. This screen has 
developed through all the varied strains of man's know-
ledge, through which man experiences the reality of 
multiple dimensions. 55 
This is an important concept to remember, for 
according to Tejera, what one notices and fails to notice 
55Kaufman, op. cit., p. 299. 
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in ordinary life is dependent upon three factors, namely; 
interest, one's conditioning, and intellectual life. 56 
No wonder then, that the so-called "serious art" divides 
people into those who are able to appreciate and understand 
it and those who cannot, for one of the chief criticisms 
of modern art by the average layman, the "man on the 
street," is that he does not know what it is meant to be, 
but yet, he knows what he likes. This is taken by himself 
to be a bold assertion of a sturdy common sense, but by 
the aesthete to be an expression of Philistinish; one 
of those over-simplifications induced by a no-standard 
position. This is also implied in Gombrich's book, 
Art and Illusion, in which the concept is presented that 
a work of art contains in some sense of the word, much 
more than appears on the surface; that art is for compre-
hension, that is "understanding," and appreciation. In 
order to do this, however, one must be equipped to "read 
the signs," i.e., literal marks that can be "read" or 
taken as clues, in order to discern what is there, not 
for its own sake and for the sake of its sensible proper-
ties, but for its meaning.57 Being "equipped," implies 
the possession of adequate intellectual and perceptual 
qualities that would enable one to make genuine cognitive 
56 · 't 16 TeJera, op. ci ., p. . 
57E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion, (London: Phai-
don Press, 1962), p. 161. 
and aesthetic judgements and to transcencl the realm of 
sensory judgements so frequently and commonly made by 
the average individual. 
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If "A" says of object "X", that it is beautiful 
and "B" says that it is not beautiful, one of them is 
right and the other wrong. If the contradictory judge-
ments were descriptive and not sensory, there would be 
accepted ways of determining which of the two was right. 
Since the sensory judgement invokes no concepts, one 
can apply no test so far as the subject is concerned. 
What we can do is fine out whether "A" and "B" are making 
genuine aesthetic judgements. 
Cultural Illiteracy 
The visual arts produced by the contemporary 
artist, seem to be isolated from a large portion of soci-
ety. Many artists find few among the lay public who seem 
to understand the concepts basic to the arts, few who can 
recognize the historical ties between present-day art 
and the arts of the past. To the practicing artist, there 
appears to be a widespread visual illiteracy, a public 
generally incapable of "reading" current visual language 
and often extremely limited in its ability to "read" the 
visual languages of the past. 
Another damanging comment on the general level of 
cultural illiteracy comes from the controversial novelist 
49 
and essayist, Henry Miller. He indicates that it is not 
only the manufactured visual vulgarity that covers the 
land or its arid commercialism, but the sticky, lost 
morass of spirit that is developed where only in the 
interstices of society can one sense an honestly open and 
fresh human purpose and an unencumbered and committed 
endeavor. He also states that nothing comes to function 
in America except utilitarian objects. One can ride for 
thousands of miles and be utterly unaware of the existence 
of the world of art. One will learn all about beer, con-
densed milk, rubber.goods, canned foods, inflated matresses, 
etc.; but one will never see or hear anything concerning 
the masterpieces of art.SB 
58 f · 374 Kau man, op. cit., p. . 
Chapter 5 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF ART TO EDUCATION AND SOCIETY 
Relationship of "Art" to "Life" 
Those elements within Western Society that 
59 
percipitate cultural illiteracy are; labor and technology, 
social, economic, and material mobility, as well as lei-
sure,60 institutions of higher learning, the cultural 
antithesis between the useful and fine arts, 61 and the 
mass media, 62 and others that are a result of these 
that are aforementioned. However, all these are inter-
related, and have a direct relationship to the status of 
art and art criticism within American Society. 
The relation of art to life is of the first 
importance, especially in a skeptical age, when man turns 
to his own creations and examine~ them, not alone from 
the aesthetic point of view, but for what they reveal, 
for what they validate and invalidate, for the support 
they give to the culture. Art and civilization are not 
separate enterprises. Almost all man does, he does by 
59 Tejera, op. cit., p. 204. 
60c1ement Greenbert, Art and Culture, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1961), p. 29. 
61Munro, op. cit., pp. 47-90. 
62 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 385. 
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art, or culture; culture being, as Greenberg states, "all 
the characteristic activities of a given people." 63 Ani-
mals have instincts and biological adaption or speciali-
zation; but man has his arts, or cultural adaptions. It 
has been rightly said that the intellectual arts are 
those that free. men most to be themselves. 64 One must 
think of the arts as Veron insisted, not as the fine 
late flower of human culture, not the fugitive bloom of 
civilizations as they emerge into the sun, but as the 
very germ and active principle in culture-building from 
the ground up; from the bone tools and pebble tools of 
the small-brained men in lower Pleistocene times to date, 
the process of man's adaption has been artfui. 65 
Beyond this, the arts are the outward manifesta-
tions of all the inner happenings of culture. They are 
the symbolic touchstones of the values of that culture 
and are reflections of its social order in a very discern-
66 
ing manner. 
63 Greenberg, op. cit., p. 23. 
64Mark Van Doren, Autobiography, (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1958). 
65Tejera, op. cit., p. 123. 
66 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 47. 
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The "Folk," "Popular" and "High" Cultures in Society 
According to Kaufman, there are three existing 
categories of social-aesthetic organization within Western 
civilization. He refers to these as, folk, popular, and 
high cultures, giving rise to folk, popular, and high 
art forms. 67 Even though there is no scientific validity 
with which to objectively support the existence of these 
categories, most, who are intellectually concerned with 
communication through various art media as manifestations 
of culture, would generally accept the existence of simi-
lar classifications. There may be individual modification 
as to make up or extent of influence, but there is general 
agreement that something approximating the three cultures, 
giving rise to their particular art forms, does in fact 
exist as cohesive and separate entities. This concept is 
echoed also by Max Lerner, who refers to the three art 
forms in the same terminology as stated by Kaufman. 68 
However, Russell Lynes refers to them as, highbrow art, 
69 middlebrow art, and lowbrow art. 
The folk culture is the oldest type of group 
expression. It is an indigenous development arising from 
York: 
67 Ibid., p. 339. 
68Max Lerner, American as a Civilization, (New 
Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 646. 
69Russell Lynes, The Tastemakers, (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1954), pp. 310-333. 
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the daily involvements of the average individual within 
a circumscribed environment. Early in the colonial per-
iod of America, with the influx of immigrant groups 
bringing differing folk ways and characteristic art forms 
to a new country, America gave rise to a specific folk 
culture. All of these have left imprints on the culture 
of America, though the internal needs and external condi-
tions that shaped the folk culture have either, to an 
extent, disappeared, or have been absorbed as a part of 
the larger mass culture. The delineation of the folk 
art was usually intuitive and in direct association with 
the sensuous and psychological qualities of the surround-
ings. Though there were often utilitarian purposes for 
the forms, they were not intrusive. They derived their 
forms from a sympathetic rapport with active and mythical 
qualities innocently yet pragmatically, weaving the condi-
tions of art and life into a sensuous symbolic relation-
ship.70 One can illustrate some genuine and representative 
American folk culture by pointing to such items as colonial 
furniture, the portraits of the itinerant limners, the 
ballads of the pioneers, the craft work of the Indians, 
the spirituals of the slaves, or the design motifs of the 
Pennsylvania Dutch settlers. Though there may have been 
a parallel high culture existing simultaneously, the two 
70Kaufman, op. cit., p. 341. 
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did not attempt to penetrate one another. There are only 
vestigial remnants of this kind of culture and its art 
forms in the United States currently, and the reasons for 
such will be presented later. Lynes refers to the folk 
culture and folk art as "lowbrow," i.e., that. culture 
which absorbs and maintains without much questioning the 
"popular arts," the unrefined folk forms of dress, orna-
mentation, iazz, language, and calendar art.
71 
The popular culture, that gives rise to popular 
art forms, or as Lynes refers to them, the middlebrow 
forms, i.e., those that fit anywhere between highbrow and 
lowbrow, 72 are the most pervasive in contemporary American 
society. These art forms are characterized by a commercial 
self-sufficience. It has developed a media of its own, 
where the serious artist will rarely venture. It comes 
in the form of "do-it-by-the-number" crafts kits, "paint-
by-the-numbers" painting sets, one dollar reproductions 
of great paintings, original art work by mail order from 
Sears and Roebuck, imitative facades of architectural 
structures reflecting past, historical eras, and many 
other expurgated and abridged versions of a high order of 
intellectual search and spuriously intense emotional 
expression. 
7lLynes, op. cit., pp. 310-333. 
72 Ibid. 
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Dwight MacDonald characterizes "popular" culture, 
or as he prefers to call it ''Masscult'' as follows: 
"It is not just unsuccessful art. 
It is non-art. .Masscult offers its 
customers neither an aesthetic experience 
nor an emotional catharsis, for these 
demand effort. The production line grinds 
out a uniform product whose humble aim 
is not even entertainment, for this too 
implies life and hence effort, but merely 
distracticn. It may be stimulating or 
narcotic, but it must be easy to assimi-
late. It asks nothing of its audience 
for it is 'totally subjected to the spec-
tator,' and it gives nothing."73 
Clement Greenberg, another critic borrows a German 
work "kitsch" to further describe the conditions.of popu-
lar culture. He comments: 
"The precondition for kitsch, a con-
dition without which kitsch would be 
impossible, is the availability close at 
hand of a full matured cultural tradition, 
whose discoveries, acquisitions, and per-
fected self-consciousness, 'kitsch' can 
take advantage of for its own ends. It 
borrows from its devices, tricks, strate-
gems, rules of thwnb, themes, converts 
them into a system, and discards the rest 
.• when enough times has elapsed, the 
new is looted for new 'twists' which are 74 then watered down and served up as kitsch." 
The sad fact is, that the revealing glimpses into 
both society and culture supposedly offered by "kitsch" 
73Dwlght MacDonald, Against the American Grain, 
(New York: Random House, 1962), p. 3. 
74clement Greenberg, "Avant Garde and Kitsch," 
The Partisan Reader, (New York: Dial Press, 1946), 
p. 381. 
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are, for the most part, truncated and superficial experi-
ences. It tends to become a barrier to an authentic 
involvement with aesthetic qualities and a more profound 
artistic expression. 
The third category of social-aesthetic organization 
is high culture and high art forms, or as Lynes refers, 
the highbrow art forms, the highbrow culture, in which 
the people's taste have been developed through intellectual 
pursuits and experiences therein, and the fine arts. 75 
High culture may not be as old as folk culture, 
but it developed as soon as social organization became 
more sophisticated than simple communcal living. It 
reflects and expresses the highest achievements and aspi-
rations of a civilization. The priestly culture of Egypt, 
the inspired rule of Rome, the Mandarin dynasties of 
China, the Renaissance, the majestic courts of France, 
in which all created high art forms that may now be 
regarded as pinnacles of cultural achievement. These 
cultures were sophisticated and intensely practiced ones, 
separated from the common run of endeavor, based upon the 
existence of a priviledged or aristocratic class that had 
highly developed social backgrounds in additon to aesthe-
tically oriented educations, in short, cultivated taste. 
75Lynes, op. cit., pp. 310-333. 
One can exerpt from de Tocqueville a concise 
explanation of the formation of these high cultures: 
"It commonly happens that, in the age 
of priviledge, the practice of almost all 
the arts becomes a priviledge, and that 
every pro~ession is a separate domain into 
which it is not allowable for everyone to 
enter. Even when productive industry is 
free, the fixed character which belongs to 
aristocratic nations gradually segregates 
all. the persons who practice the same art 
till they form a distinct class, always 
composed of the same families, whose members 
are all known to each other, and among whom 
a public opinion of their own and a species 
of corporate pride soon spring up. In a 
class or guild of this kind each artisan has 
not only his fortune to make, but his repu-
tation to preserve. He is not exclusively 
swayed by his own interest or even by that of 
his customer, but by that of the body to 
which he belongs; and the interest of that 
body is that each artisan should produce the 
best possible workmanship. In aristocratic 
ages the object of the arts was to manufacture 
as well as possible, not with the greatest 
dispatch or at the lowest rate. The men of 
whom it is composed naturally derive from 
their superior and hereditary position a taste 
for what is extremely well made and lasting. 
This affects the general way of thinking of 
the nation in relation to the arts •.. 
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In aristocracies, then, the handicraftsman 
work for only a limited number of fastidious 
customers; the profit they hope to make depends 
principally on the perfection of their 
workmanship."76 
Even though the priviledged, political, and "elite" 
groups have undergone radical change, the aesthetic tradi-
tions that have shaped and succored high art for so many 
76Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 
(New York: Mentor, 1956), p. 171. 
58 
centuries remain even in western society today, in the 
forms of painting, drawing, sculpture, architecture and 
related disciplines; all in varying degrees. The seri-
ous artist presents a continuing psychological defiance 
of the commonplace in insisting upon an engagement with 
the disturbing yet generative qualities of his inner life 
and that of mankind in general. The result is an ongoing 
creation of art works in the highest tradition, ahead of 
the banalities of the commonplace. 
The Effect of Technology on the "Folk," "Popular," and 
"High" Cultures 
The least prevalent type of social-aesthetic organ-
ization is that of the folk culture and its folk art forms. 
The major reason for this phenomenon is the development 
of science and technology. Kaufman states that in the 
industrialized nations of the west, the nineteenth cen-
tury witnessed the uprooting of folk cultures and the 
alienation of high culture, and that only a few examples 
of pure folk art remain, namely that of the tribal enclaves 
in Africa and the peon culture in Mexico, as a few exam-
ples.77 The last part of Kaufman's statement is extremely 
important, as he implies that these same elements are 
responsible for the promotion of the popular culture and 
the alienation of the high culture. This is no doubt an 
77 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 341. 
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oversimplification on Kaufman's part. Rather, what should 
be stated is that science and technology are the common 
denominators of the many related elements within society 
that promote such a phenomenon. 
The popular culture can be too easily traced to 
irrelevant sources. The conditions of popular culture, 
as characterized earlier, have spread over the world; in 
some instances they are deliberately manipulated as pro-
paganda, in others they are the commodities, ideas, and 
forms most desired by the greater majority of the populace. 
The diffusion of a vast machinery of "homoginized" culture 
cannot be denied: from the socialist realism of Russia 
to the controlled propaganda of China, from the twist, 
frug or latest discotheque craze danced on a Mediterranean 
shore to the, comics read in London, from the mass circula-
tion of magazine covers in the United States to the senti-
mental postcards from south of the border. Obviously there 
are forces at work that stimulate and support the spread. 
The most prominent consideration is the parallel spread 
of the Industrial Revolution. 
The radical innovations of an unbounded technology 
inaugurated many economic and social changes that altered 
the groundwork and class considerations of the developmenb 
of consequent culture no matter what classification they 
fell into. There was greater productivity, an increase 
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in comfort and leisure, the raising of income on all 
levels but particularly at the lowest level, There has 
been a parallel committmen¼ in economic terms at first, 
and subsequently aesthetic ones, to an abundant but mass 
and standardized approach to production and consumption 
founded on efficiency and profit. Despite all the gains 
that technology can claim, there has been a parallel and 
related development, if not an arbitrary imposition of 
an inartistic and unintellectual mass culture. This 
threatens the very advances achieved by technology in 
value terms. The inherent confusions which congenitally 
seem to arise when the standard of excellence is allowed 
to be controlled by an insensitive and uninformed low 
common denominator finds its way into all the nooks and 
crannies of living as well as into the large public 
areas. 78 
"Technology," as Max Frisch in his novel Homo 
Faber succintly points out, may be regarded as, "the 
knack of so arranging the world so that one does not have 
to experience it." Technology at once becomes a .. bur.den 
as well as an opportunity. The opportunities that can 
relieve the bulk of man in his unremitting struggle for 
daily bread, creating opportunities for what could be an 
intense and creative self-realization but is really only 
7Sibid., p. 365. 
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a redistribution of time,- can at the same time burden 
society with unsuspected illusions and concepts which trap 
the average individual and keep him from a really vital 
engagement with experience. 79 
While technology has been the underlying cause 
of the demise and virtual extinction of folk art forms 
within the United States, and promoted the incessant flood 
of popular art forms presented to the American public; 
its affect upon high art forms is of an entirely different 
nature. 
The development of science and technology has 
increased 'the ways in which one can view the world. Devel-
opments in the sciences have extended the limits of the 
senses to a tremendous degree. The eyes, aided by the 
electron microscope, can see into a world of complex and 
amazing forms. The telescope can reach into the heavens 
to examine the vast heavens,: the spaces among the stars, 
and the patterns of the nebulae. The x-ray permits explor-
ation of the intricate inner forms of familiar objects and 
creatures. The oscilloscope reveals patterns of sound and 
other invisible energies. The motion picture camera makes 
possible the capture of even the swiftest of movements for 
study at leisure. The landscape of today is not restricted 
to a view from a hilltop; it can be seen from a plane far 
79Ibid., p. 365. 
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above the earth or from a bathyscaph a mile beneath the 
surface of ·the sea. The dimensions of the perceptual 
world have been increased many times in the last few 
years, and they now continue their expansion into outer 
space. For Renaissance man the forms of the outer world 
were restricted to what he could see with the unaided eye. 
When the painter of the fifteenth century conceived of a 
landscape, it was viewed in terms of trees growing over 
him and mountains rising over the fields in distant blues 
and violets. Today the world is a different place for 
the artist. His vision is no longer confined to the 
limits of the earth. He may paint what he sees, but now 
what he sees has been extended to the microcosm and macro-
cosm that science has revealed to him. 
Because of the new breadth of subject matter now 
a part of the environment in which men live, because of 
the relatively recent emphasis on subjective attitudes 
and ·responses to experience, there is a continuing search 
on the part of the artist for visual equivalents expres-
sive of his inner world and of his consciousness of the 
world he perceives about him. Parallel with the artist's 
concern for the visual equivalent is his interest in the 
esthetic structure of his work. At times it is the sym-
bolic meaning which dominates his art, at times the esthetic, 
but most often it is a fusion of the two. 
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As in the instance of verbal or written communi-
cation, there is a need for adequate preparation on the 
part of all parties to the intercourse, dialogue, communi-
cation; and for the observer of painting, sculpture, and 
architecture. This means recognition of the problems of 
communication in the visual arts and active participation 
in the study of the new languages which appear as artists 
strive for an active expression of the contemporary life. 
Effect of Technology on Cultural Value Systems 
Technology, as Marx pointed out, produces class 
divisions within a civilization that is characterized by 
material productivity, which is the case in even the most 
advanced societies. 80 Accordingly, these class divisions 
have given rise, historically, to a minority of the power-
ful, and therefore the cultivated on one side, and on the 
other, the great mass of the exploited and poor, and there-
fore the ignorant. Formal culture, historically, has 
belonged to the first, while the last have had to content 
themselves with a folk or rudimentary culture. 81 
It has also been discovered that the first effects 
of technological innovation have usually been unsettling 
and destructive, politically, socially, as well as 
8Dc1ement Greenberg, Art and Culture, op. cit., p. 26. 
81 rbid., p. 16. 
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culturally. Inhereted forms lose their relevance, and 
there is a general breakdown until more apposite forms 
arise, forms that are usually unanticipated and unprece-
dented. This circumstance in itself would be enough to 
account for the present decline of high culture. It is 
also a fact that the source of greatest threat that the 
technological revolution offers to the continuity and 
stability of high culture is a vastly accelerated rate 
of upward social, more accurately, material and economic 
mobility. The traditional facilities of urban culture 
cannot accomodate themselves to a steadily growing popu-
lation, not merely class of newcomers to comfort and 
leisure, without suffering deterioration; to the very 
extent that industrialism promotes social welfare, it 
attacks traditional culture. 82 
Technology attacks the traditional culture not 
only through the channels of social, economic, and mater-
ial mobility, which it causes; but it also attacks the 
basic values and value systems of the numerous ethnic 
groups and socio-economic classes within the American 
society. The II Age;. of Anxiety, 11 as the twentieth century 
has dubbed, because of its continuing sense of crisis., 
violence, uncertainties, has not permitted any simple or 
stable understanding or translation of what the vision of 
82rbid., p. 29. 
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"the good life" may be. The vacillating beliefs and 
shifting values have not had a shared point around which 
to cluster, and it is this focus of attitude, this concen-
tration of a core understanding that is required to render 
the beliefs and values most effective. Modern man no 
longer has the commitments of earlier rituals or the devo-
tional attitude of unquestioned views. The sense of 
identification, of meaningful purpose has withered away 
in the upheavels of the past century; modern man stands 
shorn of his old supports, but, he is bereft of an ability 
to erect new ones, and deprived of authoritative guides 
by which to steer his way. 83 
According to Paul Goodman in his book, Growing 
Up Absurd, many of the fundamental values that have, in 
the past, inspired man into positive action and belief 
have been removed from sight or fractured into mechanized 
and oftentimes insensitive components. It is difficult 
for people to feel that what they are doing is worthwhile. 
The arts in themselves, cannot offset this social malaise; 
it is much too deeply rooted in a pervasive relationship 
of the individual in society to the characteristic means 
of production. It is economic and political in nature 
and art cannot hope to counter these influences in any 
84 
obvious way. 
83 f · Kau man, op. cit., 
84Ibid., p. 34. 
p. 28. 
The values of the contemporary world have found 
their way into the diverse styles and forms of today's 
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art. It is most clearly evident in the apparent divisions 
between the serious or fine art forms and those of the 
popular variety. The latter appear to satisfy the average 
individual's "taste," despite the fact that their mass 
production and standardization render the critical facul-
ties and the basic "hunger for beauty" futile. 
The term "culture" is used to identify the values 
of a people from a common heritage, and the term "values" 
is used to identify the attitudes, and what is regarded 
as acceptable behavior by a particular group of people of 
common heritage. The term "social class" is used when 
studying the ways groups of people relate themselves to 
other people, to economic levels, and in some degree to 
behavioral patterns. Class stratification is a reality 
in this country, but is often ignored by the idealism of 
the populaca Though t4ere is, considerable overlapping, 
shifting, in an open society, there are identifiable 
differences between groups. They tend to share what is 
called the American culture, but they have distinct sub-
cultural characteristics. Each ethnic group within a 
socio-economic class tend to vary in cultural pattern. 
Though social classes have general likenesses throughout 
the country, there are also regional differences, and 
differences if the groups are living in urban or rural 
areas. In describing this phenomenon, the sociologist 
Milton M. Gordon has coined the term ''ethclass.••8 5 
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According to Gordon, as more and more minority 
group members move into the middle and upper middle class, 
ethnic identification alone becomes inadequate to describe 
them, for they identify with the mores of their social 
status; as this takes place more cultural diversity will 
be found within economic groups. 
Gordon also found through his research, two con-
flicting trends in America. One, is a pressure for con-
formity, due to middle class orientation and the extent 
and intensity of mass communications. 86 The other trend 
is that the subcultures of race, religion, national origin, 
and economic level are much stronger than has been assumed. 87 
It was also learned by Gordon, that most people's primary 
group interaction is within their subculture, while their 
secondary group activities tend to be within the larger 
society, and that most of the professional and business 
leadership of the country comes from the middle class core 
85Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life: 
The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 51-54. 
86 Ibid., pp. 24-26. 
87 Ibid., p. 34. 
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culture, and from those members of other groups who have 
learned this core culture. 88 
Two phrases from Gordon's research, namely, "con-
formity to middle class orientation," and "that one's 
primary group interaction is within one's subculture," are 
very important; because, according to Gordon, the middle 
class has never embraced art as central to its culture, 
and that with the many and varied subcultures, there 
appears to be, on the part of the average layman, the use 
of "taste," a subjective and sensory concept, in evaluating 
art forms rather than genuine, objective, aesthetic criti-
. 89 
Cl.Sm. 
"Taste" Development 
According to McFee, "taste" is indeed a subjective, 
and not objective means of evaluation, and is evidenced by 
one's like-dislike behavior. She also adds that the indi-
vidual's "taste" responses are affected usually by the 
values and attitudes of one's group, that is, one's core 
culture, and is directly related to the personality struc-
ture that one develops. One forms "taste" unconsciously, 
often, from listening to others within the immediate core 
culture. McFee also states that "taste" formation is the 
8 8 Ibid . , p . 7 3 . 
89rbid., pp. 254-257. 
result of the combination of three elements; namely, 
individual experience, national culture, and socio-
economic class. 90 
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Ernst van den Haag examines the problem of "taste," 
but he refers to it as the "economics of taste." He points 
out that the material aspect, the goods and commodities 
which originally were only the possession of an elite 
small group now can be provided for the many, not because 
of quality or leisure time or any intrinsic values other 
than that they may be mass produced because of an effi-
cient technology and done so quite cheaply. "However, 
only those things, good things and bad things, are cheap 
that are demanded by enough people to make mass production 
feasible." 91 This puts culture, which is part of the pro-
ductive aspects of society, on an economic basis. Though 
this may have provided mass groups with greater .. opportu-
nities to experience "culture," it is only on the basis 
of shared popular tastes that this can be profitably and 
efficiently established. The lone person with unique, 
independent or developed taste that is outside the pale 
of popular acceptance is penalized in that one must either 
forego that which he prefers because it is either unavailable 
90June King McFee, Preparation for Art, (San Fran-
cisco: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1961), p. 29. 
York: 
91Ernst Van de Haag, The Fabric of Society, (New 
Harcourt, 1957), p. 70. 
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or exorbitantly expensive or he must pay the additonal 
price, though the intrinsic material factors may even be 
lower in actual value than that of the popular item. 
However, the most important aspect of generalized 
"taste" development lies in the broad, encompassing and 
insinuating social pressures that the individual is sub-
jected to. The value orientation of parents and peers, 
of the mass media, and the many traditional sources of 
cultural inheritance are the compelling factors in shaping 
the collective "taste" of the individuals that make up 
various kinds of groups. These are in a complex relation-
ship with one another, with the other identifiable deter-
minants and with the growing self awareness that everyone 
experiences at one time or another.92 
Russell Lynes states in his popular treatise on 
"taste;" "taste is one's personal delight, one's private 
dilemma, and one's public facade." 93 This paradoxical 
delight and delima of "taste"-is often thought of as a 
peculiarly inbred individual quality that somehow grew 
like Topsy. However, at the same time, "taste" becomes 
a degree of commitment to particular values which one. 
wears figuratively like an insignia on one's sleeve for 
others to rate us by. Often, one "reads" the social class 
92Kaufman, op. cit., p. 382. 
93L . 4 ynes, op. cit., p .. 
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of people, sometimes arbitrarily by their "tastes" and 
frequently infer other and more potent aspects through the 
existence of that same factor of "taste." Illogically, 
"taste" is regarded both as the product of many unconscious 
determinants, of long term sets of mind and habits as well 
as the spontaneous impulse responding to momentary fashions 
and fads on one level and to authentic individual under-
standing on another. Because of the intricacy of qualities 
and the psychological confusion surrounding the subject 
of "taste" it is consigned to its own realm. Though people 
think that everyone harkens to this ideal of democratic 
preference, that the entire affair of "taste" is a personal 
matter, the actions of the populus belie this belief. 
one's private delima spreads to the public facade, or at 
least the problem of shaping one's "taste" to conform to 
' what is envisaged as the private image of oneself, vis a 
vis the stares and conjectures of the public attitudes 
outside. Though one may insist that his "tastes" are his 
own, at the same time, he permits them to be manipulated 
by what is regarded as the important "vox populi:" the 
voice of the people. The commercial society and its 
popular culture has taken acute advantage of the situation. 
People are appealed to incessantly to buy this or consider 
that, to change their indiscriminate ways, to give vent 
to their secret desires and generally capitulate to the 
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to the mass imposition of values, all in the name of "good 
taste." 94 
These attitudes of "taste," to reiterate, and 
according to McFee, are shaped by individual experience, 
that generally occur within one's socio-economic position.
95 
In addition to this, however, is the very existence of 
change itself, that occurs with advanced bechn6logy. Tech-
nical innovations and the discovery of new materials and 
processes are fundamental determinates of "taste." They 
enlarge the possibilities offering new or an expanded 
range of choice. The introduction of metal into interior 
furnishings, the development of cheap printing processes 
for reproducing pictures, the structural innovations in 
building construction that make use of a wide variety of 
different materials, among others, have created a refur-
bished and vastly different "taste" in the generai phys-
ical appearances of buildings in the last decade. 96 How-
ever, this is a normal development that has little to do 
with the quality of "taste," but simply opens up the 
possibilities of choice. In a similar way, because of 
technical discoveries, sculpture, which up to the end of 
the nineteenth century was largely confined to stone and 
94Kaufman, op. cit., p. 382. 
95McFee, op. cit., p. 29. 
96Kaufman, op. cit., p. 383. 
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bronze casting,· to chipping and modeling, expanded its 
materials and processes to include iron, steel, plastics, 
and could be welded, cut, glued, and otherwise worked in 
addition to the older academic means. The question of 
"taste," i.e., tl'hat which is "good" or "bad" in art and 
art forms, still remains, no matter what the media 
employed. 97 
In art there is a popular need to have "taste," 
but "taste" has little, if any involvement with the actual 
forms of art that are serious expressions of the human 
condition. The inferior artistic conditions and the 
stereotyped or questionable images that result are clearly 
evident. As the popular artsspread, the superficial 
appearances and the underlying quest for mass success with 
mass audiences becomes the determinant of popular and 
artistic form. There is a blending of technics, commerce, 
and art that makes the distinctions between "good" and 
"bad" art very vague, and unimportant in the final analy-
sis. The fundamental influences of the environment have 
still not found their meaningful interpretation, except 
in ways foreign or merely adjunctive to the conditions of 
art. 98 
97rbid., p. 383. 
9Brbid., p. 291. 
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Effects of the Mass Media 
Another element that promotes "cultural illiteracy," 
and at the same time related directly to technology, is 
that of the mass media. The mass media promotes this phe-
nomenon by attacking the very basic "taste" values of the 
many "ethclasses" within the American society. It has 
accomplished this task through the indiscriminate spread 
and promotion of "popular art" forms and therefore, the 
adulteration of "high art" forms. Visual sensation is 
everywhere present today, and there has been little oppor-
tunity for choice, and for a maturing visual discrimination. 
Because of the demand for speed and efficiency, there has 
been little chance permitting the development of honest 
individual taste, (a time consuming situation and a waste 
of images). The average response to art has become inextri-
cably bound up with the popular mode of visual images. 
There is a vague and blurry distinction between the common 
visual surroundings and the all too rare qualities of art. 
All have been lumped together in a bland and generally 
unrewarding fusion of ~alues. The unique reality of art 
has become the esoteric possession of a relatively fortu-
nate few, while the average person has been prey to the 
f 1 ' 1 · k d' ' ' 99 tyranny o a Pav ovian- i econ itioning. 
99 rbid., p. 413. 
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Modern man has become the helpless victim of a 
fantastic array of sensory experiences. The designer and 
the commercial artist have been more the victim of this 
visual jumble than the consumer, for they have had to 
create within this crazy cacophony of the eyes. It is 
simple enough for the sensitive person to detach himself 
from this optically fantastic menagerie or for the indif-
ferent person to ignore it, but for the commercial artist, 
it is the very stuff with which he communicates. As such, 
it becomes an insurmountable obstacle to honest creative 
endeavor and becomes a hard, insensitive and crude visual 
backdrop of the average, banal, aesthetic understanding 
and the aborted formative level of mass artistic appreci-
ation. 
Siegfried Kracauer notes: 
"Ours is an age of pictorialization. 
Wherever we go or stay, pictures surround 
and beseige us. They stare at us from the 
pages of our tabloids and popular weeklies, 
pass across the scree:p. in a nonstop proces-
sion, and, with television seeking new out-
lets, increasingly invade the last refuges 
of introspective, the bars. There is no 
baseball game which cannot be vicariously 
attended by anybody everywhere; nor is there 
a remote work of art that would evade mass 
reproduction. Thus, a situation arises in 
which we are literally flooded with sights 
and spectacles, a vehement and interminable 
deluge.100 · 
100siegfried Kracauer, "Pictoral Deluge," Trans-
formation I, (1950), p. 53. 
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The visual image has permeated our entire society, 
from the blatant city streets, the bulletin boards of 
schools, the consciousness of how one dresses, abstract 
paintings on museum walls, to the severely fenestrated 
facades of the new glass skyscrapers; the image, popular 
or otherwise, has become a necessity in our culture. It 
comes in all forms, as sculpture in graceless shopping 
centers, a colorful record album, a lurid book jacket, or 
the self-conscious canvas of the Sunday painter. 
American's have become an eye-hungry people with 
an insatiable appetite for more, larger, brighter, more 
novel, and more lurid images. Any subtle and sensitive 
relationships that exist with "high" art forms, is quickly 
drowned amidst the raucous and overwhelming quantity and 
quality of the "popular" imagry. The aesthetic experience 
has be vitiated against the massive and the insistent 
demands the environment makes upon the eyes and the con~ 
sciousness. People have been submerged by the visual and 
simultaneously, have been prevented from really perceiving 
it. Instead of leading one to inquire into the contents, 
it has dulled the edges of understanding and stifled the 
imagination. Oddly enough, the more one sees,: the less 
he is willing or able to practice the "art of seeing," with 
all that it implies in personally spontaneous responses. 101 
lOlKaufman, op. cit., p. 415. 
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As aforementioned, Greenberg, utilizes the term 
"kitsch" in describing this indiscriminate spread of 
"popular" imagry. 102 Greenberg attributes this phenom-
enon as the resultant product of technological and 
industrial revolution which has urbanized the masses in 
both Western Europe and in particular the United States. 103 
Because it has been turned out mechanically, 
"kitsch" has become an integral part of the productive 
system, in a way in which true culture could never be, 
except accidentally. It has been capitalized at a tremen-
dous investment which must show commensurate returns; it 
is compelled to keep as well as to extend its markets. 
It brings pressure to bear on every member of society. 
Traps are laid in those areas, so to speak, that are the 
preserves of genuine culture. "Kitsch" is deceptive. It 
has many different levels, and some of them are high enough 
to be dangerous to the naive. As an example, the Metro-
politian Museum of Art is to ,J;u:tve a major retrospective, 
historical exhibit of the work of Claude Monet in April 22, 
1978. In the interim, the museum has granted Springs Mills 
Company the permission to reproduce.many of Monet's major 
works on such as towels, draperies, bedspreads, comforters, 
102Greenberg, op. cit., p. 9. 
l0 3Ibid. 
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and sheets, so that this work will "be enshrined on the beds 
of America."lO!I 
"Kitsch" has not been confined to the cities in 
which it was born, but it has flowed out over the country-
side, virtually wiping out all vestiges of the folk culture. 
It has shown no regard for geographical or national-cultural 
boundaries. 
There has been more or less a general agreement 
among the• "cultivated" of mankind over the ages as to what is 
"good" art and "bad." "Taste" has varied, but not beyond cer-
tain limits. Contemporary conoisseurs have agreed that the 
eighteenth-century artist, Hokusai was one of the greatest 
artists of his time. It is also generally agreed that of the 
ancient Egyptians, the Third and Fourth Dynasty art was the 
most worthy of being selected as their paragon by those who 
came after. Some people have come to prefer Giotto to Raphael, 
but it is still generally agreed that Raphael was one of the 
best painters of his time. There has been an agreement then, 
and this agreement rests on the fairly constant distinction 
made between those values only to be found in art, and the 
values to be found elsewhere, such as "kitsch." "Kitsch, by 
virtue of a rationalized technique that draws on science and 
industry, has erased this distinction in practice. 105 
l04House Beautiful, (New York: 
tion, Vol. 120, No; 4; April 1978), p. 
105 b · 13 Green erg, op. cit., p. . 
The Hearst Corpora-
16. 
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The twentieth century has witnessed a remarkable 
spread of these so-called artistic works and procedures 
of visual improvisation and craft activity. In the 
violence of the mass egalitarian reaction to the culti-
vated restrictiveness of high art, there has been a cor-
ruption of the essential nature of art and an adulteration 
of its values; and in art, as elsewhere, all values are 
human values, and therefore relative values. 106 
Leisure 
Technology, automation, and programmed production 
have produced still another element that affects the 
status of cultural illiteracy, namely, leisure. 
Programmed production has caused a decreased 
work week, and automation has accelerated the long range 
decrease of working time that has been occurring during 
this century. 
The Darnell Corporation survey of 342 United 
States and Canadian companies has pointed out a recent 
and decided trend toward a reduced work week, especially 
when vacation _time is included in yearly work patterns. 
Prior to World War II only one worker in four received 
a paid week's vacation. However, the two decades of 1940 
lOGibid., p. 13. 
to 1960, the total working time for the average worker 
dropped the equivalent of four weeks. In the last five 
years, an increase in vacation time has developed, with 
half the salaried workers receiving a month's vacation 
sometime in their career. Paid holidays have increased 
in 25 years, from an average of two, to over seven. At 
present, only one in four works between 32 and 40 hours 
a week. 107 The main trend indicates that there will be 
more people with leisure time than ever before in the 
history of mankind. The machine has freed vast numbers 
for leisure, but they have neither a cultural pattern 
nor cultural training to use it in a meaningful way. 
The greatest change that industrialism has made 
80 
in daily life is to -separate work from leisure in a radi-
cal and almost absolute way. Work has been more sharply 
separated from everything that is not work. It has been 
made more concentratedly and purely in attitude, in method, 
and above all, time. Moreover, under the rule of effi-
ciency, seriously purposeful activity, has in general 
tended to become assimilated to work. The effect of all 
this, has been to reduce leisure to an occasion more 
exclusively of passivity, to a breathing spell or inter-
lude; it has become something peripheral, and work has 
l07sylvia Porter, "New Trends in Vocations," 
{Syndicated News Column), Prepublication Review of Darnell 
Corporation publications, New York, June 2, 1965. 
replaced it as the central as well as positive aspect of 
life, and as the occasion for the realization of its 
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highest ends. Thus, leisure has become more purely lei-
sure nonactivity, or aimless activity, as work has become 
more purely work, more purposeful activity.108 
According to ·Greenburg, in societies below acer-
tain level of economic development, everyone works; and 
where this is so, work and culture tend to be fused in a 
single functional complex. Art becomes barely distinguish-
able, in either intention or practice, from the techniques 
or production, to healing, and even war. 109 
This fact is evidenced in the study of numerous 
cultures that are devoid of significant technology. Among 
the more notable studies, is that of the Balinese culture, 
10 . 111 
conducted by such as, Jane Belo, 1 and Margaret Mead. 
In this study, it was found that almost every Balinese 
l08 
Greenberg, op. cit., p. 31. 
109 b'd Ii.,p.33. 
ll0Jane Belo, "Balinese Children's Drawing," Child-
hood in Contemporary Cultures, ed. Margaret Mead and Martha 
Wolfenstein, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 
pp. 52-69. 
111
Margaret Mead, "Children and Ritual in Bali," 
Childhood in Contemporary Cultures, ed. Margaret Mead and 
Martha Wolfenstein, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1955), pp. 47-48. 
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participated in some way in art. Also, there was found 
to be no extreme differentation between the most gifted 
and the least gifted, between the professional and ama-
teur artist. 112 It was also found that a major factor in 
the Balinese culture, was the integration of art, that is, 
"high art" forms, with daily life. Work in art was highly 
valued in their culture. 113 
In contrast, there has been basic value conflicts 
in American society between art and one's environment. 114 
There has been difficulty in carrying on a leisure-oriented 
tradition of culture in the United States, which has been, 
h . t . 11 k . d . 115 is orica y, a wor oriente society. This, in itself, 
has been enough to keep the present crisis of cultural 
illiteracy in our culture unresolved. This parodying 
delima of values between art and environment, has resulted 
in making life as a su~stitute for art and art as a sub-
stitute for life commonplace.116 
The rise of modern naturalistic science, and tech-
nology in the west, has had profound repercussions on the 
nature of art, and the people's attitudes toward art. The 
ll2Margaret Mead, op. cit., pp. 47-48. 
113J . une King McFee, op. cit., p. 33. 
114 Ibid. 
ll5Greenberg, op. cit., p. 32. 
116Brian O'Doherty, Object and Idea, 
Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 13. 
(New York: 
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development of scientific technology has tended to remove 
the more purely utilitarian pursuits from the field of 
"art," as historically and commonly conceived; and the 
field of art has been left with a more specialized emphasis 
on aesthetic functions.ll7 
117 ' 106 Munro, op. cit., p. . 
Chapter 6 
THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE FINE ARTS 
Antithesis Between "Applied" and "Fine" Arts 
There is a direct relationship between technology, 
its societal implications, with art, education, art criti-
cism, and society per se. It is this fundamental relation-
ship that establishes the current status of "art" within 
American society. 
The initial problem that technological development 
has bestowed on American society, is that of a redefinition 
and reclassification of the term "art;" namely, (1) where 
does "art" end, and "industry" begin; (2) should there be 
an antithesis between the "aesthetic" and "utilitarian" 
functions of "art;" and (3) which disciplines shall be 
included, and which shall be excluded when using the term 
"art. 11 
Earlier in history, it was once considered that 
art contained a rather extensive range of activities. 
There was no basis for distinction between, for instance, 
the crafts and picture making. Aesthetics and utilitarian 
functioning were considered as one. However, with the 
advent of the Renaissance, the work of art became an 
exceptional thing. Art and its creator were deemed to 
possess special qualities. A separation marked art from 
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other craft activities, establishing hierarchies of 
prestige, social values, and a need for refined tastes, 
Subsequently, the development of art degenerated into a 
meretricious style of an official academy during the 
nineteenth century.118 
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In the Renaissance and afterward, the prejudice 
against the manual diminished, and less emphasis was 
placed on the basis of division, "manual or nonmanual." 
The aristocratic distinction between noble and ignoble 
still persisted, however; and it continued to be associ-
ated with that between "fine" (aesthetic, non-utilitarian) 
and "useful." 119 
Still later, in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, another change occurred, namely, the rise of demo-
cratic ideas and the rising power of the middle and lower 
classes. The basis of the distinction "noble, ignoble" 
no longer seemed important. "Manual and nonmanual," "fine 
and useful," seemed much less important than before. How-
ever, theorists tried to preserve some objective distinction 
out of the old complex of ideas. They indicated that the 
contrast between "fine or aesthetic" and "useful" was only 
a matter of degree, and preserved it for theoretical 
118Kaufman, op. cit., p. 453. 
119
Munro, op. cit., p. 151. 
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classicication. 120 
Through the industrial revolution and the rise 
of applied science, many skills and industries became :., 
highly developed along specialized, utilitarian lines, 
with little or no aesthetic aim. They gradually ceased 
to be called "arts" or "useful arts," thus leaving the 
term "art" for those skills which did have an aesthetic 
aim or purpose and function, as in architecture. The 
principal basis of division was still that of "aim and 
emphasis" or "intended nature of the product." Another 
distinction on this basis then came into use: the arts 
previously called "useful" were sometimes called "decora-
tive" instead. However, terms emphasizing their usefull-
ness, such as "applied" and "functional," were also 
current. 
During the late nineteenth and especially the 
twentieth century, a trend occurred whibh may be described 
as either the spread of industrialism into the aesthetic 
realm, the making of beautiful products, or the revival 
of aesthetic aims in machine industry. In any case, pro-
ducts with aesthetic aims came to be made and reproduced 
by mechanized, mass processes. This led to a revival of 
an old theory regarding the basis of division of art: that 
of the "kind of process" involved. The distinction however, 
120rbid., p. 152. 
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was not that of "manual or non-manual," but rather, 
"handmade or machine-made." Historically, handmade methods 
had dominated the aesthetic realm, and it was sometimes 
doubted whether there could be such a thing as machine-
made art. However, a strong emphasis was placed on "eye-
appeal" and attractive appearance which led to a new 
category within the realm of art: that of industrial arts, 
or mechanized, mass-produced, aesthetic arts. In classi-
fication however, only part of the process of manufacture 
was usually included as art: the designing, inventive 
phase.121, 
For awhile after the industrial revolutio~ and 
through much of the nineteenth century, large-scale 
machine methods were applied mostly to utilitarian pro-
ducts. Expensive things intended to be beautiful were 
mostly made by hand, as before, Hence it was supposed 
that only handmade things could really be "art." 122 
Simultaneous with this was the "art for art's sake" revolt 
of the nineteenth century which was, according to McFee, 
directed against poor manufacturing design. Its pubpose 
was to separate art from manufacturing rather than to 
improve product design. When the fine arts as creative 
121 b'd I l. ., p. 152. 
122Munro, op. cit., p. 127. 
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expression began to develop, they were set apart from the 
production of useful things. Industrial arts was estab-
lished as a separate subject area in schools, where skill 
h h h h . 1 · f d . h . d 123 rat er tan t e aest etic qua ity o esign was emp asize. 
This movement further separated the applied and fine arts. 
Antithesis Between "Art'' and Technology 
The rise of modern naturalistic science in the 
west had profound repercussions on the nature of art, and 
of people's attitudes toward art. The development of 
scientific technology tended to remove the more purely 
utilitarian pursuits from the field of "art," as commonly 
conceived; and the field of art was left with a more 
specialized emphasis on aesthetic functions. The develop-
ment of pure science and philosophical explanations based 
on science tended to deprive the arts of the need to deal 
with many intellectual problems, or to describe the facts 
of the universe for the benefit of the young. Also, the 
secular trend of western science, philosophy, and education, 
was accompanied by a secular trend in the arts. 124 
In observing the works of many who have studied 
relatively primitive cultures, at an earlier period in 
history, and in relatively remote areas currently, there 
123McFee, op. cit., p. 179. 
124Munro, op. cit., p. 102. 
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is an overlapping between art and the other realms of 
the culture. No specialized realm called "science," 
conscious of its aims and methods, working along distinc-
tive lines, is evidenced. 125 According to Greenberg, art 
and technology ("techne" before it institutionally differ-
entiated into the two things), was not only coeval with 
civilization, but was its very life and necessary condi-
tion.126 
It is also noted by Heilbroner, that because of 
this institutional separation of art and technology, there 
is, presently, an attitute toward the arts that is analo-
gous to that embedded in the usage the "world of the 
socialite. 11 127 The institution referred to by both Green-
berg and Heilbroner, is that of the institution of higher 
education. 
The "Liberal Arts" and "Humanities" 
It has already been noted that the term '"liberal 
arts" covered a group of skills or subjects, variously 
conceived in the Greek and midieval periods, but always 
distinguished as (1) genteel, noble, aristocratic, befitting 
125Munro, op. cit., p. 144. 
126Greenberg, op. cit., p. 133. 
127Robert L. Heilbroner, The worldly Philosophers, 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1953), p. 31. 
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a freeman or a member of the upper class, and thus opposing 
the "servile" arts; (2) involving mental rather than crude 
manual or mechanical work, implying a higher type of men-
tal development; (3) tending to elevate the mind of the 
artist and those whom he serves rather than providing 
physical necessities and comforts. 
There remains a concept of "liberal arts" or 
"humanities," which (in partiality) is distinct from that 
of "fine arts." It is this concept used in higher educa-
tion, to designate the "liberal arts" cirriculum, to 
justify the degree of "Bachelor of Arts," that retains the 
literary and intellectual denotation which it inherited 
from the Middle Ages.128 Though it has changed in speci-
fie content, language and social studies are emphasized 
rather than the visual arts. As subjects for technical 
training, they are opposed for being too practical and 
manual for a "liberal" cirriculum. Simultaneously, they 
are attacked on the opposite ground; that they are merely 
frills, leisure-time amusements, hence out of place in 
the new "liberal education" as interpreted by a practical 
129 age. 
There is still a lingering aura prestige about the 
"liberal arts" curriculum, about intellectual occupations, 
128M · 46 unro, op. cit., p. . 
129 b" 4 I id., p. 7. 
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which leads people to practice them despite small finan-
cial return. According to Munro, there is a noticeable 
stigma regarding occupations which are crudely ·physical 
and dirty without the redeeming factor of mental, tech-
nical skill or administrative ability. There still 
appears to be a distinction between types of occupations, 
as to which are more suited to persons of the upper 
class, though more vague and flexible than in the past. 130 
The term "humanities" is sometimes used instead 
of "liberal arts" with an implied similiar meaning. Web-
ster's Dictionary defines it as follows: 
"Humanities." 1. languages and 
literature, esp. the classical Greek and 
Latin 2. the branches of learning con-
cerned with human thought and relations, 
as distinguished from the sciences; dis-
tinguished from the sciences, esp. litera-
ture, philosophy, fine arts, history, etc. 131 
Narrowly interpreted, it indicates a range of choice in 
the "liJberal arts" curriculum, with emphasis on language 
and literature. It may include work in the visual arts, 
but that is not always implied. 132 "Humanities" may be 
a synonym for "liberal arts" and for "arts" but dictionary 
definition implies more or less of science, and more or 
l 30ibid. 
131webster's New World Dictionary, op. cit., p. 683. 
132
L. Dudley and A. Faricy, op. cit., p. 3. 
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less of "fine art." More and more, it appears, that the 
"humanities" are understood as distinct from th,e physical 
and natural sciences, as the study of human nature, society, 
or culture. Often included are Psychology and Sociology, 
but often science, and restricted to a scholarship of 
literary nature. 133 
In this then, is the survival of the old aristo-
cratic idea of a gentleman's education, as opposed to an 
artisan's; the utilitarian emphasis of technical courses, 
with a corresponding emphasis on the non-utilitarian 
quality of a "liberal education." 
Thus, the distinction between physical and mental 
work, being used for the purpose of distinguishing the 
"liberal" arts from the "mechanick" arts, the latter, said 
to "require more the Labour of the Hand and Body than of 
the Mind; as Carpentry and Carving," precipitated the 
the emergence of art as a specialized realm, with its own 
aims and values. 134 Even though this is a misnomer, in 
no group of arts have a monopoly on physical labor, and 
none on mental labor, modern Western art is more distinct 
133
Munro, op. cit., p. 54. 
134Thomas Munro, "Creative Ability in Art and its 
Educational Fostering," Art in American Life and Education, 
(Bloomington, Ill., National Society for the Study of 
Education, 1941), p. 289. 
from other, neighboring fields of the culture than has 
135 been the case in other cultural epochs. 
Core-Culture Values 
93 
Technology, its effect upon education, (especially 
curriculum construction in institutions of higher education), 
results in a situation in which both, working in conjunction 
with the other, affects the core values of the many core 
cultures within American society. McFee has implied that 
this has been accomplished through the separation of the 
"fine" and "applied" arts, which has not been as marked 
in other societies as ours presently. 136 In other soci-
ties, the force of cultural maintenance was very strong. 
People supposedly knew their roles, and few deviated 
from them. According to McFee, presentday Western cul-
ture is not so well-defined, and therefore, is ahanging 
rapidly. 137 
Studies of American core culture values are some-
what limited because of the subject is so complex, but 
some, relatively consistent values can be 
135Thomas Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelations, 
(Cleveland: Western Reserve University Press, 1967), 
p. 145. 
136McFee, op. cit., p. 27. 
137 
Ibid. 
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'd t'f' d 13~ 139, 140, 141, 142 th t ( l f i en i ie. In e ma eria a ore-
I 
mentioned by footnote, and by McFee, the core values that 
are identifiable, appear to be in conflict with!the 
supposed goals of art education. 143 
this, has been prepared on page 95. 
A table illustrating 
i In this table, three 
categories are shown, to indicate the differences in values. 
The "traditional" values are those that have be~n inherent 
from generation to generation. The "emergent" values are 
those that appear to be developing in 
tural change and the growth of "mass" 
the process 
. 1h4 society. 
of cul-
The 
values in "art education" do not represent the values of 
all, but are, rather, tendencies toward the conflict that 
145 
affects one's learning and understanding "art."· 
VALUE CONFLICT I. COl!IMON MAN, GROUP MAN, AND 
INDIVIDUAL ARTISTIC MAN. In an exploratory stu~y of 
138clyde and Florence Kluckhohn, "General Orien-
tations and Class Patterns," Conflicts of Power, in Modern 
Culture, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947) 1, pp. 106-
128. 
13 9w. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Hunt, The Social 
Life of a Modern Community, Yankee City Series,1 Vol. I 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941). 
140Margaret Mead, And Keeg Your Powder Dry, (New 
York: William Morrow and Co., 1942). 
141George D. Spindler, ."Education in a Transforming 
American Culture," Harvard Educational Review, XXV (1955), 
pp. 145-156. 
142Geoffrey Gorer, The American People,, (New York: 
w. w. Norton and Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 70-1!05. 
143 . 11 op. cit., p. 3. 
' 
144 Ibid., p. 1114 
I 
I 
145Ibid. 
"AMERICAN CORE VALUES" 
"Traditional" 11 Emergent 11 
1. common man group common man 
2. expediency and security 
hard work 
3. reason as a basis group planning 
for action 
• I 
95 
"Ideal! Values in 
' . Art !Education" 
individual artis-
ti~ man 
(dfvergent-
creative) 
artistry and 
craftsmanship 
(quality before 
gain) 
emotion combined 
with reason 
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' graduate students, Spindler, found a strong va~ue placed 
on averageness, as being descriptive of the "ideal Ameri-
' 
can type." The graduate students put a major Jmphasis 
on: sociability, well-roundedness, and ability to" 
. do many things quite well but . not to be an expert 
at anything in particular."146 Furthermore, Spindler 
writes, 
"Individuality and creativity, or.mere 
originality are not stressed in this concept 
of values. Introspective behavior is deval-
uated (even intellectuals are suspected by 
many). Deviancy, it seems, is to be tolerated 
only w~t2~n the narrow limits of sociability 
The ideal type described by Spindler's students 
are not likely to exhibit the divergent behavior that is 
necessary for the "artist." Studies indicate that the 
artistic individual has personality problems probably 
caused by the belief that the artist's role is a deviant 
one in American society.148, 149 
According to McFee, it is for this reason, in 
addition to the pressure of conformity that the student 
experiences discontinuity, seeing no acceptable place 
146Ibid. 147Ibid. 
148c1yde and Florence Kluckhohn, op. cit., pp. 
114-116. 
149 , I ' 
Louis H. Stewart, 'The Expression of Persona-
lity in Drawings and Paintings," Genetic Psychology 
Monographs, LI (1955), pp. 45-103. I 
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in a practical and utilitarian state of affairs! for his 
. . . 150 artistic expression. 
VALUE CONFLICT II. EXPEDIENCY AND HARD, WORK; 
I 
SECURITY; AND ARTISTRY AND CRAFTSMANSHIP. The value on 
expediency has been growing steadily since the beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution. The tendency has been to 
make more and more products in less and less time. Hard 
work, so necessary to the development of our country, has 
been measured in terms of the accumulation of things.151 
The two values, hard work and expediency, have led to the 
measurement of products by size and quantity. The emerg-
ment value, security, has grown out of the knowledge that 
most people can survive economically without working hard, 
that they can in fact earn many conveniences and amusements 
on a moderate salary. 152 
The products of "art," on the other hand, are 
valued for their quality, as a result of thoughtful work 
and a desire for craftmanship,. as well as improvisation 
and invention. Both time and speed are negated as the 
artist struggle to master his media and symbols to communi-
cate his ideas. Industry, however, can expedite technical 
problem-solving with the use of computers, but no machine 
can help the artist to solve the problems of designing. 153 
150McFee, op. cit., p. 115. 
152Ibid. 
151Ibid., p. 117 
I 
153 Ibid. 
I 
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The Alper study, resulted with an interesting fea-
ture. According to Alper, middle-class children were more 
likely, than lower-class children, to want to take their 
work home. 154 Thus, the implication that the middle-class 
parents, who most typify the core culture, transmit to 
their off-spring at an early age, the value of showing 
accomplishments. 
VALUE CONFLICT III. REASON, GROUP PLANNING, AND 
EMOTION. Historically, people of the United States have 
been told, that their heritage of democratic freedom is 
owed to man's reasoning ability, and that logical 
thinking is the best way to solve the problems of life. 
Science and technological advancements make it evident 
that man has progressed in the use of reason in problem 
solving. However, society has not become educated in 
. . 155 b . the use of emotion with reason. Art, ecause it 
depends on kinesthesis and sensitivity, promotes the 
integration of feeling and reason. According to McFee, 
this integration tends to be negated in Western society 
by the application of masculine and feminine characteristics 
154Thelma Alper, Howard Blane, and Barbara Adams, 
"Reactions of Middle and Lower Class Children to Finger 
Paints as a Function of Class Differences in Child Training 
Practice," Jour·nal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LI 
(1955), pp. 439-448. 
155McFee, op. cit., p. 119. 
attributed to its people, especially, that it is not 
"masculine" for the male to display emotion. 156 
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"Art and Personality." A study was made by Lbuis 
Stewart of the Institute of Child Welfare at the Univer~ 
sity of California on adolescent males and females. In 
this study, self-portraits of forty males and forty 
females, of high school age, were judged according to 
selected criteria. Those portraits that displayed the 
strongest "artistic ability" according to the criteria 
received further analysis. Because these students had 
been in the institute since the fifth grade, considerable 
information on their personality structures was available. 
The experimenter found that the overall pattern 
for the males in this group was "strongly suggestive of 
neurotic introversion, with symptoms of anxiety, low 
self-esteem, lack of social skills, and isolation from 
peers." For the females, the pattern suggested "creative 
and introversive tendencies, which, although accompanied 
by lack of interest in social contacts, are not related 
157 
to anxiety, tension, or maladjustment." 
Stewart interprets the findings for the males 
as indications of cultural value conflicts. He stresses 
156 b'd I J. • , p. 119 • 
157 
Stewart, op. cit., pp. 81-82. 
100 
the deviation of the stereotyped idea of the artist from 
the average male in American society. Stewart believes 
that many artistic males do not perceive a means of 
attaining adult male status and still continue their 
artistic work. These males may be experiencing "discon-
tinuityi" which, according to McFee, arises when an 
individu~l is rewarded for.behavior in one situation and 
not in another, and conversely, punished for behavior in 
one si':uation and not in another, because of its differences 
. l J.58 1.n va :.ies. The males in Stewart's study are then said 
to be ex!Jeriencing a "discontinuity" between their personal· 
rewards from achievement in art, and the lack of oppor-
tunity for reward from society. 159 Stewart believes that 
the males have the concept of the full-time painter or 
sculpture as generally living in poverty. The economic 
anxiety, Stewart feels, is closely related to ,the male~s 
adjustment problems. 160 Because the artistic females in 
~his sample displayed few or no neurotic tendencies, 
Stewart, suggests that the introversive males may have 
more adjustment problems than females as the ",. 
extroverted traits are so important in determing social 
acceptance and prestige" for males during this particular 
. d 161 ,_.ge per 1 o . 
lS8McFee, op. cit., p. 112. 159 rb~d., p. 119. 
160 rbid., p. 120 16 1stewart, O!J. ci~., pp. 81-82. 
The artistic male is further separated from the 
mainstream of the culture where academic or practical 
' 
studies are valued more highly than nonacademic or 
"impractical" studies. 162 
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Art, however, is not far different in intent than 
English composition. Both, are symbolic, and are organ-
ized means of communication. Letter symbols (organized 
through grammar) and pictorial symbols (organized through 
d . ) b h f h . 1 . . 163 esign are ot necessary rom t e practica ~iewpoint. 
Threat and anxiety reduces the ability of the 
' individual to respond to, and organize visual information, 
along with the ability to recall the details of objects 
seen previously. 
Success experiences increase one.':s ability to 
respond to, and organize visual information. Failure 
experience tends to decrease this ability. 164 
According to McFee, most cultures at the present 
time, including ours, are in stages of considerable change 
due to technological innovation and cultural confluence. 165 
These factors affect the different parts of the culture in 
differing degrees. Therefore, these factors influence 
one's attitudes toward art and his willingness and ability 
162 
McFee, op. cit., p. 120. 
164rbid., p. 125. 
163rbid., p. 120. 
165rbid. 
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to participate in art tasks. Art, not being central to 
American core culture, introduces conflicts such as those 
between the common man and the individual, expediency and 
. d d t. 166 artistry, an reason an emo ion. These conflicts are 
a result of differences in values and beliefs within 
cultures and core cultures, and are expressed through 
both language and art forms. 167 
Without verbal and visual means of sharing ideas, 
cultures could not evolve. While there are nonliterate 
societies (those without written language), there are no 
societies without art forms, however primitive for com-
168 
municating ideas. 
At this point, with the aforementioned implica-
tions by McFee, an assessment can now be made concerning 
the analogy between art and language. The analogy is 
made possible by the fact that both are based on one's 
power of imagining and abstracting. Art, is more heavily 
dependent on the former, language on the latter. Howe-
ever, imagining itself, involves abstracting under the 
influence of emotion as well as need. Language plays an 
important role in one's conception of the world. This 
to 
p. 
166 rbid. 
167 McFee, 
16S 
Ralph 
Anthropold>gy, 
538. 
op. cit., p. 18. 
L. Beals and Harry Hoijer, An.Introduction 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), 
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is comparable to the role which art performs in teaching 
one how to look at the world the way he does. Therefore, 
the untutored are not really untutored; it is just that 
they ·see the world in terms of some past scientific 
conceptions which have been assimilated by common sense, 
or in terms of some past artistic movement, or in terms 
of some diluted combination of both. 169 
Among the lay commentators of the arts and the 
ordinary man, there is little or no consciousness of the 
pervasiveness of art in their lives, and little of its 
. 170 
relationship to what they prize most, their happiness. 
Their cheif antagonism to the fine arts in general, 
springs from the belief that they are impractical and 
precarious financially; a frivolous waste of time which 
could be devoted to more useful work and more assured 
ways of gaining a livlihood. +fa young person wishes 
to enter the arts, the first question asked at home will 
probably be, "How are you going to make a living that 
way?"l71 
This further illustrates the status of "art," as 
commonly conceived by the ordinary man within Western 
society, as something apart from life, science, and 
169T . . 199 eJera, op. cit., p. . 
170rbid., p. 209. 
171 
Munro, op. cit., p. 48. 
technology. This status of art, is also implied by the 
eminent art historian, Kenneth Clark, who belie~es that 
the most creative and fertile minds are in science, and 
that art has been, for the present, relegated to a less 
important levei. 172 C. P. Snow, the well known English 
novelist-scientist believes likewise and states,: 
"There are literary intellectuals at 
one pole, at the other scientists, '.and the 
most representative, the physical scientist. 
Between the two, is a gulf of mutual incom-
prehension--sometimes ... hostility and 
dislike, but most of all lack of understand-
ing. nl73 
Even though Snow utilizes the words "li:terary 
intellectuals," Kaufman, more liberally interprets it 
to include artists and architects. 174 
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J. Brownski, an English mathematician voices the 
same sentiments in a passionate way. He voices the hope 
that science and art can exist alongside each other in 
harmony and mutual enhancement. Just as in the past 
"nations have not been great in science or art, but in 
art and science," so in the contemporary world there may 
be a salubrious interrelationship of the two. 175 
17 2Kenneth Clark, "The Blob and the Diagram," 
Encounter, (January, 1963). 
173c. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific 
Revolution, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 4. 
174Kaufman, op. cit., p. 334. 
175J. Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science, (New 
York: Random House, Modern Library Paperbacks): pp. 147-149. 
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Thus, society has perpetrated an antithesis in the 
area of "art," namely: the "utilitarian" versus and "non-
utilitarian," the ''fine'' versus the ''useful," the ''fine'' 
versus the "applied," and the "noble" versus the "ignoble" 
art. This sharp separation, in theory, it is now insisted, 
proceeds from an unhealthy, undemocratic social condition, 
in which a lower class does most of the useful work and 
an upper, exploiting class, most of the enjoying.176 
Edman states: 
"The division between fine and useful 
produces on the one hand, a practical civil-
ization in which there is no interest in 
sensuous charm or imaginative grace, and 
on the other, a decorative trifling of the 
piddling little equisites, the soft luxer-
iance of the aesthete whose dainty creations 
and enjoyments have no connection with the 
rest of life.''l77 
Arthur Miller also scolds society because it 
does not permit men to be themselves. 178 Social scien-
tists, too, have been critical of this cultural phenom-
enon. Griffith, for example, call ours a "waist-high 
culture." 179 He cites that ours is a culture of mediocrity, 
in which values and practices are contradictory: 
176 
Munro, op. cit., p. 110. 
177 I. Edman, Arts and the Man, (New York: w. w. 
Norton and Co., 1939), pp. 42-43. 
178Arthur Miller, Death of a Salesman, (New York: 
Viking Press, 1960), p. 61. 
York: 
179Thomas Griffith, The waist-High Culture, (New 
Harpers and Bros., Publishers, 1959). 
"We respect the arts in principle, 'but 
Deward the illustrator more than the artist, 
the jingle writer over the poet, the tune-
smith over the composer. We talk of high 
standards, but sentimentally reward the, 
most appealing instead of the most observing 
... Democracy is in fact suspicious of 
high standards."180 
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This culture of contradictory values and practices 
is attributed to the operation of several forces: afflu-
ence, prosperity, urbanism, and mass literacy.191 Griffith, 
expressing a prevailing artistic criticism of American 
culture and society that makes it, follows Ortega y Gas-
set,182 George Santayana, 183 and T. s. Eliot, 184 in 
blaming undermined values and standards for permitting 
the mass of society to seduce artists into producing what 
can be sold in quantity, even without quality. That is, 
those "popular" art forms, the greater mass of advertising 
and public illustration which not only manifest_s the lack 
of artistic merit of the forms, but also supports the 
lBOibid., p. 3. 
181Art Education: The Sixty-Fourth Yearbook of 
the National Society for the Study of Education, part II, 
Ed., w. Reid Hastie, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1965), p. 3. 
182Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, 
(London: Allen and Unw5_n, Ltd., 1932). 
183George Santayana, The Genteel Tradition at Bay, 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Son's, 1931). 
184T. s. Elliot, Notes Towards the Definition of 
Culture, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1949). 
notion that average, commonplace needs will accept an 
environment devoid of any real committment to values 
beyond the practical and the distracting. 185 
Educational Patterns 
It cannot be said, however, that there is any 
107 
real lack of opportunity to experience the "fine" arts. 
There are more numerous avenues of access than ever before. 
There is simply no great yearning or groundswell of gen-
uine sentiment in that direction. This bespeaks, not only 
of a personal deficiency on the part of those countless 
individuals who exist in a state, relative to the arts, 
as one of torpor and apathy, but a lack in the educational 
patterns of the schools, which seeks practical or intel-
lectual excellence, yet accepts aesthetic sloth. 186 
These educational patterns, or lack of them, 
relative to the "visual, fine arts," is seemingly borne 
out by the results of a study conducted by Elliot W. 
Eisner. 187 The study, which dealt exclusively with grad-
uate work in art and art education, attempted to determine 
(a) the number of institutions of higher education offering 
185Kaufman, op. cit., p. 46. 
186rbid., p. 46. 
1 B7Art Education: The Sixty-Fourth Yearbook of 
the National Society for the Study of Education, op. cit. 
pp. 274-278. 
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graduate programs in art and art education, (b) the num-
ber of institutions awarding Master's and Doctor's degrees 
in art education, (c) when the various graduate programs 
were initiated, (d) the type of courses typically taken 
at each level of graduate study, and (e) the nutnber of 
students enrolled part time and full time in programs 
leading to the doctorate in art education. In this study, 
no distinction was made between the Ph.D. and Ed.D. degrees. 
Three-hundred and fifty-seven of 407 de,gree granting 
institutions listed in the "American Art Directory" respon-
• I • • 188 h 3 . . . ded to Eisner s questionnaire. Oft e 57 institutions 
responding, 120 offered a master's program in art, 86 
offered a master's program in art education, 14 offered a 
doctoral program in art, and 16 offered a doctoral program 
in art education. The remaining 191, reported that no 
graduate study was available in art er art education. 
When institutions were asked to indicate the percent of 
courses taken in four categories: studio art, art educa-
tion, education, and other, taken by students in art 
education at the master's and doctoral levels, interesting 
differences emerged. On the master's level, 22 institu-
tions reported that graduate students in art education 
take less than 40 percent of their work in studio classes, 
188American Art Directory, Edited by Dorothy Gil-
bert, (New York: R.R. Bowker, Co., 1961). 
I IJ 'J 
classtci'3. 
st:uderits 
'!'hi,·t.y-une .insLi•_oti.ons reported that master's 
percent f I, k . o course wor 111 art 
I 
education, and !O report,,d that at their institutions 
students typic~ily take 40 percent or more. {\t the 
doctoral level, one institution reported that, students 
take no 'studio art courses. · Another, indicated that over 
BO percent of stucj,io courses are take11 typically by its 
students. While seven institutions reported less than 20 I• 
percent of course work is taken in education,' one reported 
70 percent or more. Also, it was found, of the 16 insti-
' 
tutions offering a doctoral in art education, four of the 
.1.nstitcutions accounted for almost two-thirds 'of the total 
full-time student population. 189 
While the study is dated, 
ficant in that less than one-half 
.}.;, 
the numbers are signi-
' I 
of the maj1or colleges 
and universities in tl1e United States offer no advanced 
' 
degree in art and/or art education. 
I Moreovet;•, there 
appeared neither a consensus nor a developing trend in 
' i 
regards to what should be the cu·rriculum contc'ent. 
The present rapid rate of increase in t~e mobility 
of the American population, and the rapidly increasing 
., 
110 
, I 
shift \jjn ;pp;:>ulation from rural to urban areas, h\1-s created 
'I 
both bisic ~alue conflicts in the core culture, a, nd a pres-
I 'I . 
sure Art, as a result, finds itself separated 
from ~11~ maine;tream of American culture. Simultaneously, the 
•' ~- ... 
rise £~: ecqno~ic status of a vast majority of the people, and 
the ma,s1s ~edia, urges the achievement of status and "happiness" 
1 I ► 
tllrougq tit~ acquisition of material things. Therefore, the 
' ' ' ' 
great7r! ma~s of the population sees no acceptable place for 
. ' art in a ,prp.ctical and utilitarian state of affairs. Art is 
i ' 
' I 
regarqE)B. a~ both financially precarious and an impractical way 
of gain'ing a livlihood. 
' ' ' 
Art is regarded as a mere frill and 
I 
a leisure-time amusement, and for the present time, is rele-
gated 'to a lel;;ser position in Western society than science 
and l;echnol9gy. 
I 
I, 
Chapter 7 
JUDGEMENTS CONCERNING CURRENT ART FORMS 
' 
Barriers to Understanding 
Despite the fact that museum attendance, is booming, 
that the sale of paintings, in particular, has reached 
impressive figures, and the space devoted to the "arts" in 
magazines, indicating unprecedented reader interest in 
"art" ai:id artists, the "visual arts" produced by contem-
porary artists seem isolated from a large portion of soc-
iety.190 It appears, that there are few among the lay 
public who seem to understand the concepts basic to the 
arts. There appears to be a widespread visual illiteracy, 
a publi~ generally incapable of "reading" the current 
visual languages of painting, sculpture, and architecuure. 
Therefore, the public is often extremely limited in its 
ability to "read" the visual languages of the past. 191 
The growth in material and texts ·written on the 
subject of "art" may suggest a real desire on the part of 
the "educated" public to come to grips with the challenge 
' 
that "art" offers. This desire, however, is most often 
thwarted by a somewhat inherent cultural barrier, which 
keeps the observer from responding to the art object. 192 
190 bl · Kno er, op. cit., p. V. 
191Ibid. 
l92Ibid. 
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1JJ2 
The barrier is of three parts. One, is the assumption 
that the average individual can differentiate betwe.en the 
I 
art object and other objects which do not fit this 'cate-
' gory. Therefore, the average individual forms a limited 
conceptualization of what, for him, constitutes a "legi-
timate" work of art, and deems "illegitimate" those 
works which do not conform to his patterns of acceptabi-
lity.193 
The second part of the barrier exists because 
of the limited experience and contact between most indi-
duals and examples of "high art" works of painting, 
sculpture, and building that could be described as 
architectural works of art.194 The numerous reproductions 
of "high art" to be found in the media, are often a mixed 
blessing. The media, with its reproductions, bestows on 
the average individual, the illusion that mere contact ·:, 
with art is satisfactory, when in fact, it is not. 195 
The third part of the barrier is the feeling of antagonism, 
inadequacy, and confusion when viewing works of art which 
he cannot conceptually regard as acceptable or "legitimate."19 6 
In Western art, this has meant that those symbolic forms 
which have tended to be the most photographic and close 
193rbid. 
19 51bid., p. VI. 
194 rbid. 
196rbid. 
'' 
' 
I. 
I I 
equivalents 
, f' I 
I 
to their natural forms are the most accep-
,, , 197 
table:· 1 
I 
: In order to offset 
:. 198 such as; Dewey, Anatole 
this special malaiJe, many 
I 
France, 199 Edman, 200 and 
othe;s; advocate disposing of the separation between 
I I 
the "fine" and "useful" arts and integrate the two 
I , I I 
areas., The purpose of this, according to Munio, is for 
I 
the saike of education; existing for a specialized use, 
the us'e being a new training of modes of perc~ption. 201 
However, the conclusion that the "fine" and "useful" ,, 
I 
arts overlap and have much in common, is so widely 
'l I I 
accepted today, that one would have a difficult time 
in finding a supporter for the sharp separation between 
I 
them. 
Painting and sculpture are generally classified 
as ",fihe," "high," or aesthetic arts, in contrast, the 
,, ! I 
average layman has conceived architecture as a: ·"useful" 
,'' 
113 
art. m,n a broad sense, all the fine arts have :some utili-
tarian' :functions. I The distinction, however, can best be 
The 
of 
197Knobler, op. cit., p. 309. 
:,, 198John Dewey, Experience and Nature, ·(Chicago: 
OpT~ Court Publishing Co., ,1925), p. 361. 
;, I. 199Anato~e France, "On the Unity of AFt," Journal 
American Institute of Architects, January, !l.914, p. 18. 
,I I I 
2 00I Ed . 2 . man, op. cit., pp. 4 -43. 
I I 
201M ·t 
, 
1 
unro, op. c1. . , p. 111. 
made in' terms of degree; between arts which are! "more," 
and those which are "less," utilitarian. This does not 
' 
114 
imply that the former have greater usefulness in general, 
but that they emphasize utilitarian functions more fre-
quentl:y, along with the aesthetic, and tend to ladap.t their 
d 
. . 202 
pro ucts more obviously to some non-aesthetic use. 
Caution, : .. however, must be exercised in making such 
a relative contrast. The following statement, by H. E. 
Bliss, is much too simple: "The arts in which utility is 
a secondary consideration to beauty and pleasure are 
distinguished as the Fine Arts, or the "Aesthetic Arts." 203 
Even if the broader term "aesthetic experience" is substi-
tuted for "beauty and pleasure," it is not true that 
utility is always a secondary aim in the fine or aesthetic 
arts. Architecture is traditionally classified as a fine 
art, however, utilitarian aims are often dominant. 204 
Aspects of Sculpture and Architecture 
Much of the aspects of sculpture can also be applied 
to architecture. Both are three-dimensional art forms; 
both are concerned with the organization of forms in space. 
202rbid., p. 519. 
203 H. E. Bliss, The Organization of Knowledge and 
the System of the Sciences, (New York: Henry Hold and Co., 
p. 304. 
204 Munro, op. cit., p. 117. 
,[ ,, i 
,, , I 
! ' 
, I I 
First, architecture is a functional art, can be argued 
I 
that sc\.llpture functions for a purpose, but the purpose , , I , 
115 
of the ',sculptor' s art, however, is restricted to symbolic 
commun/cation. Second, architecture and sculpture are 
I structural arts in that the method used to hold the sepa-
rate elements together is an integral part of ~he design: 
For this reason, the materials used by the architect and 
sculptor, the strength of the materials, and the way 
' 
they 'ate joined becomes a primary concern in the concep-
tion of an architectural and sculptural design. 2 05 
Ideally, function, structure, and matefials in 
architecture should be so interrelated that th~y become 
a tightly woven fabric which gives the building its form, 
' -
space, ,and textural variation. 206 This ideal condition 
has rarely occurred. There have been various social and 
economic factors which have affected architectfral design, 
requiring the architect to compromise ideal solutions for 
' 
practitjal ones. 207 
i Ideally, the architect should consider! a building 
not just as an efficient machine designed to facilitate 
the activity of its tenants, but also as an en~ironment 
' 
205Knobler, op. cit., p. 89. 
2 0 6Ibid. 
' i 2 0 7 Ibid . , p . 9 0 . 
' ' 
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I I 
in which human individuals will spend a 
I 
' , I 
portion of their 
! 
day. Tpe human being, though, has been 
' ' 
I 
considered a mere 
' 
cog in~ huge mechanism. His physical needs h~,ve been 
' I 
' 
satisfied, but little concern has been given to his emo-
tional,heeds.208 
, The above commentary on American architecture has 
' '' 
serious, implications, if, what psychologists declare is 
true. Psychologists have stated that there is:need to 
' 
underst~nd, to find meaning in the world about'us; it is 
coupled
1 
with the need for stimulation and invoivement. 
The "will to live," often said to
1
be 
the great inclusive motive of all livi~g 
creatures, is in human beings not simply 
the will to stay alive but rather the will 
to live by active relationships with t~e 
environmP.nt. Being equipped with sense organs 
and motor organs and.a well developed brain, 
the human individual has a fundamental,incli-
' nation to deal with the environment. The 
motive is not primarily directed toward 
serving the organic needs and meeting the 
1 emergencies of life, Bi:it toward knowing 
1 objects and persons, doing things to them, 
and participating in what is going on in 
the environment. Just_ because this objec-
tive tendency is so a11 persuasive it ts 
often overlooked and omitted from the list 
of fundamental motives, where it certainly 
belongs. It shows itself in the general 
1 tendencies to explore and manipulate the 
environment and in a great variety more 
, specific interests. 209 
'I 
' 
2 08Knobler, op. cit., p. 250. 
20 9Robert 
(New York: Holt, 
1947), ;p. 323. 
Woodworth and 
Rinehart, and 
Donald Marquis, Psychology, 
Winston, Inc.,iSth ed., 
' 
Office buildings, assembly plants, as w~ll as 
other s~ructures designed for commercial, industrial, 
117 
and pub~ic purposes, house great populations for a sub-
stantial portion of their lives. The atmosphere in which 
people have worked has affected them. Whatever'may be 
said for the buildings that shelter the public and economic 
complex, is equally pertinent to the design of residential 
architec,ture. 
Richard Neutra is a contemporary architect who 
has concerned himself with the problems of architectural 
design as the creation of environment. He notes that 
people are most conscious of the possible effects of an 
architectural environment when presented in extremes. 
As examples, he cites the design of certain "fun houses" 
in amusement ·.parks, homes, where walls within are built 
askew, thus presenting bizarre relationships. The person 
is in an environment different from that which he has 
normally experienced, anq. therefore becomes puzzled and 
frustrated by it. 210 
Louis Kahn, an American architect, is concerned 
with the symbolic functon of architecture. He recognizes 
the need to consider the building as a symbol for the 
' 210Richard Neutra, Survival Through Design, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 155. ' 
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' '' 
• • I h d . h. . 211 activity ouse wit in it. The symbolic function of 
archite~ture depends in part upon the response of the 
public, to the forms erected by the builder. A portion of 
this response will most certainly be conditioned by buil-
dings of the past, which have had historical significance 
in some aspects of the culture of our contemporary society. 212 
In observing the hundreds of government buildings in this 
country, one notes that Greek and Roman influence abound 
in which the columned temple has been identified with 
public buildings. The Lincoln Memorial, completed in 
1912 is an example of architectural design modeled on 
Greek antecedents. If the Lincoln Memorial is compared 
with the Jefferson Westward Expansion Memorial, in St. 
Louis,, Mo., which was designed by Ero Saarinen, the dif-
ference in startlingly evident. The Lincoln monument is 
tied to the past; the great catenary arch of the Jefferson 
Memorial has no stylistic precedent. 
Expression in architecture is not confined to 
monuments, it also includes residential and business struc-
ture5. Clothing a municipal office building, a residence, 
a library, and a church in the same architectural forms 
of the, past sacrifices expressive design to stylistic 
· 211Louis I. Kahn, Structure and Form, (New York: 
George Braziller, Inc., 1962), p. US. 
212Knobler, op. cit., p. 261. 
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consis'tency. However, 
,i 1· 
for many, who live in the so-called 
I 
"colon:ical" houses the ' ' , house expresses security, the total 
warmth''of family life, and a continuity of earlier cultural 
' 
values, which in total, provide a satisfying esthetic envir-
1 
onment.· One, from such a home, may leave it and proceed 
to his place of work, which is a steel and glass tower, 
I 
and may not feel that there is an inconsistenc~ between 
the tw9 totally different environments. Howev~r, the fact 
that this dichotomy exists suggests a lack of cohesion 
within '.one's environment and his culture. 213 
, Expression in contemporary architecture has not 
I ' 
' ' 
evaded tradition and the forms expressive of its common· 
cultur~l heritage. The fact remains that manyi people can 
I 
accept eclectic architecture as a part of contemporary 
I , 
life. , 'In general, however, each cultural period has seen 
expression in architecture re~ult from the forins and 
materials common to the time as; the Colonial,' Classical, 
Gothic 1 Tuscan, and many others. Architectural critics 
' ' ' 
have often condemned eclectic and imitative forms of 
architecture, because it does not fine its exp'ressive forms 
in the present day world; buildings have been given a super-
I , 
ficiai; imitative skin that camouflages an infernal design 
with~~ anachronistic shell, the inconsistenc~ between 
213 rbid., p. 269. 
·120 
: t' ! 
•i. I 
,I I 
I 
the nature of the building and its appearance has fre-
' I quentl1y, been ridiculous and even bizarre. 214 
l ! Thus, architecture, both domestic; i.e., resi-
dential., and commercial should be expressive of a 
technol'ogical age and symbolic in terms of the use and 
functions within the building proper, but more often this 
I 
is not the case. William Morgan, the Architecture critic 
for 'l'he1 Louisville Courier-Journal, cited a recent example .. ' 
of this particular situation. Morgan was very critical 
of the new Jefferson State vocational-Technic~l School 
and Manpower Skill Center, at Eighth and Chestnut Streets, 
in Louisville. He cites, that the two buildings in no 
way re.f_lect the advanced technology occurring·inside. 
Rather,' the face of the buildings is a package of dull-
ness anq boredom. The entirety of the two buildings, 
gives tpe appearance of a factory rather than a vocational 
traini~g school. The interiors of both buildings are even 
more un:interesting than the exteriors. He cites, that 
instead of studying in a school that provides an educational 
experi~hce in itself, and offers some visual excitement, the 
student: is faced with the lowest-cost-per-square-foot 
. ' 
decor o~ the cinder-blocks and oppressively low ceilings. 
214 Ibid. 
, 21 5william Morgan, "Boring Vocationa11Tech Buildings Do Little But Mock the Lost Past," The Courier-Journal 
(Louisville), October 2, 1977, D-6, Col. 1. 
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Aspects of Painting and Drawing 
Many people believe that the photographic image 
is th,e ,"real," most truthful, and accurage way of pic-
turing the three-dimensional world, in regards to the 
two-dimensional "high" art forms of painting and drawing 
and closely related disciplines.2 16 However, this belief 
is no,t common to all times and all cultures. 217 Anthro-
polog,is,te and psychologists, including Melville Herskovits 
and Carl Jung have reported that primitive men often can-
not identify human images in photographs. The notion 
that only those images and forms that are close equivalents 
to their natural forms, and therefore, the most accurate 
h d 1 . 218 as opcurre on yin Western art. Even though the 
history, of art abounds in examples of two-dimensional 
representations of the three-dimensional world that bear 
no resemblance to photographip representation, there is 
., 
nothing to suggest that these 'latter forms are the work 
of ar,t-ists and practitioners that were inadequate, either 
currently or in the past. 219 
In Europe, for four-hundred years prior to the 
nineteenth century, the methods used for representing 
216 Knobler, op. cit., p. 146. 
217 Ibid. 
218
rbid., p. 149. 
219 Ibid., p. 153. 
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form and .space in the visual arts remained essen-
tially 'unchanged. 220 Linear perspective, aerial per-
spective, and shading were the prime methods for indicating 
natural space and form. They had been used so extensively 
and for such a long period of time that they took on the 
value of absolutes. It was assumed that all methods of 
representation were to be measured by these standards. 
Late in the eighteenth century photography was invented, 
and subsequently developed in the nineteenth century. 
Thus, a relatively simple method for creating the vis-
ual equivalent of the "real" world was introduced. 221 
Simultaneously, a minority of artists began to experiment 
with new methods of representation. Stimulated by scien-
tific and technological advancements, and influenced by 
art from the East, and from Africa, these artists sought 
to extend the traditional equivalent forms beyond their 
representational and expressive limits. 222 Thus, in a 
relatively short period of time, from the middle of the 
nineteenth century to the first two decades of the twen-
tieth, there arose in succession the Impressionists, the 
Pointillists, the Fauves, the Cubists, the Futur±sts. ·and 
220 
: Knobler, op. cit., p. 41. 
221Ibid. 
222Ibid. 
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others that attempted to discover an equivalent for com-
municating to others, the world they perceived about 
th 223 em. This led to bold innovations which in turn 
produced dynamic pictorial relationships. The artists 
sought to express the changes that science and technol-
ogy was producing on life, through the reordering of art 
elements. 224 This resulted in a variety of directions. 
The Futurists, were stimulated by the modern qualities 
of speed, motion, and the philosophy of force. These 
were analyzed in terms of their visual properties, re..l. 
ducing them to complex and flickering compositions that 
expressed the contemporary feeling of kinetics and pres-
sure.225 The Constructivists, sought to portray motion 
and mechanization through their minutely balanced designs, 
hoping to influence the world through symbolic examples 
of harmony and equilibrium. 226 Mondrian, Gabo, and Pevsner 
sought new forms to express technological and scientific 
ideas, which, they felt, dominated society. Therefore, 
they sought new visual organizations, which they hoped 
would serve as a spiritual guide toward a more humane and 
223 Ibid., p. 43. 
224Kaufman, op. cit., p. 425. 
225 rbid. 
226 Ibid. 
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I 
i : 
integrated civilization. 227 Simultaneously ,1 abstract 
' and hon-objective art entered the scene, believing that 
I , 
nonr~~l-~sentational forms were of a more pure: expression 
than' the traditional photographic images of realism which 
had been so overtly adulterated.228 On the other hand, the 
forms and patterns of science and technology, and all of its 
' many:components are the concern of such as Leger. Still, on 
the other hand, the turmoil and insecurity contained in 
I 
today's world is reflected in the distortions, and abandoned 
movement of such as Pollock and de Kooning. 229 Psychology 
also :has influenced art in its probing of human motives, 
and ~ound a ready recipient in Surrealism. 
In much of the art in the fourteenth, fifteenth, 
and sixteenth centuries, man looked into art and life to 
seek knowledge regarding the power of his environment. 
I 
However, the high art of the last century demonstrates 
just ,the opposite. 23 0 It is an art of introspection and 
' one of subjectivity. Nevertheless, despite the diversity 
of styl,es and techniques, the artist has created a rather 
truthful image of modern living. 
The present-day lay-person, therefore, should not 
assume that the photographic image is the standard by which 
227rbid. 
22 8 rbid. 
229Ibid. 
23 0ibid. 
I' 
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' 
to judge other images. He should be aware th•t the visual 
world is multilingual, and 
' ' 
that there are many, ways of 
i 
communi,cating visually, man's experiences. He should be 
aware that personal perception has been given a value 
which it did not have in the past, in that it can be per-
ceived historically, scientifically, and psychologically. 
However, according to the aforementioned cultural barriers, 
t 1 t db K bl th . · tl not the c· ase.
231 as pas u a e y no er, is is curren y 
Art and Intelligence or Another Barrier 
In addition to the three cultural bar~iers afore-
mentioned, Knobler, Dewey and Tejera state that our culture 
makes another serious mistake that also acts ~s a cultural 
barrier. The mistake that our culture makes, is in believ-
ing that non-discursive products are necessarily non-
cognitive.232 Dewey, for exa~ple, thought of creative or 
inventive products as resulting from what he aptly called 
233 qualitative thought. That is, that a work of art is 
both interrogative (exploratory) and judgmental (or deter-
minativ~). It would seem to follow, from what has been 
said, that art and intelligence are inseparable enter-
prises. Both are symbolic, intelligence in a11 instrumental 
231 Knobler, op. cit., p. V. 
232 . . 
TeJera, op. cit., p. 172. 
233rbid. 
' '' : ' I! 
' 
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' process, and art in a consummatory process. While 
. I 
I 
ligence seeks to control what it understands, art 
intel-
seeks 
d . th h. h . . . . . h 234 to ramatize at tow ic it is giving s ape. Ideas, 
relations, and plans of action based upon observation, 
are the subject matter of intelligence, while qualities 
I 
dramatically related in the interest of expression are 
the subject matter of art. 235 
Art and intelligence are both communicative pro-
' cesse:s. Art is so in the sense of communion; thrt is a 
' 
shared celebration or consecration of a value, perception, 
or experience. 236 The achievement or development of this 
value requires intelligence. 2 37 Intelligence is communi-
cative in the sense that it institutes cooperation in 
activities. Intelligence attempts to be a perception of 
how things function both in physical and non-human con-
text~. 238 Understanding the manipulation of things, ; ,., 
involves art. Likewise, successful and assured manipula-
tion are based upon the arts of experiment and v 1erification. 
Thus, works of art are the result of varying degiees of 
234 Ibid., p. 213. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Ibid. 
art 
I I I 
, i I 
i I I 
I 
I 
aha. intelligence, 
I 
and understanding a work of art 
I 
is a like or similar activity. 2 39 
I , 
I ' 
It would seem, that the job of intelligence, 
discourse, and criticism, is as Blackmur has said, that 
127 
of finding ways of enlarging its own and the public's 
aethetics so as to contribute to the enlargement of the 
aest:tietic experience. 240 Indeed, the trick is to enlarge 
the public's aesthetics to the point where it fuses intel-
lectu'al, inferences with the artist's work. 
Aspects of Future Art Forms 
Simultaneously, an emerging culture is b~ing formed, 
that is essentially technological and scientific. Auto-
mation, speed, travel, experimentation and research in 
physics, biology, chemistry, and other physical and natu-
ral areas of objective study, as well as in the behavioral 
scie~ces, are shaping a culture predicated upon universal 
technological principles. These will create a drastic 
redirection in daily living that will affect everyone. 241 
It will also create a revolutionary alteration in the 
environment. The art resulting from, and expressing such 
239 Ibid., p. 215. 
240R. D. Blackmur, "A Burden for Critics," Lectures 
in Criticism, (New York: Bollinger Foundation, 1941), p. 
203. ' 
24 1Kaufman, op. cit., p. 338. 
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a chang
1
e can 
I 242 created. 
onJ.y be different from what has already been 
The creative artist. because of the aforeJentioned 
I 
cultural barrier5 and the emerging new culture, will be fur-
l. f d t d' d . · d' 243 ther alienated roman un ers an ing an supportive au ience. 
I 
ThereforP, the artist will have two alternatives from which 
' 
' to choo, regarding his actions. First, the artist could 
sell his 7kills and powers of expression to the popular cul-
i 
I 
ture, to be used as means of entertainment for the mass 
' 
public: Many have chosen this alternative, stating that their 
art no
1 
longer adhered to the earlier traditions o,f internal 
I 
i.ntegr~ty, excellence, and high artistic standards.
244 
Second-
ly, the artist could maintain his integrity, excellenc~ and 
I 
' 
high s,tandards; and with a less well educated an9 far less 
sophis,li:icated public, in regard to art, become more esoteric 
I 
and is~lated from daily life. 245 
From this then, is the implication that future 
high art forms will be relegated into one of two'areas of 
' concentration. One, that they will succumb to such a 
I 
stand~rd that they will take on the character of popular 
art fc:irms; 
their lhigh 
or secondly, the high art forms will maintain 
level of excellence and artistic standards, 
242 Lbid. 
2«3rbid., p. 345. 
244rbic;.. 
245rbid.. 
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I: 
and because of their symbolism and communicative quali-
1 I ' 
ties, experiencing a lack of dialogue between ttie' art 
work and the viewe:i; be relegated to futher isolaUion from 
dailyll'ife. 246 II: 
i Another serious implication from this,~~ that 
current art forms will not, in themselves have~ signifi-
i , I 
cant affect on future art forms; rather, the affect upon 
I I 
futur~ forms will come through the channel of jUdgements 
! . I 
of such forms by a predominately, culturally il·literate 
sociely and by a small number of critics. Thisi I position 
: 'I 
has been taken by such as Ortega, who has argued that the 
mass, 
1
f which has assumed political power, and iJJists upon 
, I 
their 1 own commonplace values, has lost respect •for the 
I 
valuek of the earlier elite that sustained a h~Jh culture. 
I i I 
He states: "The mass crushes everything beneath it, 
: I 
I 11 
everyrhing that is different, everything that~~ excellent, 
indiv~duals qualified and select." 247 It may ~lt be pri-
! 
marily the continued existence of high art thaildisturbs 
critibs, who point to the vastness of mediocrity that is 
I 'I I 
'I 
a condition of modern living; but it could be that they 
I I 1 • 
fear ~or the future of high art in light of th~ dwindling 
i , I 
number of the "elite" who, in the past, have sul,tained 
i I , 
art. Dwight McDonald, one of the mostlcritical such 
246rbid. 
247Jose Orgega y Gasset, op. cit., pp. '~-19. 
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I I 
I. 
of social observers, echoes this aforementioned sentiment. 
I 
He indicates that the changing cultural conditic'ms fosters 
I 
I · . . I • a pseudo-art that is inimical to the interests of "high" 
I I 
art. !He also indicates the the audience for cultural pro-
ducts lis largely composed of a large body of ignoramuses, 
and that high culture may indeed be in danger of extinc-
tion.748 
This is a serious criticism, and an implication 
in whfch educators, administrators, and art educators in 
I • 
particular, must address themselves to, and resolve on 
the basis of clarity of purpose, educational understanding, 
I 
I 
and sensitivity to aesthetic values. 249 . The importance 
of this cannot be overemphasized, 
I 
art in our culture obviously does 
as the existance of high 
I 
not always insure its 
right~ul recognition from an appreciative mass audience. 2SO 
I 
I 
It is ,here that art education pas its fundamental obliga-
tion, Jnot only in bringing art to the masses, but of 
devel9ping a mass body of intense and informed 9pinion 
I 
and critical appreciation through education. 251 As such, 
I 
the ultimate responsibility for the future of serious art 
248Kaufman, op. cit., p. 351. 
249 rbid. 
250
rbid. 
251rbid. 
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' I 
and the development of an honestly responsive mass audi-
1 
ence rests within the context of education. 252 ; 
•If it is tb. be believed, that art is tojbe pro-
. i 
duced and enjoyed only by an elite subculture in our total 
society, then one might have reason for believing in the 
I 
social isolation of the arts. On the other hand, if art 
is considered as a phenomenon of human behavior, creating 
symbols for communication and to change the natµre of one's 
experiences, then art is related in degree to all society.253 
If the latter is accepted, educational institut:ions, educa-
tors (especially art educators), and administrators become 
engaged with the problems inherent in societal 'change, in 
recognizing art as a major communications system of social 
inter~ction. 254 
Therefore, unless critical discourse re,lative to 
art achieves the intellectual scale of our revolutionary 
epoch, art will be deprived of serious reference and fail 
to lu~e the attention of serious minds. 255 It will result 
' 
in a sum total of amateurishness, a lack of talent, and 
willfµll absurdity in making decisions regardi~g art. 256 
252Ibid. 
, 253George Pappas, Concepts in Art and Education: 
An Anthology of Current Issues, (London: The Macmillan 
Company, Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1970), p. 72.' 
254 Ibid. 
255Ibid., p. 363. 
256 Ibid., p. 364. 
i I; I 
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! I Therefore, the value for art criticism must be j:he effort 
to re-introduce art into the framework of humanly serious 
, r 
concerns, and dispell the 
, ! I 
popular-culture fallal::y that 
I 
everything concerned with the creation and evalhation of 
art can be made immediately discernable to the .so-called 
common reader or the Sunday painter. 257 Lewis Mumford, 
likewise concerned with the aforementioned problem states: 
"Some people appear to be more con,cerned 
1with having and doing the 'right' things than 
being able to make independent judgemen'ts 
from a wide range of possible choices., We 
have well-designed products, but many are so 
,standardized that only a very discriminating 
person will go off the b~aten path to make 
independent selections." 58 
Therefore, there is a need for an educated criti-
cal c~tizenry that will insist on both high artistic 
' excellence, and also insist on both the aesthetic as 
well as.the utilitarian functions of art. 
257Ibid. 
,, 258Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, (New 
York::,:Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1943)', p. 5. 
' 
'i 
i I 
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Chapter 8 
THE NEED FOR ARTISTIC JUDGEMENTS IN THE SOCIETY 
;· ; I 
Education Implications 
, ! Inevitably, in the reviews of culture made today, 
society ends up with an "undeclared war between art and 
taste: art being what is offered, and taste the collec-
tive repponse to it." 259 Art loses in just about all 
the a~says which contemplate the social conditions for 
art. 
"As consumption becomes more important 
· to our society, advertising will affect our 
lives as much as the school or church. Put 
more bluntly, ... in a society where we 
•make more than we can use, it is as important 
to persuade people to buy superlative as to 
familiarize them with the best that has been 
thought and said."260 
While a number of educators and writers261 join 
the list of those that are despairing of modern society, 
many fe~l that resistance can be made. Griffith, for 
, 1' I 
example!, a little more optimistic, states that the social 
malaise of art could be negated if there were an emphasis 
on unde,rstanding and criticism in art and art instruction. 262 
' 
' i~ 9Griffith, op. cit., p. 246. 
260Joseph Wood Krutch, Human Nature and the Human 
Condition, (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 31. 
261Hans Sedlmayr, Art in Crisis, (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1958). 
' 262Griffith, op. cit., p. 272. 
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Even t~Jipessimistic Krutch later states that sciciety may 
be imptoved if "each new generation is always taught to 
I 
be discontented with the kind of life which the average 
' I I 
1 
.... 263 
man ives. By this way, he states, standards can be 
lifted even in a materialistic culture . . ' 
For some time, the modern artistic assessment of 
Western civilization has been servere, but more recently 
the faint hope that Griffith and Krutch have voiced have 
been ech~ed by such as Ayers, 264 Meadows, 265 Feldman,
266 
Hazard·, 2'67 and 
269 
life Why,te, 
Kouwenhoven. 268 Also there are those 
Riesman, 270 and Lee271 who state that 
263K h . 79 rutc, op. cit., p. • 
1
264c. E. Ayers, Towards a Reasonable Society, 
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1960). 
265Paul Meadows, The Culture of Industrial Man, 
(Lincol11:: University •Of Nebraska Press, 1950). 
266E. B. Feldman, "Artist and Mass Culture," 
College Art Journal, XVIII (Summer, 1959), pp. 339-244. 
·267P. D. Hazard, "Problems of the Arts in a Mass 
Society,;" Art Journal, XX (Summer, 1959), pp. 203-205. 
' . 
268John A. Kouwenhoven, Made in America, (New York: 
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1948). 
,269w·11· 
1 ' 1 1. 1.am H. 
(New Yo'rk: Simon and 
Whyte, Jr., The Organization of Man, 
Schuster, 1956) • 
. 270David Reisman, Nathan Glazer, and Reul Denney, 
The Lonely Crowd, (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1953). 
271 Dorothy Lee, Freedom and Culture, (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959). 
I I 
: I I 
" ' ' '
' 
' I 
the purpose of this increased education is to promote 
I , 
' 
within ,the individual, the capabilities necessary in 
135 
: I 
choosing intellectual, social, and esthetic independence • . I . 
I 
To be assured that more people will be able to understand 
and desire the best, Ayers urges that that there be 
' 
increased education aiming at enhancing man's ability to 
experience. 272 
Barkan, in quoting Bruner, states that "the 
dominant view of men engaged in instructional curriculum 
is that students gain on understanding of the 'fundamen-
tal structure' of whatever subject we choose to teach. 11273 
He continues: 
"In making this statement, Bruner 
does not deny any developmental values 
which can be derived from engagement in 
the study of a subject. All he is saying 
is that the 'key educational task' is to 
give students an understanding of the 
fundamental structure of any subject we 
see fit to teach. When applied to the 
teaching of art, this would mean that' 
'there is a subject matter of the field 
of art' and it is important to teach 
it. 11274 
: According to this view, art is a discipline in 
I 
the sci!lle sense that mathematics is a di~cipline, and 
272 
Ayers, 
273 
Manuel 
Art Education, XV 
274 rbid. 
op. cit., p. 241. 
Barkan, "Transition in Art Education," 
(October, 1962), p. 14. 
I 
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:j 
one should learn to understand art in terms of its funda-
' ! 
menta~,concepts. 275 Still another approach is taken b~ 
f I I 
Ecker:) I in which he voices the belief that the essential , 'I 
i I 
ingredient is that education,even art education be both 
"qualitative" (aesthetic) and "theoretical" (scientific), 
·. I 
and that both components should operate in all areas of 
human experience through a qualitative problem-solving 
process 
:· i in which "qualitative relations are ordered to 
1 . . . d ,,276 desired qua itative ens. Concerning art as a form 
of 
the 
op. 
qualitative intelligence, he states: 
': I "Artistic learning, the result of 
solving qualitative problems, will have a 
central place in the curriculum only when 
art educators can demonstrate that artistic 
'I solutions, paintings, sculpture, and even 
1
, city planning have a significance beyond 
the immediate situations in which qualitative 
problems arise. The significance of art, its 
liberating function, is that it frees·one 
to conceive of other problems and solutions; 
its meaning lies in its relations to past and 
future art experiences of men. Artists show 
the way with creative solutions to their prob-
lems. But art. experience is wider than the 
studio, the gallery, -1;1.nd the art classroom. 
: , i Art education can direct its attention to 
' I 
building those pervasive qualities that ought 
to distinguish American civilization. The 
development and expansion of qualitative-
, 275Art Education: The Sixty-fourth Yearbook of 
National Society for the Study of Education, part II, 
cit., p. 226. 
. ' 
:,f ! 276oavid w. Ecker, "The Artistic Process as 
Qualitative Problem Solving," Journal of Aesthetic and 
Art Criticism, XXI (Spring, 1963). 
' 1 I 
I 
' ' 
"' artistic intelligence must be one of the 
·::! primary goals of American schools."277 
I ' ,, ,, ' 
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:, : According to this view, the purpose of art educa-
1 1: 1 
tion is to both experience and understand art as a process 
of soiving "qualitative-artistic problems," in order to 
devei~p "qualitative-artistic intelligence."278 McFee 
also, ::kchoes these sentiments in her belief that art 
education for citizens in a democracy should be based 
' , I 
upon a·curriculum that is sufficiently broad enough 
' 
to be:useful for all students. 279 She elaborates on 
' 
this idea with the following statement: 
• '
1 "Art education should prepare a people 
to make aesthetic discriminations, in the 
,,, production, consumption, and use of their 
,11 products,and also in such matters as urban 
' ' 
' development and renewal, housing, and the 
development of artistic symbols found in 
' the environment of daily life. u280 , ,Ii 
,, I 
McFee states further that understanding and dis-
• '• ! . 
crimination in the visual arts is necessary because, in 
a democracy, the environment.can be improved or allowed 
;i I 
277
oavid w. Ecker, "Does Art Educate?" Eastern 
Arts Quarterly, I (September-October, 1962), pp. 
18-1?.: 
,I 278Art Education: The Sixty-fourth Yearbook of 
the National Society for the Study of Education, op. 
cit ... p. 227. 
27 9rbid. 
I I 
I 
280 rbid. 
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' to dec~y, depending upon the knowledge and interests of 
the el~dtorate. 281 This seems to be the underlying thesis 
of her ',hypothesis that one of the major purposes of art 
' ' ' 
is the maintenance of the culture through mutually under-
stood artistic symbols. 282 That is, art, as it exists 
in the ,present conditions of our cities and towns, repre-
sents many periods and copies of periods, in assorted 
states of preservation or decay. The whole expansive 
, I 
face of American expresses values and attitudes through 
' art for~s and their conditions. The art quality ranges 
from the sublime to the odious, and according to McFee, 
students must have qualifying concepts to evaluate the 
entir~ range if they are to make objective aesthetic 
'11' 
discri~inations as citizens in a democracy. 283 
,' In contrast to these aforementioned theories, it 
'' 
has been generally ,is.sumed by institutions of higher edu-
cation, with regard to art instruction, that both artistic 
judgement and art appreciation might best be developed 
: 284 
out of the involvement with the studio aspects of art. 
Recen:t}Y, however, many are educators such as Conant 
281rtiid. 
I' 
282Pappas, op. cit., p. 73. 
, 283Art Education: The Sixty-fourth Yearbook of 
the National Society for the Study of Education, op. cit., 
p. 7 3.: 
' 
1
'
284 Ibid., p. 47. 
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'' 
'I have urged that an emphasis should be placed on both 
appreciation and criticism without the necessary inter-
venti~~iof studio work, even though such work is advisable. 
He suggests further that direct contact with original 
works ?fart, and analysis of such works might better 
fulfii{!the educational potentialities of art. 285 
tion, 
Historically, the assumption has been that educa-
and art education have provided the individual 
; I 
with 'the necessary aesthetic and critical sensibilities 
with which to appreciate art and its inherent character-
, 
istics,'. This assumption has been too easily established. 
If, however, this aesthetic and critical sensibility is 
present' in students and the lay-public, then this thesis 
' ' 
would be redundant. However, according to Kaufman, this 
is not. the case. He cites that our personal environments 
are, for the most part, either down right ugly or depres-
singly drab. He also cites that students generally, have 
not been effectively encouraged in a critical aesthetics 
'' ,, I 
and th'~t previous educational experience has not fully 
developed the necessary refinement of perceptual and 
symbol:~c discrimination, even in the less salutary fashion 
286 of valuing art and beauty. Therefore, it appears that 
1 
285Howard Conant, "The Role of Arts in Education," 
Art Education Bulletin, XVII (May, 1960), pp. 4-14. 
286Irving Kaufman, "The Contexts of Teaching Art," 
in Pappas, op. cit., p. 257 . 
. : I 
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11 
the typtcal college graduate still accepts unc:r;itically, 
h
. h .'. : . 1 . d 1 1 ' 1 . I · 1.s p ~.s1.ca env1.ronmen t an cu tura ml. 1.eu, n<?t car 1.ng 
about ,';impractical" matters. 28 7 Thus, society has main-
I 
tained two very naive ideas, namely, bhat the miniscule 
output 'cif art objects can modify the environment and 
that through psychic osmosis an artistic influence can 
; ., I 
" ' 
be givE!n off by such objects. 288 
1
According to Hoebel, man needs the mirr,ow of the 
arts, ·not only to raise his level of existence, but also, 
for hiJ!survival as a human being. 289 This implies then, 
that one inherits an art culture, which in turn conditions 
' I I 
his "taste':" However, Ducasse states that a "taste" of 
almos:t:,i any sort can be modified and developed by appropr i-
, 
ate and assiduous cultivation. 290 Personal "taste" how-
ever o(ten encounters a problem in constructing a justified 
response to a work of art that is diametrically opposed to 
one's "taste." Frequently, and historically, the art that 
has ~r.p
1
ven most durable is that which has been opposed 
to tl'\e: "taste of the time." 291 Because of this, most 
287 Ibid., p. 258. 
288 Ibid. p. 377. 
289E. Adamson Hoebel, Man and the Primitive world, 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949), p. 
161. ' i I 
290 Ducasse, op. cit., p. 8. 
29lo'Doherty, op. cit., p. 151. 
I: 
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,, 
peopl~,have been far too willing to acquiesce in the view 
!1 : 
I I , , 
that :tl;lere 1.s nothing to be done about artistic "tastes" 
but t?ilenjoy or suffer them. 292 
'· Contemporary speculation is beginning to assert 
that only the systematic building of relevant cognitive 
'' 
and ev~luative maps in .the various contexts of art instruc-
'' I' 
tion,is likely to develop a critical aesthetic sensibility 
to promote the habits and dispositions necessary to count-
,: I 
eract"the purely emotional "taste" appeals made to the 
individual :in a modern mass democracy. That is, unless 
','' 
the pupil, through art education fortifies himself with 
basic·,i ! critical aesthetic disciplines, he will be unpre-
pared; to judge art, or individual forms of propaganda, 
: i I 
whether expressed in debased popular art, or in the 
' ' ' 
pointless posturings of the pseudo-avant-garde. 293 It 
I' 
is with this statement, that we arrive at one of the 
I 
core ptoblems in art education, namely, the assessment 
of th~
1 
!relative worth of the ,wide variety and many faces 
of art, 294 and because the popularity of art among spec-
tators ,
1 
is clearly greater than at any previous period of 
, 'I 
. '· 
, 2 92saw, op. cit., p. 17. 
I 
, 293solon T. Kimball and James E. McClellan, Jr., 
Education and the New America,· (New York: Random House, 
1962) ,; ,pp. 301-303. 
'I 
I ' 294 
Pappas, op. cit., p. 263 . 
• I I 
': 
,; I 
'' I I 
Arneric~n history, 295 it is necessary for distinctions 
to be made between the acceptance of art as a good invest-, ·, 
ment,: ,a_, desirable decoration of a home, or the recognition 
of art: as a serious occupation for even those not espe-: 
296 cially' talented. 
New Objectives 
In order to understand the reasons for stressing 
'I 
the mastery of unifying topics, and for grasping the so-
called structure of such a :subject as art, it is necessary 
to ex'.aJ!1ine briefly, the character of new challenges 
besetting society at this time. It is not only that the 
wise use of abundance and leisure demands a renewal of 
'' the ideals of excellence and self-cultivation, but in 
addition, heightened powers of discrimination and judge-
'I • 
ment are necessary in order to control the streams of 
,: I 
impres'sions that flow incessantly from the mass media. 
Also, the study of art as a source of personalmeaning 
I I 
and value orientation in a technologically interdependent 
society demands greater degrees of aesthetic mastery than 
one g.en'erally observes. 
29 7 In view of this, and also 
I: 
295Art Education: The Sixy-Fourth Yearbook of 
the National Society for the Study of Education, op. cit., 
p. 6 •i : 
296 b' I id., p. 7. 
: I 
297Ralph A. Smith, Aesthetic and Criticism in 
Art Education, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. ,I 1966), p. IX. 
' ' '' 
' ' 
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tradiljional ideals, the need is now being recognized for 
I 
i 
placing renewed emphasis on the nature of significant 
'' 
conteriti in art instruction and on the logical operations 
,1,' 
by mean~ of which content is meaningfully manipulated. 298 
Logical·operations, it is to be understood, are the proces-
ses 'ol:' defining, explaining, evaluating, and conditional 
inferring. 29 9 Lest this should sound trite or too general, 
it should be pointed out that recent studies concerning 
classroom discourse reveal that the level of dialogue 
between instructor and pupil seldom exceeds the level of 
i • ! 
"taste:"1 or so-called "common sense," with the result, that 
opportunities to develop disciplined patterns of thought 
are left unexplored. 300 Research into classroom discourse ,, 
conce:r::
1
riing art is in its infancy, 301 but personal obser-
vation and experience afford a similar conclusion. 
This is also the view of Ralph A. Smith as he 
states" 
"Now, since a work of art is a phenomenon 
I that generates a plethora of puzzling questions, 
298Ibid. 
1 
' ' 
299 B. Othanel Smith, "A Concept of Teaching," 
Language and Concepts in Education, (Chicago: Rand 
McNall~ and Co., 1961). 
: I 300Ibid. 
301Robert D. Clements, "Art Student-Teacher 
Questioning," Studies in Art Education, Vol. VI, No. 1 
(Autumn, 1964). 
I' 
I I 
,'' it is unfortunate to observe teachers and 
pupils failing to structure intelligently, 
',, issues which frustrate one's efforts to 
1 !', understand the nature of art. College 
, ,:, : instruction, for the most part, is deficient. 
': Since the necessary knowledge and linguistic 
skills have not been acquired which would 
render problematic aspects of the concept 
of art more manageable, it is not surprising 
: that high degrees of linguisbic dissonance 
" are recorded in art instruction. n302 
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In lieu of this, art instruction should involve, 
as do ,other realms of instruction, the intelligent use 
of language which in turn entails a careful scrutiny of 
state,ments. This kind of behavior, also a form of "doing" 
or "a:ct!ivity," suggests that there are important verbal 
as well' as nonverbal learning contexts in art education. 
However,, it should not be expected that this necessary 
' 'I 
skill will be cultivated until there is significant 
changes in the art curriculum and in the preparation of 
art x~structors. 30 3 
In addition to having a significant linguistic 
aspect,: art instruction should be a multidimensional ,, 
enterprise in which more is at issue than having pupils 
emul~te artistic behavior. 304 There should be a renewed 
emph~~;~s on self-cultivation, which according to Smith, 
' 
is arilobjective that is currently neglected in art 
'! 
,, 
302Ralph A. Smith, op. cit., p. X. 
JOJibid., p. XII. 
30 4rbid. 
' ,, 
' '' ',,i I 305 education. In addition, connoisseurship should be 
'' 
' ' ,, ' emphasized, which calls for devoting more attention to 
'I• 
> 11 I 
the na~~re of what has been called enlightened prefer-
' 
ence and justification.306 
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New objectives for art instruction further stimu-
I' late questions about the meaning of aesthetic insight, 
or ways of "knowing" other than scientific knowledge, 
namely·perception. 307 Except for the blind, perception 
'' 
of the visual arts would seem to pose no difficult prob-
lems, bµt according to Knobler, few persons with normal 
vision realize how limited their perception really is. 308 
Perception, the awareness of the world about us, is based 
on the.: :information that comes through the senses, and is 
I: I 
all too: often considered a natural, matter-of-fact attri-
bute of the human being. However, according to Knobler; 
. , 309 this is not so. , 
Professor J. Z. Young, an English physiologist, 
has conducted a number of experiments with individuals 
I : i 
305Ralph A. Smith, "Aesthetic Criticilsm: The Method 
of Aesthetic Education," in Pappas, op. cit., p. 405. 
' ' 
: f 
30 6Harry S. Broudy, B. Othanel Smith, and Joe R. 
" ' Burnett, Democracy and Excellence in American Secondary 
Education, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964), p. 
215. l 
1 307Philip H. Phenix, Realms of Meaning, (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1964), p. 142. 
l, 
308Knobler, op. cit., p. 14. 
J0 9Ibid. 
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born bJlind who, in their later years were enabl:ed to see. 
I ,, 
He states that the once-blind person, now physiologically 
normali!does not "see" the world immediately. 
"The patient, on opening his eyes for 
the first time gets little or no enjoyment; 
indeed, he finds the experience painful. He 
reports only a spinning mass of lights and 
! 'colors. He proves to be quite unable to 
pick out objects by sight, to recognize what 
they are, or to name them. He has no concep-
tion of a space with objects in it, although 
,he knows all about objects and their names 
··by touch. 'Of course,' you will say,· 'he 
must take a little time to learn to recog-
nize them by sight.' Not a 'little' time, 
'but a very, very long time, in fact, years. 
His brain has not been trained in the rules 
of seeing. We are not conscious that there 
are any such rules; we think that we see, as 
we say, 'naturally.' But in fact, we have 
learned a whole set of rules from childhood."3lO 
1 1 The experiments by Young suggest that the sensa-
tions one receives have no meaning for the person until 
he is knowledgeable of how to order them into a coherent 
: ' 
perception. To perceive something, requires that the 
observer make a selection of the numerous sensations 
transmitted to him at any one time. 311 Therefore, one 
must be both critical and aesthetically discriminating, 
in selecting those sensations which are significant and 
d . . 
1
d. th h' h . l t 312 iscar ing ose w ic are irre evan. As Young points 
, 310J. z. Young, Doubt and Certainty in Science, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 62. 
311Knobler, op. cit., p. 14. 
312rbid. 
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: ' out, this requi:b.es training. Thus, the untrained observer 
cannot,,.make "sense" out of what he sees before him. 313 
I 
'I ' l, :What is being called for, is new objectives in 
art and art education, that will solicit inquiries into 
the relation of language and the verbalization of con-
' cepts and standards to what is currently considered non-
discur,sive forms of communication and expression, in 
other w~rds, "art. " 
Modes of Criticism 
Qualitative intelligence, critical aesthetics, 
logical operations, and the calling for the verbalization 
of concepts and standards, means the utilization of that 
' 
discip~ine commonly referred to as art criticism. "Crit-
icism" is unquestionably one of the most troublesome terms 
encountered when one refers to discourse relative to art. 
' 
It is sometimes used to refer to any critical statement, 
descriptive or evaluative, uttered about works of art, 
'' 
and at:iother times, it is used to refer only to evalu-
ative assertions. Moreover, the term has either positive 
or nega.tive connotations depending on the mean,ings that 
I' 
that ~ave become attached to it in one's personal 
exper:Lence. 314 In this thesis, the term "art criticism" 
I 
,:• I 313Ibid. 
314 Ralph A. Smith, op. cit., p. 299. 
' I' 
' ' I 11 
, I 
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is intended to imply an aesthetic criticism, that is very ,,, 
much iri1 the same nature as that mode of criticism advo-
cated by: Rosario Assunto, 315 Munroe C. Beardsley, 316 
' 317 318 , . 319 D. W. Gotshalk, Frank Sibley, and Ralph A. Smith. 
·,:The theories regarding aesthetic criticism, as 
proposed by the aforementioned men contain slight vari-
,' 
ations 1, 'but these, are predominantly of a semantic and 
numerical nature. Conceptually, and in regard to intent 
and pu~pose, their theories are very similar and virtually 
identical. According to Gotshalk, aesthetic criticism 
': 
consists of three phases: the "genetic" phase, which 
' is the•study of the factors that shaped the work being 
' ' 
viewed; the "immanent" phase, which is the study of the ,, 
major features of the work; and the "judgement" phase, 
which is the application of a set of relevant standards 
' 
to a work, which does not occur until it has undergone 
: 315Rosario Assunta, "Criticism," Encyclopedia of 
World ,Art, Vol VI (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc.,' 1961), columns 114-118. 
316 Monroe C. Beardsley, Problems in the Philoso-
phy of Criticism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 
Inc., •1958). 
3170. w. Gotshalk, Art and the Social Order, (New 
York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966). 
, 318Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts," from Joseph' 
Margol\s (ed.), Philosophy Looks at the Arts, (New York: 
CharJ,.es Scribner's and Sons, 1962), pp. 77-87. 
, 319Ralph A. Smith, "Aesthetic Criticism: The 
Method •of Aesthetic Education," in Pappas, opl 1' cit., pp. 
404-422. . 
149 
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I 1" ' 11' 
' ,I , ,I 
I 
320 both 't:he "genetic" and "immanent" phases. Gotshalk 
': I 
holds 'that this kind of criticism is more of a suggestive 
I , 
nature,j 'rather than legislative and judicial, and there-
1 ! 
fore, conceived in this manner, criticism can be an 
invaluable aid in appreciation. 321 Beardsley, places 
the practice of aesthetic criticism in a median position 
between the work of art and the discipline of aesthetics 
' 
as copceived as philosophical inquiry. 322 Beardsley, 
distinguishes between three types of critical discourse: 
non-n
1
qrinative, descriptive statements; nonnormative, 
I 
interpretive statements, and evaluative statements.323 
Utilizing this :method, Beardsley believes that there is 
a hierarchy of reasoning in criticism, namely: genetic 
I 
reaso'ning, affective reasoning, and objective reasoning. 324 
325 Beardsl:ey cites objective reasoning as the most relevant. 
That ,is to say, that objective reasons typically single out 
I' 
' characteristics of a work such as unity, complexity, or 
: I 320 , 
. ·, D .. w. Gotshalk, "Explanation, Art Criticism 
and Norms," in Ralph A. Smith, op. cit., p. 301. 
321Ibid., p. 302. 
322Ralph A. Smith, Aesthetics and Criticism in 
Art Education, op. cit., p. 299. 
323 Ibid. 
;::1 324Ibid. 
325
Ibid. 
I ',, 
I '.I 
;·1i 
i !, 
I, 
: I; 
, 1,I 
interis,ity, or some combination of these qualitiies, and 
' ,I i 
that1aJ work of art tends to be aesthetically good or 
·1 j I 
bad :Jct.th respect to its organi-zation, complex'.~ty, or 
\ I ; 
peculi'ar intensity. 326 
' 
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I, 
i 
These two theories are similar but not identical. 
, 
Theref~re, for the sake of 
I 
clarity and understanding, 
further elaboration is needed, and for this purpose Got-
shalk's theory will be utilized. Gotshalk proposed that 
: I 
aesthetic criticism evolved through three phases, the 
genet,i~, 
',I 
h 
, I. 
p ase·is 
' 
the immanent, and the judgement. The genetic 
the study of the factors that have shaped the 
,, 
work of art. That is, the environmental factors such 
as the1physica1 milieu, social needs, traditional influ-
, f• I 
,I j 
ences 1'and others that create the so-called "cultural 
climate" of the artist. 327 
I 
This is also implied by 
' I 
Rosenberg, in which he cites that the first require-
ment of art ~riticism, is, that one be mindful of the 
politjJcal, social, religious,'., philosophic, and moral 
''] I ',, 
influences present during the creation of a particular 
' 
art wo~k, thus establishing its cultural context. 328 
'1 i 
The second, or immanent phase of aesthetic criticism, is 
the study of the major features within the work of art 
,, I 
Pappas,i 
' ' ' 
326 Ibid. 
327Ibid., p. 343. 
32 BRo~enberg, "Critic ism 
op. cit., p. 360. 
and Its in 
f II' 
I :I, 
i' 
':1 
, •,I I 
'p I 
' '' 
: I I 
itselt.: These features are: 
151 
the materials used, forms 
' 
present in the work, mode of expression, and the intended 
' 
func~::i.'&n of the work. 329 The aim is a penetration into 
: .'I , ' : 
the actual intrinsic perceptual properties of the art 
work,, ,because some works are internally less intelli-:, 
gible than others; and often, when one comes to learn 
what ,is actually in them, critical opinions often change 
drama'ti,cally. 330 It is important to note that the first 
two P,hases are conducted apart from evaluation, for that 
is the activity of the judgmental phase. The genetic 
immanJn;t phases prepare the way for the judgmental. They 
characterize the background of a work of art in such a 
way that an objective estimate is possible and that stan-
' I; 
dards:' ,can be applied. 331 These standards must be appro-
priate and relevant. However, they are not genetic or 
immane'rit actualities, but rather ideals. Even though 
the-genetic and immanent phases are subordinate to the 
judgmental, they are simultaneously, necessary and aux-
r ol I 
'I' 
ilia;y·to it, which is the essence of the process. It 
is in:this sense that art criticism is the. fullest 
possibie appraisal of works of art as aesthetic objects 
329 
Ralph A. Smith, Aesthetics and Criticism in 
Art Education, op. cit., p. 344. 
': 33 0ibid. 
331
Ibid. 
I'' 
' ,, 
I I• 
i 
' ' I, 
I' 
I I 
; 1, I 
; 1,: 
according to an 
is criticism in 
I Ii 
I: 
appropriate set of standards.332 This 
t · ·t d" · · I d ar -in-is- istinctive-nature, ,an not 
criti:cism of art-in-its-total-nature with all its rami-
1 
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fications and connections beyond the process o~ aesthetic 
perce;bion. 333 
• Gotshalk' s theory also greatly 
' I 
resembles 
I 
the 
theory ·concerning critical activity offered by.Ralph A. 
Smit~. 3:34 Critical activity, according to Smith, may be 
' 
described in terms of overlapping phases which!contain 
statements ranging from the cognitively certain to the 
! t I 
cogn:ilt'~vely less certain. 335 This critical activity 
involves four phases, namely: description, an~lysis, 
. ' ' d l . 336 h f" t 'h interpretation, an eva uation. Te irs p ase, 
•' I 
description, involves naming, identifying, and·classify-
ing; a kind of taking stock which inventories bognitively 
. I 'I 
establ~shed aspects of a work of art. This category would 
I 
comprise also, art-historical data, and in the· case of 
repre~
1
e;ntational works, knowledge of cultural 
, :1 I 
history, 
I 
I, 
332 rbid., 
333 rbid. 
p. 345. 
I 
' 
i 334Ralph A. Smith, "Aesthetic Criticism: The 
Method of Aesthetic 
404-422. 
Education, " in Pappas, op.: cit., 
335 rbid., p. 413. 
336 rbid. 
pp. 
or 
,, 
I ,1 1 
I 'I' I; 
'' 
1: I 
I,, 
I: ' 
I• ' '' I
whatlc,ver 
depicted. 337 
1· 
I' 
1 · 
is required to identify the subject-matter 
I 
This coincides with Gotshalk's gJnetic 
I 
153 
phase! :and the initial activity of art criticism, as cited 
by Rosenberg. The second phase in Smith's theory is 
that of, analysis. 
'' 
This involves a close look at the 
I 
' components, elements, and details that make up,a work, 
the larger groups or complexes into which they are com-
posed,, ·and the relationships they sustain. 338 I That is, 
the materials used, mode of expression, forms and other 
intri11sic elements are discerned. This is virtually 
i I I 
identical with Gotshalk's immanent phase, with'one 
exception, that of function. Function is included in 
the third phase of Smith's theory which is interpretation. 
1 I I . 
I 
This concern of interpretation is to say something about 
' 
the ~eaning of the work of art as a whole, as ?istinct 
, . . 339 I . 
from any interpretation of its parts. There is an 
I 
I 
important distinction however in this phase·. The 
' 
distinction is that a work is evaluated not inlterms 
I ' 
whether it is 11 good 11 or 11 bad, 11 but rather, it ~s an 
' 
of 
aesthetic evaluation of either sufficiency or deficien-
340 
cy. 
i 
That is, a work may be sufficientl?,7 expressive to 
337 rbid. 
3 38rbid. 
339rbid., p. 415. 
340rbid., p. 417. 
I ,
1 
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l 11' 
I 'I I 
, I 
I: 1:. I ' ;1 I 
l J1 1 
warrarit: aesthetic contemplation, or it may be r'egarded 
as shallow, and insignificant, and thus, not warrant 
, , . 341 
such !contemplation . 
. 11 
Lest it be forgotten, the foregoing only consiti-
tutes what is regarded as a reasonable and acceptable 
descrip'tion of critical activity. Neither does it expli-
citly prescribe content nor procedures for doing criticism. 
Also,: critical phases are distinct from critical procedures 
d t , h. ·1· db h f . 1 ·t· 342 an ec niques uti ize y t e pro essiona cri ic. 
In response to the foregoing theories of Gotshalk 
and Smi
1
th, Sibley, offers an alternative method of cri ti-
cal activity, in which he suggests methods and procedures 
that can be utilized in art instruction. 343 Sibley's 
critfchl activity involves seven processes. Number (1) 
is the, pointing out of nonaesthetic features in a work 
of art'. That is, by indicating one thing, the
1 
learner 
is compelled to direct his attention to something other 
than WAat he is observing. 
' ' 
(2) the pointing out of the 
of the' aesthetic features of a work. (3) the linking 
of rema:t.ks regarding the nonaesthetic and aesthetic 
aspeqts. (4) the utilization of genuine metaphors and 
341
Ibid. 
342rbid., p. 418. 
3 43Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts," in Ralph 
A. Smith, op. cit., pp. 336-339. 
1 •1 155 
',, 
' '' ,I' 
simii':i'.es in descriptive discourse. (5) the utilization 
' . of contrasts and comparisons. (6) the utilization of 
ii,' 
reiteration and repetition. (7) even though it is non-
~erbal, the use of expressive gestures. 344 
Purpqse:s of Criticism 
If there is a legitimate function that schooling 
in cripicism, (in this case aesthetics criticism), can 
'' 
' proviqe; it is, for the person who has practiced this 
activity, analogous to the function of the professional 
guide who conducts the traveler through a foreign city, 
'' 
and points out the important sights. The person schooled 
in criticism should possess an extensive and intimate 
acquaintance with works of art. His faculties will have 
' ' 
become. sensitive through much observation and comparison. 
He wil'l be able to discern facts and differences in works 
'' 
of art which could pass unnoticed by others. It would 
also allow:him to take the untutored "consumer" of art 
upon a'"tour" of a given painting, sculpture, or archi-
tecbural structure, and call to the consumer's attention 
h 'f h h ld h . 1 k 345 t ose eatures tat e wou ot erwise over oo . · 
,1 
" Concepts used in aesthetic discourse, according 
to Sa\\(; direct one's attention to the important features 
'' I;, 
344Ibid. 
345aucasse, op. cit~ p. 8. 
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I, 
: 
of th¢'.'(.Jork being viewed. 346 These features are important 
'' ' 'J, I :, I ' 
in the
1
: ~ense ):hat if they were not noticed, th'e work would 
I ' 
; .. d 347 not b,::,
1
: apprecia t.e . Appreciation includes not only cor-, : :, I 
rect e~aluation, but also complete perception if one is to 
derive;Jesthetic satisfaction from works of art, which Knob-
• I ' 
ler s~~tes is a complex combination of attitudes and percep-
tual a~ilities. 348 This aesthetic satisfaction can be 
': 
analog~\ls to th<> enjoyment of a fine wine. In order to 
' I I 
enjoy th~ wine, one needs only the capacity for "taste." 
However; if one desires to enjoy mot merely the taste of 
'' 
the wine, but also the "fineness" of it, then indeed for 
this helneeds learning, since the pleasure he seeks is not 
the sensuoue pleasure merely, but also the "intellectual" 
\I I . 
' pleasure of recognition, comparison, and judgement. 
Because: the wine he tastes is rare, old, ·and famous the 
I' I 
"connoisseur" derives a keen pleasure, but distinct from 
' I , 
that derived from the taste of the wine by the average 
. . . • 349 
ind1v1d9al • 
. ' 
'iArt criticism can be of great assistance to art 
appreciation, but. should not be considered as a substitute 
I •1 ! 
for ap~ieciation. Criticisr.1, using the means of the stan-
dards of interdimensional competence and of universal 
' ! 
' 
· ,', 346saw, op. cit., p. 197 • 
• , I 
' 1347 rbid. 
, ; 348 
·,1 Knobler, op. cit., p. 5 
'349 
Ducctsse, op. cit., p. 227. 
: I , ,, 
: Iii 
termina~ h
. I 
ac ierement, can separate a vast quantity of 
, I 
those inferior works of art of the popular variety, from ;, I 
I,;, I ( , , , 350 1 
those ,tnat are
1 
more rich in universal values. 1 Such 
jl [ · 1 
inferio~ works often provide agreeable illusions and 
' 
' 
pasti~elto persons who wear sufficiently .heavy aesthetic 
blinkers. It is for this reason that such works can 
' ' 
assist :rn blocking the paths of appreciation. 351 These 
' ' 
' I 
works can overpower the mind and raise a high wall.,, 
'i I . 
between the ma'ss of men, and man's superior artistic 
achieve~ent. The purpose of criticism therefore, is to 
' , I 
reduce::t;he size of this wall, and to keep alive in as 
157 
many as possible the concept of what constitutes· a superior 
work 
·:,' 352 
of
1 
'art. 
" I 
, :In addition, art criticism, of the aesthetic 
type, as proposed in this thesis, can be of considerable 
' ' ! 
use in'artistic creation. 
' ' Although creative activity is.· • I 
I 
based on, a number of factors, it is rarely, if at all, 
' an automatic 
I I 
p,i:-ocess. It also•_,employs reflective guid-
ance. 353: ' An artist may choose subjects not well !>uited 
to his .talents or be unaware of certain possibilities 
'' 
of his' ji:,1eculiar idiom. He may become careless and unknow-
.' 
I 
ingly re·lax his standards, or become puzzled by the general 
il.3 5oRalp1 h A S . th . t 355 ·I • mi , op. Cl.., p. . 
I 
'351Ibid. 
;352Ibii:l. 
I , 
} 53 Ibib., p. 356. 
',' ,, 
I '1' 
'' ' ''' , I, 
. ·: 
' ' 
' '' ' 
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'i 
' I I ' 
direcb.i,on of his growth. Through analysis and criticism 
of specific works of art, he can illumine all these 
things'..1354 If artists refuse to learn from critical 
I 'I I 
I' 
analyse·s of their work, they frequently do learn from 
penet:ra•ting analyses of the works of other artists. 
355 
Furthermore, good criticism can disseminate a body of 
ideas and foster an atmosphere favorable to the artist's 
best ,creative work, by developing a wider and more dis-
crimfnating audience for the arts, which would demand 
the r,elish the best that the artist can create, and 
reject:the conterfeit works of spurious talents. 356 
Finally, art criticism can be of considerable 
use as 1 a source of knowledge. This is particularly 
appare,nt when one remembers the full range of art and 
art criticism that has been aforementioned. These phases 
' clearly, can contribute richly 
the origins and properties of 
to one's knowledge concerning 
357 
a work of art. Although 
the so+e aim of the judgmental and evaluation phases is 
I i I 
not t?'enunciate propositions that are universally valid, 
it can nevertheless formulate estimates of certain dimen-
sionaf 1yalues of works of art which have a general 
354 rbid. 
355 , 
, , I Ibid. , p . 3 5 7 • 
356rbid. 
357rbid. 
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I ':1 
1, 
I ii: 
I I 
l .d. 35& va l. 1.ty. 
: I 
a philcisophy:. 
Therefore, criticism is both a science and 
It is a science in a sense that it is a 
I ' 
'i body :o;~ statements based on experience and capable of 
I' 
verification by competent observers. 359 Criticism is a 
philcis'qphy in the sense that it proceeds in terms of 
broaq ~ssuinptions, and using intelligible direction, 
propoi'es what art should offer human beings. 360 
However, according to Smith, pupils, at least on theoret-
·l 
ical 'gicunds, are presently not required to regard things 
disce.ri-i.ingly. Nor is the student expected to give a, 
explanation of a work'1s merit in terms of a critical 
theory; .. ,361 This is a significant implication, for it 
should'be obvious that knowing how to defend an aesthetic 
>1 
judgewent is a radically different affair than merely 
allowin:g art to elicit personal feeling responses. 36 2 
' Thus,, 'aesthetic criticism and aesthetic evaluation have 
disti,nc'tive aspects in regard to the educational process, 
and both art and art education should be cognizant of them. 363 
i 
This :is' also Jerome Stolnitz' s contention in his work, 
: \ 358rbid. 
359Ibirl. 
360Ibid. 
36libid., p. XII. 
362Ibid. 
,: ' 363Jerome stolnitz, "The Educative Function of 
1' 
Criticism," in Ralph A. Smit.h, p. 365. 
': 
'' ' ' ,, 
I 
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"The Educative Function of Criticism," in which he cites that 
"! I 
' ' ' 
ther~ 
10
.is an educational function in criticism, and that 
' ' H I function is the improvement of one's aesthetic percep-
'I ,, 
tion. ,3:64 Criticism, therefore, should make aesthetic ,, 
, 'J, I 
percep~ion more discriminating. It should enable one to 
see what had not been previously. It should give one 
' ' ;: i ' 
a sense of the works "aesthetic intention" so that no 
illegitimate demands are made on it. 365 Therefore, ,, I 
' I 
the edricative function of criticism is not simply to 
impar~!knowledge, but directly and indirectly, it instructs 
percep~ion, thought, feeling, and imagination, so that 
'I , 
I I b ' one can, o serve a work of art more sympathetically and 
k . l 366 h' . . , nowi_ng, y. , T is view regarding the educative pur:-
,' I I 
'I 
pose of: criticism is also held by Stuart Hampshire, as 
' 
he states: 
' I 
"One engages in aesthetic discussion 
, 1 for the sake of what one might see on the 
:' I way. , . if one has been brought to see 
•what there is to be seen in the object, 
'the purpose of discussion has been achieved 
: , . , . The point is ~9 bring people to 
': see these features. 113 
• 1 I 364 ' 
, I Jerome Stolnitz, "The Educative Function 
Criticism," in Ralph A. Smith, Ibid., p. 365;, 
' ' 
, I 365 Ibid. 
'I 
! 366 Ibid. 
I 
of 
• ,, I 6 
',' 3 7stuart 
in Wil,liam Elton, 
Blackwell, 1954), 
'i: i 
Hampshire, 
Aesthetics 
p. 165. 
"Logic and Appreciation," 
and Language, (Oxford: 
'' 
I 
. 'I 
' . . ' ' 
I I!' 
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Thus, aesthetic criticism is educative in its 
, I 
own way. But, "the common reader," the person who takes 
: Ii 
some 
1
t,~terest in art and wants to increase his ·interest, 
must'take responsibility also, for criticism in itself 
is not sufficient. It is no substitute for direct aes-
' 
thetic• !awareness. According to Stolnitz, criticism is 
I 
educative, only in its end product, felt aesthetic experi-
ence, and when the percipient makes the effort of aesthetic 
368 atte~tion and sympathy. 
This calling for an aesthetic criticism, and the 
' ' reasons thereof, is summarized quite adequately by the 
following quote by Lucian: 
'' 
"A work of art requires an intelligent 
spectator, who must go beyond the pleasure 
of the eyes to express a judgement, ~g~ to 
argue the reasons for what he sees." 
More than any other group, instructors of art 
and art education can direct students in the practice of 
careful aesthetic judgement, in frank, thoughtful self-
I 
expr~~sion, and in honest and humane feeling. According 
to Beck, careful aesthetic judgement can circumscribe 
"kitsch," and that education for thoughtful self-expression 
I ii I 
will d~crease the numbers of the incoherent, that honest 
, · 
368Je~ome Stolnitz, "The Educative Function of 
Cri tic'ism," · in Ralph A. Smith, op. cit., p. 368:. 
' '' 
369L . . "t 404 ucian, in Pappas, op. ci ., p. . 
'' ' 162 
will increasingly replace conformity, and compas-
'J•) 
. 'I I f 1· sionate ee ing 
: 1, I . 
cruelities that , I 
: I 
will stand against the extension of those 
are mirrored by the new imagists in art. 370 
' i 
· i 370Robert H. Beck, "The Social Background of Art 
Educat·:llon," in Art Education: The Sixty-Fourth Yearbook 
of the' !National Society of the Study of Education, Part II, 
op. cit., p. 10. 
' " 
'; I,, 
': I 
i 
' ' 
' 
Chapter 9 
ROLE OF THE ART CURRICULUM IN 
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
r ' I 
"Visual Arts", 
'I 
'I 
In the beginning of this thesis, it was noted 
that,~bth "ar~" and "fine art" were sometimes used in a 
, I 
narrow sense that excluded architecture, music, and litera-, ' 
ture.· This was termed the "visual aesthetic" sense of 
' I "art':'',,and "fine art." "Art" when used in this sense, and 
I I 
used alone is popular because of its brevity, as in "art 
school)" "artihistory," or "art museum." College ·art 
departments d~sire it because it puts their subject at 
the ~'~Jd of alphabetical lists. 371 In popular usage, the 
, l 
term, ",cirt" does no great harm, but in a technical dis-
, ,•1 
cussiori it was found unwise to use "art" alone in this 
narro~lsense.: It was also noted, that the visual arts 
were iredominantly excluded from the Greek's "arts of 
. i . 
the Mu'ses," pushing out two of the original occupants, 
• I 
' 
music'cind literature. Also, it was noted that the restric-
I 
tion oi the concept of "fine art" to a few visual arts 
, ·. I 
was ari: \historical accident. 
• i I 
It ma~ be remembered that the concept of "fine 
' 
art 11 ~duld be:interpreted in a narrow visual sense or a 
. : I 
,:; I 371Munro, 
cit., p. 132. 
I 
1,;1 
The Arts and Their Interrelafions, op. 
163 
' . 
I. 
' I' 
' 
'' 
, 'I 
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i: I I . ' ' . broad aesthetic sense, which implied an antithesis as to 
' 
those arts that were "fine" and those that were "useful." 
; :: i 
Therefore, the. first proposal for the institution of 
I,' I 
higher education is to set an example in terms of defi-
' ' 
nition and classification, and utilize the term "visual 
' 
arts 11 l 1.ihstead of "fine arts." It should be used instead 
of "art," alone when "visual art" is meant, as in college 
, I 
catalogues. Restricting the term "art" to visual arts 
I I 
involr,es a sharp separation from music and literature. 
: '' 
It may be argued that music and literature are visual 
arts,: ih the s'ense that musical notes, phrases, etc. , 
can be perceived by the eye, thus "read," but they are 
also a~ditory, when words are read aloud or spoken, and when 
' '' 
writt~~· notes are played on musical instruments. This 
is us~ally covered by calling them, "combined," "mixed," 
' 
or "audio-visual" arts.372 
• Ii I 
An Alternative Course of Study 
' 
'! It has been noted previously, by; McFee, 373 Green-, 
B74 , 375 376 . 377 
berg, 0 Doherty, Munro, He1.lbroner, , and 
op. 
op. 
, 372 Ibid. 
: 
'373June King McFee, Preparation for Art, op. cit., p. 33. 
, 374c1ement Greenbert, Art and Culture, op. cit., p. 5. 
: i I 375Brian O'Doherty, Object and Idea, op·. cit., p. 14. 
I 
·376Thomas Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelations, 
cit., p. 106. 
'! 377Robert L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers, 
cii.tl, p. 31. 
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Tejera~ :37 that technology has created basic value con-
flicts betweeh art in American society, and one's environ-
; I ' I . 
13 7·9 h' l d . k . l . f b . ment., I It as resu te in ma ing 1 e a su stitute 
· I 300 
for art, and art a substitute for life. It has 
tended to rembve the more purely utilitarian pursuits 
j: I j: . 381 
from .the fielci of "art" as historically conceived. 
All ~hi:s, in furn, has resulted in a situation where the 
av.er~g~: laymar has little or no consciousness of the per-
vasiveness of! art in their lives. Art has, to a large 
I extent·, been regarded as a frivolous waste of time and 
I I L. 
impractical. 3182 Accordingly, as cited by Heilbroner, this 
separation of! art and technology, and art and life is mir-
rore~. :i:n the [curriculum construction of the institution 
: I I I 
of h±g~er education. 383 . ' 
_, 
1 
Illusftrating Heilbroner's contention, is the 
curriculum construction in art in general education, .,which 
I 
' ' 
presents the !following alternatives: (a) basic sbudfuo 
cour~e~ invo~ving painting, drawing, design, sculpture, 
I 
op. 
378v~ctorino Tejera, Art and Human Intelligence, 
cit., p. 1199. 
. '' 
: l I 37 9McFee, op. cit., p. 33. 
1 
38Oo•looherty, op. cit., p. 14. 
381Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelations, op. cit. 
I
. 
; I 382Tejera, op. cit., p. 199. 
383 I. 
Heilbroner, op. cit., p. 31. 
,, ,, 
'' 
' 
tUi and .,.e
1 
crafts; (bl historical art survey courses and 
art ~pP,reciat~on courses; (c) a humanities course in 
which: Hisual,l .musical, and verbal arts are related and 
prese;n.ted in a sociological context. In this general 
scheme, it 
sion ;JJde, 
is important to note that there is no provi-
in a general context of courses, for helping 
166 
the student in developing an awareness of the visual arts 
' I 
in his limmedi~te environment and helping him to become 
more ls~1nsitivl to the dynamics by which they operate. 
i ',; Ronalb Silverman and Vincent Lanier have also 
recogr.;zed thfis inadequacy in the art curriculum, and . . I 
prop9s~ that i'1 fourth course or series of courses b"? 
offerec,. The courses are primarily verbal, but often 
(';: 
maniEJul:ative, 1 a.nd attempt to describe the ramifications 
of tl~e ,visual/ arts in today's world. 384 They offer the 
' I I 
follow~ng as lthe content of such a course: 
' I ' ' . 
, 1. Art in the home: '~xamining the aspects of 
the pupil's home in which visual aesthetic 
jhdgements are made, and discovering ways 
ih which these judgements can reflect a 
h~igher degree of understanding of the 
m;echanics of art. 
I 2. 
i I 
Art in the community: investigating archi-
t1ectural, industrial, and commercial-art 
p~oducts and activities existing in the 
1bcal community. 
I 
I 
I•' 1 384Robert Silv,erman and Vincent Lanier, "Art for 
the Adolescen1t;·" Art Education: The Sixty-Fourth Yearbook 
of the, ·Nation'al S_o_c_ir. e--,-t-y~f~o-r-""'t .... h-e-~s""'t-u-d""'y--o~f,.....,E=d..,,...u_c_a_t,......1_0_n_,_o_p ___ _ 
cit. r, Pi· 122. 
'' 
3. Art in communications: analyzing the art 
abpects of cinema, television, and printed 
m'aterials. 
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I 4 I · 1· · . . h t f . Art in po itics: reviewing t e ex ent o 
ahd the means for presenting political state-
mknts in prints, cartoons, paintings, and 
sbulpture. 
! I s. i · · 1 . th d Art as a vocation: exp oring e scope an 
n~ture of oc~~~ational possibilities in the 
v,isual arts. 
I 
' 
Thus,! the second proposal for institutions of 
I 
high~r
1 
;educatlion would be the development of a course or . . I 
series of cou!ses, very much in similar construction, 
' I' I 
and int:ent and purpose as that proposed by Silverman and 
I 
Lanier:. 
Core C : . 11 urr icu :um 
. I 
Earli
1
er in the thesis, it was pointed out that 
the cu:i)ricul+ content in the liberal arts college varies 
i I i I' 
consid~rably .I It was noted th~t the history and appreci-
i 
ation of painting, sculpture, and architecture are some-
: I 
times .i:nclud~d in the liberal arts curriculum. However, , I 
they are seldom required and often omitted entirely. 386 
i 
Only the lite1rature is always included. The facts make 
:; i I 
the de·gree, Bachelor or Master of Arts, seem a misnomer 
. . I 
for those who understand "art" in an aesthetic sense; 
for ~tudents 1
1
can secure these degrees and"·know little or 
i I 
: 385 IJid., p. 123. 
<, I 386MJ:p.ro, The Arts and Their Interrelations, op. 
cit.,' ,~. 53. 
I ' 
i 
nothing, about iart. "Liberal arts" is still understood 
in the medieval way, in that it involves some work in 
math~ma:tics a~d some science, but usually not enough to 
' I
' 
k f h . 1 1 'b . 387 ma e one aware o t eir cu tura contri ution. 
Using 1the term "humanities" for clarification, 
' 
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is o~ 'very lilttle assistance. It may include work in 
the visual arlts, but that is not always implied. 388 Both 
terms, "liber~l arts" and "humanities" can be construed 
to include moire or less of science, and more or less of 
art. ·More a)~ more, "humanities" are being understood 
as distinct fJrom physical or natural science and mathe-.. , 
ma tics; as thj~ study of human nature, society, and 
culture. 
389 
!sociology and Psychology are sometimes 
included, butl · often the humanities are regarded as anti-
thetical to alll science, and restricted to scholarship 
f 
0
1 · I: d h . 390 o a iteraryl ,an aest etic sort. 
HoweJer, the term "liberal arts" carries with 
it the connoJdtion from medieval days; that is, the "fine" 
arts separate/d from the "applied" arts, that is, the lat-
ter are pracJical, and the former only worth while in 
I 
' 388L. 
1
oudley and A. Faricy, op. cit., p. 3. 
cit., 
389 
, Munro, 
p. 54. ,i 
390Ib~d. 
The Arts and Their Interrelations, op. 
,1 
i 
I' 
1, 
, I 
' ' 
;Therefore, because of this disparity, we 
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I' ' arrive1at the third proposal. The third proposal is that 
: I I 
, ' I ' instit1:1tions
1
of higher education should replace the liberal 
arts,:or gen~ral education curriculum with a new core cur-
• 1 I ricu um, emphasizing the 
I 
arts and sciences. Current 
I I 
thin~ing . lh. int is regard, 
I 
is reflected in the curriculum 
: 
changes which have been adopted by Harvard University, 
. ; I 
to commence in the fall semester, 1978. Harvard Univer-
1 
I 
sity has decided to replace its general education program, 
I 
that h'as beeri in existence since 1945, with a new "core 
I I 
curric
0
ulum." ' This curriculum, has as its purpose, the 
specia~ emphasis of the 
: ' 
I I . 
to empnasize :five areas 
'i I 
arts and sciences. 
in particular: (1) 
It is designed 
art, (2) his-
tory,· ,·(:3) soe,;ial and philosophic analysis, (4) literature, 
(5) 
I ' 
sci1ence a-:nd mathematics. Their rationale for this is: 
"to 
, , I ; 
ha1/e students acquire a basic literacy in major forms 
'I 
f . l . . ,,391 o intel ectual discourse. 
;1 I ; 
Aestheit'.ic Cri,ticism in Curriculum 
That the nature of art is complex is axiomatic, 
and ' ' I hardly bears 
I I I 
repetition. That art is an open system, 
tmpredictable; anu. unforeseeable, is being hammered homP 
' ' 
with re~ularity by artists. The presence of alternative 
'' i i 
aesthetic theories, ant'. the absence of a viable unified 
, 39 :;_"Harvard Weighs Reform of Educational Curriculum," 
The Chroniclelof Higher Education, March 6, 19~8, Volume XVI 
No. 2_) J?· 1. . -
: 
' ' 
I 
I 
'' 
I 
' ' \ I 
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',, 
theory,· has baffled and amused artists, has pl~gued aes-
; 1 I 
thetic:i!ans, art critics, and art educators. However, all 
' I I 
these Jroups .are engaged in the utilization of ·:theories 
: I I 
' I ' 392 
and criticisnl, to varying degrees. In a sen'se, the 
' ' ' ' : . 
artist needs lthe fewest theories. He makes his works, 
'' 
' and it: 'is the aesthetician' s task to see whether his 
i :• I 
theories pro8erly account for the qualities in the works. 
I' : 1' 
' ' The ~f!~orts 4f the critic hinge on applying appropriate 
criteria to Jorks of art. The art historian, even the 
I 
one who rest~icts his task to description, is following 
a particular mode of empiricism. The art educator cannot 
avoid, theory,· because he must be guided by it; hence, he 
' 
must s:ynthesize the knowledge in art of the artist, and , : I 
the knowledge of art of the aesthetician, the critic, 
and the art ~istorian. 
Art education and the art curriculum, in terms 
I 
of its.construction have been anchored almost entirely 
' ' ' 
in 
< : : 
reJ.Jation to the artist, that is, studio art courses, 
: : I : 
and only slightly in relation to the art historian, that 
is, art histtjry survey courses. The art curriculum, 
accor~+ng to Barkan is faltering, because we have not 
learne4 to use aesthetics and criticism, nor do we 
' ' 
prop~~fy use[the art historian.393 
., ' 
' ' I 
1 392A'seminar in Art Education for Research and , . I 
Curr·iculum Development, The Pennsylvania State University, 
Edward L. Matt1.l, dI°rector, 1966, p. 243. 
393Ibid. 
' '. 
' i 
' I, 171 
I. 
I 
! ' 
According to Barken, the artist can afford to 
be skeptical lof theory, but not the instructor of art; 
f l h1 I t k . . h . t d 'I f or w a ever s epticism t e art instruc or er~ves rom 
•,, I I 
I ' I I 394 
the artist, operates to the detriment of his instructor. 
' ' I I 
According to 1Stephen Pepper: 
i 
I 
i ' : "Utter skepticism, . , turns out to be a species of dogmatism. When a man declares, 
., , 'nothing is known at all, ' he does not 
I 
1 seem Ito be committing himself to any cognitive 
'! resp6nsiblity. He seems to be playing safe and 
reli~ving:1himself of all demands for evidence. 
Actually, he is just as responsible as if he 
declared, 'I know all things and their nature 
is such and such.' He must produce evidence 
for his sweeping denial of the trustworthiness 
of evidence; otherwise, ~~5re is no reason to 
accept his declaration." 
, · Therefore, according to Barkan, art curriculum 
I ' I 
will 1c~ntinue, to falter until we accept a respo'nsibility 
, , I 
for rationali;ty. 396 
' Excur.sions into the historical transformations 
I 
of tl"\e, '.curric'ulum goals in art education illustrate 
, I 
the absence of the tradition ojj studio art from art edu-
' I I 
' cation:.1 This' has led to the bifurcation between practices 
' 
in the field 
1
:of art in the culture and in art instruction. 397 
394Manuel Barkan, "Curriculum Problems in Art 
Education," A Seminar in Art Education for Research and 
Curriculum Development, op. cit., p. 243. 
' ' '! 
'1 I 
I '1 ! 
I 
'' 
l 
395st~phen 
I 
396Ma'nuel 
Pepper, in Edward Matti!, Ibid. 
Barkan, in Edward L. Matti!, Ibid. 
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I' 
This problem in art education is a major concern of 
,, I : 
EdmundiFeldman. According to Feldman, the pril!lary goal 
of art: educaJion should be to confront students with 
:• I 
unending queitions about human meanings in their own 
' 
1 398 life-centered problems. This was also the essential 
premi$~ of silverman and Lanier. If such a quest were 
' : ' 
pursued, art instruction would lead to an education in 
, : I 
' I ' 
humanistic in'quiry. The art educator would ask: "Do 
' ' 
' I 
we fa·shion ou:r instructional mate±ial around such important 
I 
and ex!==,iting 
1
questions as the life of man in cities, in 
I 
neighborhoods, in domestic dwellings, and in public 
buildings? D~es the world of industrial design1, package 
I 
design',1 and product design, enter into art insttuction 
. . I . II • h ld h . I in any systematic way? This sou ave important 
: 
' implications tor the art education curriculum in colleges 
I 
and universities, if, the nature of our culture is reflected . ' 
I 
in the 9ualit~ of the things we use and produce, em stated 
by McFe~. 399 
' ' 
! • ' ,; Implied in this conception of curriculum structure, 
is the ~eed to reconceive the meaning of the work "activity" 
in the ~omenclature of art education. The idea of activity 
as inquiry-moving activity would no longer be restricted 
I ! 
to studio production activities as the primary moving 
' 'I I 
'I 
., , 398 l 
Ed!jlund Feldman, in Edward L. Matti!, Ibid. 
I 
399Mc~ee, op. cit., p. 19. 
: ' 
,, 
' I' 
' ' ' ''' 
I, 
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: i' I I 
I ii 
acti".t½ies fo
1
r inquiry in and about art. Rather, activi-
' I I• 
ties a'ssociat'.ed with critical and historical analysis 
I , I 
woulq
1
1:jecome jduly recognized and consciously ut:,ilized for 
I' 
their:rdoving .powers. There would then be an array of 
differe,nt kin'ds of inquiry-moving activities such as: 
paintiWg, scu
0
Iptur ing, examining, 
· d . I'\ 1 . d .. JU ging, eva uating, an writing. 
comparing, describing, 
' ' 
: ; i There'fore, we arrive at the fourth proposal for . 
. : I . ·
1 
f h" h d . . d t the institution o ig ere ucation, in regar s o art 
and art education. The fourth proposal is, that art 
I : 
departments should attempt to seek a structural relation-
, ' ! 
ship between the components of studio art (production), 
and art· survey courses (history), by including aesthetic 
'I: 
criti~ism in the curriculum content. If this were 
attempted, then the curriculum content components would 
b , d .\ e: pro uction, 
, I 
' ' 
scholars in a±:-t, 
; 
criticism, and history. The professional 
the artists, the critics, and the histori-
ans w~uld then be the models for inquiry, because of the 
, Ir , 
•,I I 
kind of 1 human:meaning questions they ask relative to art 
and li!fe. Their particular ways of conceiving and acting 
, I 
on the~e questions are the kinds of questions and ways 
I 
of acting that art instruction should seek to teach stu-
dents,. ': The a:ttist and critic would serve as models for 
' ' '' I', I I 
quest.ions that could be asked about contemporary life. 
The historian would serve as a model for questions that 
174 
might be asked about art and life in other times, other 
societies, and other cultures in order to illuminate the 
meaning of the past for a better understanding of the 
present. Thus, the role of criticism would be that of 
an integrating force between the currently polarized 
components of studio art and art history, both separate 
and apart from art education. Art as an organized field 
of study, according to Wold and Hastie, has maintained 
two distinct and yet inseparable bodies of knowledge. 
One, relates to the creation of artistic forms, the doing 
or making of art; the other, gaining an historical retro-
spect of what has been made or done. However little has 
been done in relation to critical analysis of works of 
art, that is, looking and making qualitative judgements 
about it, whether it be high art, popular art, or other-
. 400 
wise. 
There is some evidence to support the claim that 
art education in the past has taken the cue for direction 
of its efforts from the prevailing values of the moment 
in the general education enterprise. 401 Previously, '·'· 
there was a preoccupation with individual psychology 
400 stanley G. Wold and w. Reid Hastie, "From 
Research and Theory to Teaching Practice," Art Education 
The Sixty-Fourth Yearbood of the National Society for 
the Study of Education, op. cit., p. 337. 
401rbid., p. 334. 
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and art for personality integration. 402 In the past ten 
years'however, the primary accent upon art has been for 
development of self-expression and a general creativeness. 
Now there is evidence that the modd is changing as art 
instruction becomes centered upon the "refinement of the 
capacity for aesthetic response and expression" through 
intellectual understanding as well as making works of 
art.403 
However, art and aesthetic criticism should hot 
be dismissed as an academic and educational gambit. The 
question should not be whether this kind of material 
should be taught, but rather, to what extent will it pro-
mote one's aesthetic development. Aesthetic development 
generally implies: (a) the improvement of taste through 
refined perception, (bl the improvement of the standards 
by which taste is justified, and (cl the quality and 
quantity of subjective enjoyment and satisfaction derived 
from art objects. 404 
Therefore, because some of the propositions in 
both art theory and art criticism have cognitive status, 
both could be the means for safeguarding the body politic 
402 rbid. 
403 rbid. 
404 
Harry S. Broudy, in Ralph A. smith, Aesthetics 
and Criticism in Art Education, in Ralph A. smith, op. cit. 
p. 41. 
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f . lf 405 rom .1-tse . Just as science is society's defense 
against distortions of intellect by prejudice and special 
interests, so high cultivation in art is society's defense 
against undisciplined feeling swayed by parochial inter-
d 1 .. d . 406 ests,an imite experience. If art does indeed make 
some connection with reality, i.e., with the import 
0f life, then art education and art criticism at a high 
level is as essential to individual development and social 
health as in science and industry. 407 
The field of art education and art criticism, in 
the aesthetic sense, as proposed, should concern itself 
with educating people for greater control and understanding 
of those visual-timages termed art. It has involved edu-
cation in studio practice as well as education in art 
history, but also should concern itself with a critical 
study of art (to include architecture and design). It 
should, therefore, according to Hausman, educate,,for 
knowledge, understanding, and application of aesthetic 
d . · · h · 1 , . 408 imensions int e visua forms of ones experiences. 
Aesthetic criticism, through aesthetic education may be 
construed as a special form of value education. It may 
405 Ibid., p. 43. 
4 06Ibid. 
4 07Ibid., p. 44. 
408Jerome 
in Art Education: 
p. 28. 
J. Hausman, in George Pappas, Concepts 
An Anthology of Current Issues, op. cit., 
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be described as having enlightened beholding in the 
aesthetic domain of human experience as its principal 
aim. Beholding is enlightened whenever a response or 
judgement is grounded or justified by relevant criteria, 
and this implies a learner who goes beyond sensuous 
pleasure to express judgements and give reasons for what 
he sees. 4o9 
If it is true, that individuals are more likely 
to see reality through the images of art than they are 
by attending to reality itself, then ways must be found 
to understand the proper place of art and its effects in 
human life, because the messages in art are less than 
explicit. 410 Therefore, because of distortions and 
ambiguities, the untutored mind will fail to understood 
the relevance of many works of art. Furthermore, art is 
nothing, if it is not persuasive enough to seduce the 
1 . . . f d 1 f 1 . 411 popu us into accepting its arms as mo es or emu ation. 
Furthermore, the effects of art can be either facilitating 
or inhibiting to human thought and aspiration. 412 Thus, 
409Ralph A. Smith, in George Pappas, Ibid., p. 406. 
41 0Jacques Barzun, The House of Intellect, (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 17. 
411George Steiner, Language and Science, (New York: 
Atheneum, 1967), p. 10. 
412wilbur Schramm (ed.). The Effects of Television 
on Children and Adolescents, (New York: UNESCO, 1964). 
decisions about the meanings and import of works of art 
. 413 
have practical consequences, and in a democratic 
society, such problems are best dealt with by educating 
a large portion of people to enlightened and objective 
judgement in the aesthetic domain. 414 
This objective and critical aesthetic judgement 
is especially important in our advanced technological 
society, for man has been traditionally been called a 
culture producer, and claimed the title, "Homo Faber:" 
178 
the maker of tools and images. But with continued advances 
in technology and science, he assumes a more critical 
function, and of, "Homo Arbiter Formae:" man the maker 
f h . d . . 415 o est etic ecisions. 
413Ralph A. Smith, in George Pappas, Concepts 
·in Art Education: An Anthology of Current Issues, op. 
cit., p. 407'. 
414Ralph A. Smith, in George Pappas, Ibid. 
415Jack Burnam, in George Pappas, Ibid., p. 385. 
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